Essays in European integration and economic inequalities by Kadow, Alexander
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Kadow, Alexander (2012) Essays in European integration and economic 
inequalities. PhD thesis. 
 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/3403/ 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 Essays in European integration
and economic inequalities
Alexander Hendrik Kadow
submitted in fulﬁlment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
College of Social Sciences
Business School
Economics
University of Glasgow
May 2012Thesis Advisers: Professor Ronald MacDonald
Professor Campbell Leith
Examination Committee: Dr. Alexander Kovalenkov
Professor Charles Nolan
Professor Hassan MolanaAn meine Eltern für ihre fortwährende UnterstützungAbstract
The ongoing process of economic integration in Europe and beyond has
already led to profound changes that are likely to manifest themselves fur-
ther. Within Europe, formerly centrally planned economies have joined the
European Union (EU) with the intention to ultimately introduce the com-
mon currency. On a more global scale, marginalised farmers in developing
countries seek to become integrated in the world trading system to lift them-
selves out of poverty. However, issues surrounding economic inequalities are
no longer exclusively conﬁned to emerging economies. Indeed, awareness of
income inequalities and their impact on the domestic economy is increas-
ing among industrialised nations. This dissertation seeks to contribute to
these topical debates in the form of three self-contained essays. The ﬁrst
essay is concerned with monetary integration in Europe. More speciﬁcally,
we consider the EU member countries from Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE) that seek to adopt the euro in the foreseeable future. Our analysis
is based on a global VAR (GVAR) model to investigate to what extent cen-
tral banks in CEE follow the European Central Bank’s lead. We look in
another core chapter at the economic implications of the Fair Trade (FT)
movement. This is a fairly novel topic to the economics profession and we
thus aim to provide intuitive insights. One of the key elements of our trade
model is that FT generates and hinges upon economic inequalities. We com-
bine these two aspects in the third core chapter. In particular, we analyse
how monetary policy operates in an environment which is characterised by
wage inequalities using a New Keynesian model that features heterogeneous
labour. The third essay is motivated by the case of the United States, where,
similar to many European countries, there is strong empirical evidence for
rising internal economic divergence. Overall, the thesis not only combines
and investigates topical issues, it moreover does so employing various tech-
niques with the intention to also make contributions on the methodological
level. We conclude the monograph by highlighting policy implications and
by providing directions for future research.Contents
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Introduction
1.1 Scope of analysis
Economic policymakers all over the world are confronted with a whole range
of challenges these days. Economies in the eurozone, for example, are trying
to address some of the structural issues that have become increasingly ob-
vious in their monetary union. On a more global level, many countries need
to deal with rising degrees of poverty and inequalities. Emerging economies
seek to obtain a larger share of the pie that is being created and distributed
through global trade, whilst industrialised nations such as the United King-
dom (UK) or the United States (U.S.) experience fractures within their
societies caused by economic inequalities that have hitherto been largely
unnoticed.
It is not clear at this stage what kind of answers will be formulated to
these and other economic issues and how eﬀective they might be. The ap-
proach taken thus far can succinctly be characterised as allowing for and fos-
tering integration. The idea is that for instance integrated ﬁnancial markets
increase liquidity which amid lower capital costs should eventually foster
eﬃciency and economic growth. Moreover, in a truly integrated monetary
union that is characterised by synchronised business cycles, responses to
monetary innovations should be transmitted in a more homogeneous fash-
ion such that indeed “one size” should ﬁt all members. On the real side,
the opening up of borders for cross-border labour ﬂows should allow for a
more eﬃcient matching process and thus allow for a gradual equalisation of
international wages and lower unemployment.
Overall, there are – at least in theory – tangible beneﬁts to a higher
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degree of economic convergence and indeed European integration as well as
globalisation (i.e. the integration and convergence of markets on a global
level) are processes that have been evolving over several decades, if not
centuries. In particular intra-European economic policies have been charac-
terised by a strong desire to foster integration. The European Union (EU)
of today is the result of a process that began more than half a century ago
with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community and that ﬁ-
nally culminated via the creation of a single market in a monetary union.
While political motives such as ensuring lasting peace and stability were
important drivers of the European integration process, it would have most
likely not sustained without a suﬃcient degree of economic performance and
convergence (also see Pinder and Usherwood (2007) for a brief non-technical
overview). Particularly the euro as common currency was thought to accel-
erate this process. The jury is still out, however, as to whether countries
would not have been better oﬀ without a single monetary policy stance. Re-
cent research suggests (see for example Deutsche Bundesbank (2011)) that
imbalances in terms of trade persist which adds to the prevailing doubts
concerning economic coherence in the eurozone at the current stage. But
there is arguably also an extra-European dimension in that only a united
Europe is likely to remain inﬂuential in a globalising world that is increas-
ingly being shaped by emerging economies. Indeed, recent ﬁgures suggest
that for example growth in EU outward foreign direct investment (FDI) in
Russia rose by 82% and in Singapore by 54% (Eurostat, 2011b). Similarly,
Brazil has become the EU’s ninth most important global trading partner
according to current data and more than one out ten goods as share of
EU gross domestic product (GDP) are traded outside the union (Eurostat,
2011a).
Convergence processes such as European integration or more generally
globalisation are of a rather long-term nature and it would be hard to ar-
gue that any of them have been “completed” – let alone that there would
exist any such clearly deﬁnable end point to each of them. As such, poli-
cymakers face continuous challenges whose nature is bound to change over
time. Economic integration has been considered a necessity in its own right
throughout the Great Moderation. Financial, commodity and in part also
labour markets have been liberalised and several formerly centrally planned
economies from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have become full EU
members. With the Crisis of 2008, however, the notion of integration has
become more nuanced. Countries seek to ﬁnd the right mix of policy regu-
lation and coordination both in the monetary and real sphere. AlternativeChapter 1. Introduction 15
forms of trade between the extremes of free markets and protectionism
are becoming increasingly popular internationally. Moreover, distributional
aspects are more and more being recognised and addressed. Imbalances
both within and across countries are being assessed and policymakers have
started to realise that their actions might have asymmetric eﬀects across
economic agents who diﬀer in crucial characteristics.
This changing nature is reﬂected in the present monograph. The objec-
tive is to investigate some of the prevailing aspects pertaining to integration
but also economic inequalities both on a European and global level. Inte-
gration and inequalities can occur on diﬀerent markets (ﬁnancial markets,
labour markets, etc.) and on diﬀerent levels (e.g. between or within coun-
tries) and it would be impossible to do justice to all of these aspects within
the framework set by a doctoral dissertation. We shall therefore focus on
three distinct aspects in particular:
1. the degree of integration of money markets between Central and East-
ern European markets and the euro area
2. the impact of the Fair Trade movement in industrialised countries on
the developing world
3. the eﬀects of monetary policy in an environment that is characterised
by economic inequalities
These topics form the backbone of the present monograph and are inves-
tigated in the following three core chapters in an essay-style manner. All
of the core chapters are self-contained and seek to shed light on topical is-
sues and economic debates. They intend to explore diﬀerent aspects in an
original way, using a variety of methodological approaches. It goes without
saying that the investigation into each of these matters merits a further
analysis on its own, and we shall therefore point out potential extensions in
our concluding remarks in Chapter 5.
1.2 Overall theme and contribution
The overall theme that re-occurs throughout the core chapters is that of
European integration and economic inequalities. European integra-
tion is hereby understood as a rather broad term that has both intra- and
extra-European elements. The inner-EU part refers to internal integrationChapter 1. Introduction 16
processes, where we in particular focus on monetary integration in the en-
larging euro area. Extra-EU facets relate in this context to the links with the
rest of the world (ROW). Those links exist both with the emerging as well
as the industrialised part of the ROW. Convergence through global trade
is becoming increasingly important for the EU as a whole as recent ﬁgures
suggest (Eurostat, 2011a). Whilst openness is thought to be an important
driver of integration, it is equally the case that socio-economic imbalances
that have traditionally been more associated with Anglo-Saxon economies
are more and more aﬀecting the EU at its core (Goos and Manning, 2009).
It might seem odd at ﬁrst sight to consider aspects pertaining to integration
and inequalities jointly in one study. However, the notion of asymmetries
and imbalances as part of globalisation and European integration are be-
coming ever more apparent to economic policymakers (Smaghi, 2011). An
important contribution with regards to contents and topic of this study is
therefore to highlight the close relationship between inequalities and inte-
gration.
   
 ROW
 EU
Developing
world
Industrialised
world
CEE Eurozone Ch. 2
(monetary)
Ch. 3
(real)
Ch. 4
(interaction)
Figure 1.1: Links between core chapters
Figure 1.1 illustrates the emphasis of each of the core chapters as part
of the overall theme. On a most general level, the dissertation considers
the interplay between two blocs: the EU and the ROW. The EU itself isChapter 1. Introduction 17
split in Chapter 2 into eurozone and non-eurozone countries (more speciﬁ-
cally countries from CEE). This Chapter analyses the degree of monetary
integration between these two components. Chapter 3 considers the grow-
ing link between the EU as a whole (especially including the UK) and the
developing world through the Fair Trade (FT) movement. This Chapter is
thus purely concerned with real factors. In the ﬁnal core chapter, Chapter
4, we investigate the interplay between monetary and real factors. In partic-
ular, we consider the conduct of monetary policy in an environment that is
characterised by economic inequalities. This particular study is motivated
by the case of the US, where economic inequalities are rather pronounced.
However, there is also a link going back from the industrialised part of the
ROW to the EU (as indicated by the arrows in the Figure) to reﬂect the
increasing evidence for socio-economic imbalances in countries such as the
UK or Germany.
Whilst Chapter 2 considers integration, the FT chapter also highlights
problems with inequalities which indeed can arise through integration. Eco-
nomic inequalities are here stated in terms of real wage inequalities. The
scope is gradually widened in the ﬁnal core chapter, in which we re-introduce
monetary policy into the analysis and allow for additional forms of economic
inequalities (in terms of consumption and wealth). In contrast to the trade
chapter, however, the economy is closed and we consider a segmented do-
mestic labour market that is characterised by heterogeneous input factors.
When referring to the notion of economic inequalities, it is important to
stress that those are conceptualised here in terms of relative measures. This
is done by considering aggregates (i.e. FT vs. non-FT sector or skilled vs.
unskilled labour) which has the methodological advantage of increased the-
oretical transparency and tractability. In more empirical settings, of course,
one would like to measure inequalities in terms of distributions.1 Indeed,
diﬀerent policy implications arise depending on the speciﬁc percentiles con-
sidered of the, say, income distribution as we illustrate in Section 4.2.
As the OECD (2012) notes (also see this report for further references and
stylised facts), economic inequalities are no longer conﬁned to developing
countries. The comparatively weak growth performance of industrialised
economies over the last few years, particularly in the EU, has been accom-
panied by growing social problems (such as dual labour markets or rising
youth unemployment in many European countries). It is thus not so much
the level of inequalities but the rate at which those are increasing that
1However, also in many descriptive studies single aggregate measures, most notably
the well-known Gini coeﬃcient, prevail.Chapter 1. Introduction 18
poses challenges to policymakers. Inequality in the EU as a whole has risen
because income convergence among EU countries has not oﬀset growing in-
come inequality within countries (Fredriksen, 2012). Regardless of whether
one considers emerging or industrialised economies, however, the overriding
policy implications are the same: Boost the accumulation of human cap-
ital and make educational outcomes less dependent on social background.
Those factors combined with a reduction of dualism and an enhanced inte-
gration of immigrants describe a set of policies that could potentially lead
to an increase of GDP per capita and may reduce income inequality in the
long run (Koske et al., 2012).
Clearly, questions pertaining to European integration but also more gen-
erally economic inequalities have received increased attention lately. We
address some of these issues in three self-contained chapters. Whilst the
essays can be read independently from each other, they are centred around
a common theme. Taken together, all core chapters seek to analyse and
to raise awareness for topical economic issues and are hence likely to spur
further research.
1.3 Research questions and motivation
Since all core chapters stand on their own feet and have their own distinct
institutional background, we provide extensive background information as
part of the individual pieces. We nevertheless want to highlight in this
Section the main motivation for each of the essays in turn and raise the
research questions we seek to answer.
Chapter 2 is set very much in the tone of the EU Eastern enlargement
which – at least several years ago – was regarded as a milestone in the
process of European integration. Transition economies from CEE were and
are, unlike countries such as the UK or Denmark, required by the Treaty on
European Community to eventually join the European Economic and Mon-
etary Union (EMU). Given their relatively small economic weight and close
links with the euro area, those economies may be considered as being rather
keen to become part of EMU soon. If this was the case, signs of integration
should become apparent over a longer time horizon. Indeed, there are a
number of studies (Dickinson and Mullineux (2001); Schadler et al. (2005))
that analyse the convergence of banking sectors and exchange rates in the
formerly centrally planned economies, highlighting their challenges in the
gradual transition phase towards the euro area. Building on Kadow (2011),Chapter 1. Introduction 19
we develop in this Chapter the so-called Euro Dominance Hypothesis (EDH)
to test for monetary integration in the enlarging eurozone.
The EDH seeks to translate the well-known German Dominance Hy-
pothesis (GDH) into today’s institutional environment. The GDH claimed
that German Bundesbank policies were transmitted into other European
Monetary System (EMS) interest rates during the pre-euro area. The issue
of German monetary leadership in the EMS has been investigated empiri-
cally by several authors (Fratianni and von Hagen (1990); MacDonald and
Taylor (1991) amongst others) – overall with inconclusive empirical evi-
dence, however. The lack of a clear-cut picture probably also arose because
of the limitations of econometric advancement at that time. Particularly
the notion of cointegration was not well established and often not tested for
at all. Moreover, the institutional environment has changed. The original
notion of German Dominance referred to the alleged contradiction between
the symmetry of monetary policy adjustments the EMS had been designed
for and the claim that the Bundesbank was dictating its monetary policy
to other members’ central banks. With the creation of the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB), however, the eurozone as monetary system by deﬁnition
became symmetric if we are willing to abstract from internal governance
issues. We therefore seek to oﬀer in this Chapter an upgrade to the GDH
on both the methodological as well as the institutional level. We reformu-
late the GDH in terms of the current eurozone and non-eurozone countries
that are on the brink of joining. Using cointegration techniques, we analyse
to what extent there is a co-movement of short-term interest rates between
the euro area and the CEE countries and how those are aﬀected by (global)
monetary shocks.
Chapter 3 turns to the economic eﬀects of the Fair Trade (FT) concept.
This grassroots consumer movement has received relatively little attention
in the economic literature thus far, which is rather surprising given its grow-
ing importance. According to latest ﬁgures, consumption of products cer-
tiﬁed by FT organisations more than doubled between 2000-2005 (Krier,
2005). Europe forms the centre of the movement and coﬀee, the ﬁrst prod-
uct to be FT-certiﬁed, its backbone (Hira and Ferrie, 2006). In a nutshell,
the FT concept seeks to establish a direct relationship between ethically-
minded end-consumers, who for altruistic reasons pay higher prices, and
marginalised producers in developing countries. Whilst there are many as-
pects surrounding FT, we single out in this Chapter the economic eﬀects of
the so-called FT premium which we capture by a wage diﬀerential between
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alised countries for several reasons; one being the empowerment it gives to
consumers in the North to express political views (say, a lowering of trade
barriers) directly through their shopping trolley. Buying FT products is
thus in line with rational behaviour and, on a more general level, reﬂects
Adam Smith’s writings on the co-existence of benevolence and self-interest
(Ashraf et al., 2005).
The Chapter intends to provide theoretical underpinnings to the FT
concept. We augment the benchmark Ricardian trade model by the exis-
tence of FT. Our model features three goods (FT good, non-FT good and
numeraire good), where the FT good is only produced in South and only
consumed in North. Labour is homogeneous but the FT sector diﬀers from
the non-FT sector in the prevailing working conditions, which in the pres-
ence of rationing gives rise to inequalities. We moreover investigate the
welfare implications of FT. Is the fair wage oﬀered in the FT-sector indeed
welfare-enhancing as commonly claimed by supporters of FT? We elaborate
in particular on Leclair (2002)’s claim that this form of alternative trade
only supports one set of producers at the expense of others. We deliberately
strive to provide closed-form solutions for greater analytical tractability and
intuition.
Chapter 4 considers the relationship between monetary policy and eco-
nomic inequalities over the business cycle. It appears increasingly important
in the light of the recent Crisis to understand distributional eﬀects of mon-
etary policy and this Chapter intends to make a ﬁrst step in that direction.
Given the potency of monetary policy to steer the macroeconomy and given
the increasing degree of economic inequalities throughout the industrialised
world, it seems natural to ask if monetary policy is a suitable as well as fea-
sible tool to tackle those inequalities. Indeed, this argument lies at the heart
of Rajan (2010)’s analysis of the root causes of the Crisis beyond the usual
immediate drivers such as global imbalances, weak ﬁnancial regulation and
excessive risk-taking. He conjectures that fractures within the U.S. society
caused by rising levels of economic inequalities have created increasing po-
litical pressure to provide a quick remedy for the poor without tackling the
structural problems at its roots. Instead of redistributing income, Rajan
(2010) argues, the emphasis was on low-income lending with the intention
to boost consumption in the short run. The longer-term dynamics under-
lying rising income inequalities were thus countered by short-run measures
and we ask what role monetary policy as rather blunt tool could possibly
have in supporting those aims.
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(NK) model by the presence of heterogeneous labour and incomplete ﬁ-
nancial markets. Distinguishing two sets of households who diﬀer ex-ante
in their skill levels (skilled vs. unskilled) introduces the notion of relativi-
ties in key macroeconomic variables such as consumption, real wages and
wealth. This distinction is in line with stylised facts for many major in-
dustrialised countries like the U.S. as reported by Goldin and Katz (2008)
and Heathcote et al. (2010) amongst others. The conventional monetary
policy design problem is thus augmented by the presence of relative vari-
ables that matter next to absolute magnitudes. A rise in the ratios pro-
vides a natural measure of increasing inequalities and we investigate how
economic inequalities evolve over the business cycle in a rule-based envi-
ronment. The general equilibrium perspective moreover permits analysing
the optimal monetary policy response (from a welfare-theoretic point of
view) in the presence of heterogeneous households. Our framework is able
to address several research questions: Are there asymmetric eﬀects across
households in response to aggregate shocks? But also, is it desirable for a
monetary authority to introduce asymmetries into the conduct of monetary
policy (i.e. assigning relatively stronger importance to one set of household
over the other) over the business cycle as means of mitigating the suﬀerings
arising from economic inequalities? To the best of our knowledge, the is-
sue of economic inequalities and its relationship to monetary policy has not
been investigated from this angle thus far.
1.4 Methods of investigation
Reﬂecting the various angles from which we study the subject matter, the
analysis in this thesis makes use of both empirical and theoretical methods,
depending on the ﬁt to the relevant research question. Whilst it is diﬃcult
to draw a clear line between microeconomic and macroeconomic theory, the
methodological approach in this dissertation is clearly more biased towards
the latter one. Thus, as should be expected from a thorough work on
macroeconomic issues, the dissertation considers real as well as monetary
aspects from both a short-run and long-run perspective, and the methods
of investigation are chosen accordingly.
Table 1.1 provides an overview of the employed methodologies and shows
how those can be allocated across the core chapters. As common in main-
stream macroeconomic theory, we diﬀerentiate methods by their time span
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equilibrium they refer to (reduced form vs. more structural and general
equilibrium approaches), degree of uncertainty (deterministic vs. stochas-
tic) and the overriding economic environment (closed vs. open system).
Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4
time span long run short run short run
time dimension dynamic static dynamic
equ. type reduced form general equ. general equ.
degree of uncertainty stochastic deterministic stochastic
economic environment multi-country two-country closed economy
Table 1.1: Classiﬁcation of methodologies
Chapter 2 adopts a dynamic time series perspective. We want to inves-
tigate convergence processes which from an economic perspective may be
thought of as being described by a long-run equilibrium. The counterpart
to the notion of long-run equilibria in econometrics can be found in the
idea of cointegration and it is exactly this correspondence that has led to
the popularity of cointegration techniques in economics. Loosely speaking,
cointegration implies that non-stationary variables are linked through some
long-run relationship that is stationary (for I(1) series) in levels. Of course,
it is per se not obvious why certain variables should be linked through an
equilibrium relationship over time and any cointegration study that is typ-
ically framed in reduced form thus needs to be supported by a convincing
economic storyline. Sims (1980) pioneered in the analysis of unrestricted
and structural vector autoregressive (VAR) models which emphasise sta-
tistical ﬁt over theoretical consistency. However, it has become common
knowledge nowadays that ﬁrst-diﬀerenced VAR speciﬁcations of I(1) vari-
ables are mis-speciﬁed if there exists a cointegrating relationship between
two or more of the series which led to the development of the cointegrated
VAR (CVAR) (see Johansen (1995) in particular).
We test for monetary convergence between EMU and CEE countries us-
ing a rather novel global vector-error correcting modelling approach (Global
VAR, or GVAR in short). GVAR modelling (Pesaran et al. (2004); Dees
et al. (2007)) may be considered an attempt to unite more data-driven Euro-
pean approaches with the more theory-driven American view on economet-
rics in that some variables are considered as structurally exogenous based
on theoretical considerations. This approach is therefore in particular suit-
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assumption of foreign prices is plausible. Moreover, unlike conventional vec-
tor error-correcting systems, the GVAR procedure ﬁrst considers country-
speciﬁc models, before turning to the global system that comprises all coun-
tries jointly. This procedure allows for richer dynamic speciﬁcations and a
more eﬃcient analysis of macroeconomic data, particularly over short time
periods as is the case for the EU Eastern enlargement.
Chapter 3 utilises static trade-theoretic arguments to analyse FT. More
speciﬁcally, we augment the benchmark Ricardian trade model whose notion
of comparative advantage and emphasis on relative technological diﬀerences
arguably constitutes some of the most elementary yet powerful concepts as
motivation for the study of international trade. International trade models
may be considered the discipline’s showcase for general equilibrium con-
cepts and in particular the basic Ricardian model stands out in its elegance,
merely requiring the most minimal set-up. After all, any economy can be
characterised by its existing technology, factor endowments and household
preferences. These components together with certain behavioural assump-
tions about economic agents describe a complete economic model that can
be used to analyse a particular economic question. In the benchmark Ricar-
dian trade model, there is one representative household in each of the two
countries who inelastically supplies labour, the only input factor, to per-
fectly competitive ﬁrms. Based on the counterfactual idea of both countries
opening up to perfectly free trade, specialisation patterns arise in line with
the prevailing comparative advantage. As a result, general equilibrium out-
comes are driven by households’ preferences and ﬁrms’ technologies, where
a ﬁctitious Walrasian auctioneer clears all markets at all times which allows
for an endogenous determination of all prices.
Our FT model augments this benchmark setting in two dimensions.
First, there are three goods, whereas the FT-good is produced only in de-
veloping South and exclusively consumed in developed North. This rations,
given ﬁxed expenditure shares, employment in the FT-sector. Second, those
workers who are part of the FT sector are better oﬀ compared to the non-FT
sectors. Thus, whilst there are other (more long-run) aspects of FT such
as technology transfer or capacity building, we focus on the the economic
implications of the so-called FT premium, which is arguably the best-known
feature of FT to “FT laymen”. By the FT premium we essentially refer to
the social premium which the FT organisations oﬀer to the certiﬁed farm-
ers and their communities. This set-up permits investigating the impact of
the increasingly popular FT movement in industrialised countries on FT-
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Whilst the FT Chapter is very much in the (neo)-classical spirit, the
ﬁnal core chapter, Chapter 4, is of the so-called NK type. This implies
the presence of imperfect competition and price stickiness. NK models are
typically seen as a monetary extension to the real business cycle (RBC)
literature which considers dynamic economies subject to stochastic ﬂuctua-
tions and under endogenous household labour supply. These type of models
currently constitute the mainstream approach to analysing macroeconomic
policy eﬀects and are typically categorised under the dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) heading. It should be noted, however, that
DSGE models cover wide-ranging aspects and several variants emphasising
diﬀerent features co-exist, showing further developments compared to the
initial research stages as summarised in the contributions in the volume
edited by Cooley (1995).
We extend in this Chapter the benchmark NK model (Clarida et al.
(1999); Galí (2003)) that has evolved as the workhorse for monetary pol-
icy analysis to investigate the relationship between monetary policy and
economic inequalities. In particular, we allow for the presence of hetero-
geneous labour diﬀerentiating between skilled vis-à-vis unskilled workers.
Moreover, ﬁnancial markets are incomplete and subject to transaction costs.
DSGE models based on rational expectations have come under increased
scrutiny lately (see Arestis and Sawyer (2008) for example) and the pur-
poses they have been constructed for thus far might not have reﬂected more
recent developments on both labour and ﬁnancial markets. Nevertheless,
DSGE approaches feature model-consistent behaviour (hereby more closely
relating to aggregates) and have micro-foundations that add to the frame-
work’s consistency and allow for a transparent investigation of welfare ef-
fects. Our model does address some of the methodological shortcomings
typically brought forward in that it relaxes the notion of a single represen-
tative household and features a form of ﬁnancial frictions.
Depending on the models used, we employ diﬀerent computational tech-
niques. Relationships in chapter 2 are estimated using maximum likelihood.
The FT model is solved with pen and paper. The NK economy is anal-
ysed using perturbation methods. Eﬀects in the more theoretical models in
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1.5 Thesis structure
The present monograph is structured as follows. This introductory chapter
is followed by the main analysis in the form of the three self-contained core
chapters. Chapter 2 investigates the EDH from a cointegration perspective.
This work was presented at the SGPE conference in 2010. Chapter 3 turns
to the economic eﬀects of FT. The analysis was presented at the SGPE
conference in 2011 and the 2011 EEA conference in Oslo. Chapter 4 analyses
the link between monetary policy and economic inequalities. A previous
version was presented at the Departmental PhD workshops in 2011. Finally,
Chapter 5 provides an overall conclusion to the thesis, summarising and
highlighting policy implications as well as providing directions for further
research.Chapter 2
Does the euro dominate Central
and Eastern European money
markets?
Chapter Summary
The so-called German Dominance Hypothesis (GDH) claimed
that Bundesbank policies were transmitted into other European Mon-
etary System (EMS) interest rates during the pre-euro era. We
reformulate this hypothesis for the Central and Eastern European
(CEE) countries that are on the verge of accessing the eurozone. We
test this “Euro Dominance Hypothesis (EDH)” in a novel way us-
ing a global vector autoregressive (GVAR) approach that combines
country-speciﬁc error correction models in a global system. We ﬁnd
that euro area monetary policies are transmitted into CEE money
market rates which provides evidence for monetary integration be-
tween the eurozone and CEE countries. Our framework also allows
for introducing global monetary shocks to provide at least tentative
empirical evidence regarding the eﬀects of the recent ﬁnancial crisis
on monetary integration in Europe.
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2.1 Introduction
Long before the introduction of a single European currency, the notion of
potential asymmetries within the European Monetary System (EMS) star-
tled a debate both between academics and central bankers. The claim was
that other members’ central banks surrendered their monetary sovereignty
to the German Bundesbank by mimicking German monetary policies with
an eye towards keeping their domestic currency values stable vis-à-vis the
Deutschmark (DM).
This so-called German Dominance Hypothesis (henceforth GDH) has
received considerable attention in the empirical exchange rate literature.
Whilst monetary economic theory provides arguments in favour of an asym-
metric monetary system (Barro and Gordon (1983); Giavazzi and Pagano
(1988)), conclusive and robust empirical evidence on the validity of the
GDH is rather scant. The econometric approach used to test the GDH was
typically based on short-run nominal money market rates and identiﬁed
asymmetries in the EMS using Granger causality tests. The monetary sys-
tem was considered asymmetric in the strict sense if there was evidence for
unidirectional causality from German money market rates to the other EMS
members (Uctum, 1999). Several authors (Katsimbris and Miller (1993);
Hassapis et al. (1999)) added an extra-European dimension and tested how
monetary innovations from the rest of the world (ROW), proxied by the
US, were transmitted into the EMS. International asymmetry in this con-
text implied that the ROW only aﬀected the other EMS countries through
its impact on German money market rates. German Dominance would then
only be fulﬁlled if both forms of asymmetry could not be rejected simulta-
neously.
German monetary leadership in the EMS has been investigated empiri-
cally by a number of authors. Fratianni and von Hagen (1990), von Hagen
and Fratianni (1990) and de Grauwe (1989), for example, ﬁnd no statistical
evidence for the notion of German Dominance (at least not in the strong
form of unidirectional causality). Their results rather support the idea of
multidirectional linkages within the EMS, attributing the Bundesbank an
important, yet not dominant, role. Karfakis and Moschos (1990), on the
other hand, fail to reject the GDH.1 Using a bivariate set-up, they conclude
that German interest rates Granger-cause other EMS members’ rates.
We believe, however, that previous empirical results on the GDH should
1Giavazzi and Giovanni (1987) and MacDonald and Taylor (1991) are amongst others
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be taken with a pinch of salt due to several limitations in the econometric
methodology employed at that time. In particular, the notion of cointe-
gration was not well established and often not tested for at all. Commonly
used vector autoregressive (VAR) speciﬁcations in ﬁrst diﬀerences are hence
likely to yield biased estimates. Also, Granger causality tests suﬀer from a
timing problem since they are unable to distinguish between the short run
and the long run. These issues are addressed properly by Kirchgässner and
Wolters (1993). They formulate and test the GDH in a multivariate cointe-
gration framework and ﬁnd evidence for German Dominance by imposing
appropriate restrictions on loading coeﬃcients and the cointegrating vector.
The original GDH debate was essentially couched in terms of the loss of
monetary independence (a cost). The notion of German Dominance referred
to the alleged contradiction between the symmetry of monetary policy ad-
justments the design of the EMS had intended and the claim that the Bun-
desbank was dictating its monetary policy to other members’ central banks,
hereby turning the EMS into a “Greater DM Area”. In today’s institutional
environment of a still enlarging eurozone, however, the alternative notion
of monetary integration (arguably a beneﬁt) seems more appropriate.2
Indeed, the institutional environment in Europe has changed fundamen-
tally since the earlier tests of the GDH with the creation of a European
Economic Monetary Union (EMU) and the creation of the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB). Whereas the empirical evidence on German Dominance
in the pre-euro era (and the loss of monetary autonomy of national central
banks to the Bundesbank) remains a matter of debate, the ECB nowadays
acts as the single legal body that is ultimately in charge of monetary policy-
making for the whole euro area. The eurozone as monetary system is hence
by deﬁnition symmetric, if we are willing to abstract from governance is-
sues within the ECB. The question of greater cooperation of national central
banks as opposed to following a hegemonic player no longer applies in the
absence of the “N −1 problem”.3 For countries outside EMU, however, the
case is not as clear cut. Whilst potential ECB leadership may be desirable
from a convergence perspective, it may equally be problematic in the face
of domestic or global shocks over a shorter horizon. This also raises the
question of the transmission of EMU-wide shocks to those countries.
The main contribution of this Chapter consists in reformulating the
GDH in terms of the current eurozone and non-eurozone countries that are
2Estonia was the latest country to introduce the euro in 2011.
3See Fratianni and von Hagen (1992) for a lucid discussion of the cooperative versus
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on the brink of accession; that is, we introduce the so-called Euro Dom-
inance Hypothesis (henceforth EDH). Our monetary convergence analysis
focuses on the transitional economies from Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE) for several reasons. First, the process of European integration re-
ceived a fresh impetus with the eastern enlargement of the European Union
(EU). This, in turn, revitalised research into issues such as the endogeneity
of optimum currency areas, the potentially increasing heterogeneity in mon-
etary policy transmission channels or the impact on movements of goods,
capital and labour across borders.4 Second, unlike countries such as the
United Kingdom or Denmark, the Treaty on European Community requires
newly-joining EU member states to eventually introduce the euro. Out of
the original ten CEE member countries only Slovenia (in 2007), Slovakia
(in 2009) and Estonia (in 2011) so far have complied with the Maastricht
convergence criteria on a lasting basis which allowed them to introduce the
euro. The CEE countries which yet need to become part of the euro area
are in alphabetical order: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland and Romania.5 European monetary integration is in this
study deﬁned as a gradual and dynamic process of interest rate convergence
with the eurozone that culminates in the introduction of the euro as sin-
gle currency. This implies that national central banks irrevocably ﬁx their
national currencies to the euro at some predetermined rate and hand over
their monetary autonomy to the ECB. Although national central banks can
still inﬂuence the decision making within the ECB, implementing monetary
policies independently to stabilise the domestic economy will then no longer
be possible.
The current situation of CEE countries outside the eurozone trying to
bring their domestic monetary policy stance and currencies more in line
with the ECB policies bears similarities with the EMS situation. In the 80’s
and 90’s the DM and the Bundesbank were considered the major currency
and, respectively, the “leading” central bank within the EMS. The DM was
widely used outside Germany – particularly in CEE. About 30-40% of the
currency in circulation was held abroad according to a Bundesbank study
(Seitz, 1995). A similar degree of currency substitution for the euro can also
be identiﬁed in some CEE economies (Dvorsky et al., 2008). Both the ECB
and Bundesbank, moreover, share a similar constitution. The GDH was
4See for instance Angeloni et al. (2005) or de Grauwe and Mélitz (2005) for a further
discussion.
5Given the time span considered, our analysis also includes Estonia as one of the
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generally motivated by the credible low-inﬂation path of the Bundesbank,
which the ECB intends to continue. Given these historical and institutional
similarities, it seems natural to consider the euro and the ECB as a contin-
uation of the DM and the Bundesbank, respectively, and to upgrade models
developed for the analysis of interest rate linkages within EMS to today’s
environment.
Our testing framework not only oﬀers an upgrade in the institutional
dimension but also at the methodological level. While reduced form spec-
iﬁcations such as the vector error correction model (VECM) employed by
Kirchgässner and Wolters (1993) may be considered theory-averse, large-
scale macroeconometric models are by their very nature computationally in-
tense and are thus typically only developed by major policy institutions. We
test for monetary convergence between EMU and non-EMU countries us-
ing a rather novel global vector-error correcting modelling approach (Global
VAR; henceforth GVAR) due to Pesaran et al. (2004) and furthered by Dees
et al. (2007).
GVAR modelling may be considered an attempt to unite more data-
driven European approaches with the more theory-driven American take on
econometrics.6 In contrast to cointegrated systems as advanced, most no-
tably, by Johansen (1995), some variables are treated as structurally exoge-
nous based on theoretical considerations. This procedure allows for richer
dynamic speciﬁcations and a more eﬃcient analysis of macroeconomic data,
particularly for relatively short time periods (Pesaran et al., 2000).
The GVAR approach seems to be particularly suitable for the case of
small open economies, where it is plausible to assume that variables such
as foreign prices are exogenous. Loosely speaking, variables are consid-
ered weakly exogenous in this context if they only aﬀect domestic variables
contemporaneously but are not aﬀected by domestic deviations from the
long-run equilibrium. Granger and Lin (1995) refer to weakly exogenous
variables as long-run forcing in the presence of cointegration and as such
this notion is very much diﬀerent from Granger causality which commonly
framed the empirical investigation of the GDH.
While the GDH suggested that the Bundesbank dominated monetary
policies in the EMS, our version of the EDH implies that the ECB now takes
up a similar role in the enlarging E(M)U. The GVAR approach allows for a
coherent formulation of the EDH: it fully exploits the information set and at
the same time reﬂects the structural underpinnings of monetary integration
6Also see Hoover et al. (2008) and the references therein for a discussion on this
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in Europe. We also investigate to what extent the EDH testing results are
sensitive to the prevailing exchange rate regime in the CEE countries. More
speciﬁcally, it will be interesting to see whether the EDH not only applies
to countries such as Bulgaria, Estonia or Lithuania which have adopted a
unilateral currency board arrangement with the euro but also to explicit
inﬂation targeters such as Poland or the Czech Republic.
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 discusses and compares
in more detail alternative ways of formulating the EDH. We present the data
and test the EDH in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 investigates how the ﬁndings
on Euro Dominance are aﬀected by global shocks. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Formulating the EDH
2.2.1 The EDH in terms of Granger causality
There are diﬀerent ways of translating the concept of Euro Dominance into
econometric terms. Early contributions to the German Dominance debate
tended to be ﬂawed essentially in two dimensions. First, the GDH was
typically formulated in terms of so-called Granger causality tests without
properly accounting for cointegration. Second, the GDH was usually tested
within a restricted information set, looking only at pairs of countries at a
time without considering multiple-equation systems. If the axiom of correct
speciﬁcation gave us reason to believe that the Data Generating Process
(DGP) is indeed driven by bivariate systems, the standard unrestricted
VAR(p) model of order p in ﬁrst diﬀerences for a particular CEE country
and EMU would look as follows:
"
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where Φdt represents a matrix of deterministic terms such as impulse dum-
mies and a constant and εt is assumed to be i.i.d. – independent and iden-
tically distributed. This speciﬁcation obviously neglects the possibility that
integrated stochastic processes may be linked through a stationary linear
relationship; but it would be straightforward to restrict (2.1) accordingly.
We shall ignore cointegration for now in line with the early literature
on the GDH and formulate the EDH in terms of Granger causality tests
(Granger, 1969). This simpliﬁes testing for asymmetries considerably be-
cause Granger causality tests simply ask whether the knowledge of one series
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Granger causality tests are thus purely a matter of precedence and infor-
mation content. Unlike weak exogeneity tests which refer to parameters
of interest, Granger (non-)causality is a property of the DGP, capturing a
relationship between variables. If there was unidirectional causality, that is
changes in euro area rates were aﬀecting money markets in CEE, we should
be able to reject the following null hypothesis
H0 : π12,k = 0 (2.2)
against the alternative H1 that at least one π12,k 6= 0. Next to Euro De-
pendence, we could also test whether the ECB is acting independently of
innovations arising in CEE by considering
H0 : π21,k = 0 (2.3)
against the alternative that at least one π12,k 6= 0. Accepting (2.3) and si-
multaneously rejecting (2.2) would establish evidence for Euro Dominance
in what we may call a “strong form”. This set of hypotheses could be easily
investigated using Wald-type of tests based on an F-distribution (Lütke-
pohl, 1991).
Somewhat curiously, the literature tended to impose unidirectional causal-
ity only without considering multilateral relations.7 There is, however, a
more fundamental problem with formulating any form of dominance hy-
pothesis in terms of Granger causality: Even when testing for cointegration
and allowing for feedback relations, Granger causality tests suﬀer from a
“timing problem” in that they fail to distinguish between short-run and
long-run causality.8 We would suspect, after all, that the presumed fol-
lowers may want to deviate from the leader’s decisions for some time, say
reacting to domestic shocks, whilst at the same time maintaining a long-run
path of convergence.
2.2.2 The EDH in terms of a VECM
Kirchgässner and Wolters (1993) were the ﬁrst to properly account for coin-
tegration by formulating the GDH in terms of a VECM which combines
short-run deviations with long-run equilibrium co-movements in a multiple-
equation setting. We could follow their approach and write in the presence
7von Hagen and Fratianni (1990) provide a more comprehensive framework which
does account for international asymmetries and multilateral realtion with all hypotheses
stated in terms of Granger causality tests, however.
8One solution to this would be resorting to causality tests in the frequency domain
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of cointegration the reduced form VECM(p) of order p for the N countries
as
∆Rt = Φdt + αβ
0Rt−1 +
p−1 X
k=1
Πk∆Rt−k + εt, (2.4)
where εt is a N-dimensional zero mean white noise process with positive def-
inite covariance matrix and Φ includes deterministic terms such as dummies
and Rt contains the domestic nominal interest rate series. The parameter
matrices α and β are of dimension (N ×r) with r representing the number
of cointegrating relations. This framework arguably is more ﬂexible than
(2.1) as it not only encompasses the unrestricted VAR but also allows for
a coherent modelling of both short-run and long-run relations. Economi-
cally speaking, the latter ones may be understood as describing a long-run
equilibrium and it is precisely this link between statistics and economic
theory which makes error-correcting modelling appealing. It is well-known
that the VECM is a restricted VAR in that it adds the cointegration space
Γ = αβ0 which identiﬁes the long-term integration process: β quantiﬁes the
cointegrating relations and α contains the loading coeﬃcients which attach
weights to the long-run equilibrium relations. The short-run interest rate
dynamics are described by Π. The VECM is thus sometimes referred to as
Cointegrated VAR (CVAR) and obviously nests the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced VAR.
European monetary integration was earlier deﬁned as a process that
has both short-term and long-term aspects. We assume for the remainder
that all CEE countries have the intention to join EMU over the long run,
given the absence of an opt-out clause. A natural way to identify Euro
Dominance is therefore to analyse convergence in terms of Γ. In reference
to Kirchgässner and Wolters (1993), the EDH may be thought of consisting
of four hypotheses:
(I) CEE Dependence:
Interest rates are linked with the euro area in the long run. Provided
these linkages really exist, central banks in CEE are inﬂuenced by the
ECB’s course over a longer horizon in their preparations for joining
the euro.
(II) Euro Independence:
The ECB acts independently from the new member states’ central
banks. Interest rate decisions in CEE have no eﬀect on the euro area
and hence the entire adjustment towards equilibrium is driven by the
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(III) CEE Insularity:
There are no spill-over eﬀects between CEE countries. The individual
long-run relation with the euro zone is solely driven by the respective
country (and potentially the euro area); other CEE economies do not
aﬀect this process.
(IV) Global Insularity:
Monetary innovations arising outside Europe have no direct impact
on the equilibrium, but are only transmitted indirectly via the ECB.
We cannot reject the EDH in its strong form, if we ﬁnd evidence for CEE
Dependence and Euro Independence. As these conditions impose a rather
hierarchical one-sided relationship, Condition (III) is meant to enrich the
argument by allowing for feedback relations in a multivariate context, thus
fully exploiting the information set. Condition (IV) adds a global dimension
to the EDH, accounting for the increasing interlinkages across countries.
With the US as proxy, we could moreover analyse whether global shocks
such as the failure of major banks in the US hit CEE countries directly and
whether this may have any bearing on the process of monetary integration
in Europe.
We could roughly evaluate these conditions by reading oﬀ ˆ α. While this
allowed us to economise on degrees of freedom, we could also test the EDH
formally by imposing appropriate exclusion restrictions on the estimated
weighting matrix and employ standard likelihood-ratio tests.9 Suppose α is
structured as follows: The euro area series, being the numeraire, is contained
in the last row as all equilibrium relations are normalised accordingly. The
eight CEE countries of interest are in the top rows, followed by the US
series such that N is partitioned as follows: 0 in the subscript refers to the
numeraire, the ECB, i = 1,...,8 are the CEE series and the ﬁnal row is
9 = US in subscript. The cointegrating relations r = 9 for the case of a
common stochastic trend are expressed in terms of the ECB and are in the
j columns, where j = 1,...,8,US.
9Alternatively, if one was only interested in establishing long-run causality, one could
also resort to parametric Granger-type conditions on the cointegrating relations. How-
ever, this testing procedure strongly relies on the existence of a common stochastic trend
and suﬀers from size distortions in small samples as Rault (2000) shows using Monte
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The set of hypotheses could then be tested as follows:10
H0 : α =



 

 


0 ... 0 α1,US
. . .
. . . ... . . .
0 0 ... α8,US
αUS,1 ... αUS,8 αUS,US
0 ... 0 α0,US



 

 


. (2.5)
CEE Dependence implies cointegration between the CEE series and EMU
rates. Rejecting (2.5) provides evidence for the validity of this condition.
Note that cointegration with US rates is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for
CEE Dependence to hold as (2.5) suggests. Euro Dominance suggests in
econometric terms weak exogenity of euro rates. Weak exogeneity of the
euro zone with respect to a set of parameters of interest implies that we can
condition on this variable without loss of information (Engle et al., 1983).
For euro rates to dominate CEE rates, we would have to fail to reject:11
H0 : α0,i = 0. (2.6)
H0 : α =

 

 
 

 

α1,1 0 ... α1,US
0 α2,2 0 α2,US
. . .
. . . ... . . .
0 0 ... α8,8
αUS,1 ... αUS,8 αUS,US
α0,1 ... α0,8 α0,US

 

 
 

 

(2.7)
Imposing restrictions as shown in (2.7) allows for testing for the evidence
of multilateral relationships among CEE countries. Rejection provided evi-
dence for spill-over eﬀects and thus against CEE Insularity.
Compared to (2.7), world insularity imposes an even stronger idea
H0 : α =

 

 

 



α1,1 ... α1,8 0
α2,1 ... α2,8 0
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
α8,1 ... α8,8 0
0 ... 0 αUS,US
α0,1 ... α0,8 α0,US

 

 

 



, (2.8)
10Here and in the following it is understood that the H0 is tested against the H1
describing the unrestricted system.
11Although we are particularly interested in the long-run parameters, rejecting (2.6)
implied that weak exogeneity could be ruled out in the short run as well (Urbain, 1992).Chapter 2. The Euro Dominance Hypothesis 36
where (2.8) suggests that US rates are not only predetermined with respect
to CEE rates but also that CEE countries are not responsive at all to any
innovations arising from the rest of the world. In a way, the existence
of Global Insularity would imply that the process of European integration
dominates any potential global imbalances.
Thus, the notion of CEE Dependence implies that CEE interest rates
and euro rates cointegrate, whereas Euro Independence additionally requires
evidence for weak exogeneity of the euro area with respect to the CEE mar-
kets. We would be unable to reject the EDH in its strong form if we found
evidence for the ﬁrst two conditions, which would identify euro rates as the
common stochastic trend. The notion of CEE Insularity might be consid-
ered to enrich the argument by allowing for feedback relations in a multi-
variate context. The other insularity condition lifts the EDH to a global
level, thereby accounting for the increasing interlinkages across countries
and allowing for feedback with the ROW. Apart from the latter aspect of
global linkages, theses hypotheses have been investigated by Kadow (2011)
in a multiple-equation cointegration setting. While his emphasis is more on
the role of the evolving banking sectors, he ﬁnds evidence for multilateral
links both across CEE economies and with the eurozone.
Even though the VECM approach allows us to formulate the EDH in
a consistent manner, economically meaningful normalisations of the cointe-
grating vector would crucially hinge on the existence of a common stochas-
tic trend. Indeed, the preceding discussion would be of limited use without
having established econometric evidence for this common stochastic trend.
Cointegration tests for large N but a relatively short time dimension – as
is the case for the CEE transition economies – may be prone to size dis-
tortions, however. The most natural way of dealing with this “curse of
dimensionality” appears to be to ﬁrst investigate interest rate linkages on
a domestic level, before analysing all series in a combined system. This is
the essence of GVAR modelling we discuss next.
2.2.3 The EDH in terms of a GVAR
Our proposed approach in formulating and testing the EDH is mainly em-
pirical in nature but it also has some structural underpinnings which we
brieﬂy want to mention. Suppose there are two blocs of countries (CEE
and EMU), both of which have their own independent central banks. EMU
is a large economy and adopts a common monetary policy stance, whereas
CEE consists of several somewhat more disjoint small open economies.Chapter 2. The Euro Dominance Hypothesis 37
Monetary policymakers in CEE are as a consequence slightly more hetero-
geneous in their choice of operating procedures, yet they share the common
overall objective of ultimately becoming part of EMU.
We may conceptualise the situation in CEE by means of the following
policy rule:
Rit = G(L)zt,
where Rit represents the vector of policy instruments in a particular CEE
country (typically short-term interest rates or foreign reserves), G(L) is
a vector polynomial in the lag operator L and zt contains policy-relevant
endogenous and exogenous variables, including short-term interest rates in
EMU.12 Specifying some sort of reaction function, however, might not
only be limited by data availability and reliability but would also lead us
to exclusively centre the analysis around short-run central bank behaviour.
Our proposed error-correcting speciﬁcation is richer: it captures short-run
deviations but models interest rate convergence in the context of a long-run
equilibrium.
Table 2.1 gives an overview of the prevailing monetary policy regime as
of the end of 2009. As can be seen, CEE central banks have moved towards
the extremes of the spectrum of possible exchange rate arrangements over
the last decade. The Bank of Latvia, for example, has pegged the lat tightly
to the euro, only allowing for much smaller ﬂuctuations than stipulated in
the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), which essentially replaced the
former EMS. Other national central banks announce explicit inﬂation tar-
gets and allow their exchange rates to ﬂoat more freely. The Maastricht
criteria of stable nominal exchange rates with low and stable inﬂation rates
describe the relevant benchmarks for monetary convergence and the sta-
bilising eﬀects on the bilateral exchange rate from inﬂation targeting, or
active exchange rate ﬁxing, are apparent from market data.13 Table 2.1
thus provides important institutional background for the remainder as it
facilitates comparisons of the transmission of shocks of inﬂation targeting
with exchange rate targeting countries in CEE.
Whilst the GVAR model can easily be generalised, we conﬁne ourselves
in line with the structural underpinnings and reported descriptive and anec-
12Obviously, if euro area interest rates would not matter to the policy rule in CEE
the corresponding parameter value gi in the parameter vector g was just zero. Other
variables which may be part of zt are output gaps or exchange rate diﬀerentials between
the two blocs.
13See Figure A.1. A notable exception may be the Hungarian forint which has been
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dotal evidence to short-term nominal interest rates. This allows for a more
transparent mapping to the VECM approach for testing the GDH (a crucial
methodological contribution of our paper).
monetary policy framework
Bulgaria CBAa
Czech Rep. ﬂoating; inﬂation targeting
Estonia CBAa; ERM IIb
Hungary ﬂoatingc; inﬂation targeting
Latvia hard pegd; ERM IIb
Lithuania CBAa; ERM IIb
Poland ﬂoating; inﬂation targeting
Romania ﬂoating; inﬂation targeting
Table 2.1: Overview of monetary policy frameworks in CEE (December
2009). Sources: Public information by the ECB and national central banks
in CEE. a: unilateral currency board arrangement with the euro; b: mem-
bership in the ERM II; c: replaced exchange rate intervention band against
the euro in 2008; d: replaced peg to SDR basket of currencies in 2005.
Nominal interest rates also seem to be the most reliable measure of mon-
etary convergence for the enlarged euro area. Coricelli et al. (2006) study
the transmission of monetary policies in CEE and ﬁnd empirical evidence
for a complete passthrough from key domestic monetary policy rates to
short-term money market rates. Indeed, the CEE banking industry has
undergone substantial reforms towards market-based structures during the
90’s. In contrast to bond, equity and derivative markets, the ﬁnancial sec-
tor currently matches EMU standards and can no longer be considered
“underdeveloped”.14 Previously state-owned banks were privatised to es-
tablish a so-called two-tier banking system, consisting of an independent
central bank and several private commercial banks. The process of mar-
ket liberalisation led to the removal of interest rate ceilings on credits and
lowered entry barriers for private domestic and foreign banks. Accounting
standards, commercial and bankruptcy law as well as banking supervisory
and regulatory procedures were put in place to meet the changed market
structures (Dickinson and Mullineux, 2001).
Given the state of development of the ﬁnancial sector in CEE, conver-
gence of monetary policies may therefore be best identiﬁed on the domestic
money markets. If national central banks outside the eurozone mimicked
14See Schadler et al. (2005) for more detailed evidence.Chapter 2. The Euro Dominance Hypothesis 39
the ECB’s path, it may be conjectured that this is reﬂected there, i.e. CEE
and EMU interbank rates are expected to be cointegrated. GVAR modelling
(Pesaran et al. (2004), Dees et al. (2007)) initially tests for cointegration
in country-speciﬁc systems, before combining all error-correcting terms in
a global model. One may thus view the proposed framework as an at-
tempt to consolidate the diﬀerent approaches used during the EMS period
to examine the GDH (i.e. considering both single- and multiple-equation
systems). This two-stage approach oﬀers an alternative, more structural,
way of investigating the EDH.
A crucial diﬀerence between the VECM and the GVAR model related
to these structural underpinnings lies in the way weak exogeneity is intro-
duced. Weak exogeneity is tested for in the VECM by imposing exclusion
restrictions on the estimated parameters, whereas particular variables in
the GVAR speciﬁcation (typically foreign quantities) are treated as weakly
exogenous from the outset. We could, of course, also condition on weakly
exogenous variables in the VECM. As we shall see below, however, the
GVAR allows for a coherent analysis of impulse responses within a global
system and thus accounts for the interlinkages across the partial models.
Each country-speciﬁc error-correcting model contains both domestic and
foreign variables. The latter ones are treated as long-run forcing in the sense
of Granger and Lin (1995) without necessarily ruling out short-run feedback
eﬀects from the lagged variables. We conjecture euro rates to be (weakly)
exogenous to CEE countries. We also introduce global inﬂuences, proxied
by US interest rates. We have N = 10 countries, where EMU is the reference
country. We thus adopt the following notation: euro rates are denoted by
R0t and dollar rates by R∗
t, respectively. We index CEE rates by i = 1,...,n
with n = 8.
We model the EDH in terms of the GVAR as follows. We introduce
two sets of V ARX∗(pi,qi) models for each country bloc, CEE and EMU,
where pi and qi refer to the lag order of the domestic and the foreign rates,
respectively. The CEE-system has the following representation
Θi(L,pi)Rit = ai0 + Λi(L,qi)R0t + εit (2.9)
and for EMU we have
Θ0(L,pi)R0t = a0 + Λ0(L,qi)R
∗
t + ε0t. (2.10)
All idiosyncratic shocks εt are assumed to be i.i.d. Note that (2.9) and
(2.10) are simply reduced form VAR models augmented by (weakly) ex-
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if Λ(L,qi) = 0. The CEE model suggests that CEE countries are small
open economies which take interest rates in the large economy – EMU –
as exogenously given. US interest rates aﬀect under the null CEE markets
indirectly via EMU rates and are thus meant to proxy outside inﬂuences
arising from the ROW.
The EDH can now be stated as a joint hypothesis consisting of three
legs:
(I) CEE Dependence:
Ri and R0 are cointegrated.
(II) Euro Independence:
R0 is weakly exogenous to Ri.
(III) Global Independence:
R∗ is weakly exogenous to R0.
Loosely speaking, Condition (I) implies that CEE and EMU rates are
linked over the long run. Provided these linkages really exist, it may be
conjectured that central banks in CEE are inﬂuenced by the ECB’s course
over a longer horizon in their preparations for joining the euro. However,
without establishing evidence for the idea of Euro Independence, we would
believe in the notion of a linear combination between the series as common
stochastic trend. Only if euro rates were weakly exogenous to CEE rates, we
would be able to give some empirical justiﬁcation for identifying the ECB as
the dominant player in this long-run process. Clearly, given the institutional
environment, this should be expected. It will therefore be interesting to
see what role EMU plays in transmitting shocks to CEE markets and how
results diﬀer across countries. Next to relating the evidence to the prevailing
oﬃcial policy stance in CEE, we therefore also add Condition III which
considers the role of US rates. Provided US rates can also be identiﬁed as
the common stochastic trend in the EMU model, it follows that interest
rate movements in our countries of interest, the CEE economies, have no
eﬀect on the ROW.
Our deﬁnition of the EDH implies several adjustments compared to the
original GDH speciﬁcation. In particular, we no longer conjecture any form
of “insularity” (i.e. the absence of spill-over eﬀects) which seems to be an
awkward notion, given the size of the CEE countries and the degree of
cooperation and coordination within the EU. The way we formulate the
EDH rather reﬂects two developments the EU faces: globalisation and in-
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the ROW as captured by Condition (III). Integration is more related to
intra EU issues, most notably the eastern enlargement of the E(M)U, which
Conditions (I) and (II) examine. In a later step, in Section 2.4, we shall
elaborate on the idea of globalisation and the impacts on the EU and fully
exploit the GVAR approach by linking models (2.9) and (2.10).
2.3 Testing for Euro Dominance
2.3.1 Data
Our study is based on 3-month interbank rates obtained from Eurostat.
Since Bernanke and Blinder (1992)’s seminal paper, short-term money mar-
ket rates have become the commonly accepted proxy for modelling monetary
policy behaviour and transmission in many economies. Amid our focus on
long-term aspects of monetary convergence and given the noise and jumps
present in daily interest rate movements, we opted for a monthly frequency.
The dataset ranges from January 2000 to August 2009, roughly one year
after Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy. Accession negotiations with
the CEE countries started already in the late 90’s such that market ex-
pectations and interest rate diﬀerentials in line with the idea of uncovered
interest rate parity are likely to reﬂect any signs of convergence early on.15
Figure 2.1 shows the CEE money market series in levels. Money market
rates for the eurozone and the US are added for the sake of comparison.
The ﬁgure seems to suggest that short-term interest rates are indeed con-
verging.16 All interbank rates display a sharp increase towards the end
of 2008 – a clear indication of the alleged credit crunch on global ﬁnan-
cial markets. Interestingly, past CEE interest rate ﬂuctuations have often
been much more severe than these spikes. Romania or Poland, for exam-
ple, experienced interbank rates that were up to 10 times higher than their
end-of-sample values.
Whilst Figure 2.1 is suggestive of a converging pattern, graphs on their
own might be misleading and a more formal analysis is called for. Our
proposed framework obviously requires variables to be integrated of order
15Ideally, one would like to initialise the data in 1999. We refrained from doing so due
to a considerable amount of missing values for some countries in that period.
16We also report the individual series in Figures A.2 and (in diﬀerenced form) A.3
to account for the substantial initial spread between some CEE interest rates and euro
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1, I(1), even though the GVAR approach is ﬂexible enough to accommodate
stationarity.
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Figure 2.1: Monthly observations of 3-month money market rates. Source:
Eurostat
We employ the standard augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regressions to
test for the presence of unit roots in the series:
∆Rt = µ + γRt−1 +
p X
k=1
δk∆Rt−1 + εt.
On the basis of the graphical analysis we decided not to include deter-
ministic trends in the Dickey-Fuller regressions. As usual, we test the null
hypothesis of a unit root, H0 : γ = 0, against the alternative that the time
series is stationary, or I(0), H1 : γ < 0. We conducted the tests at diﬀerent
levels of augmentation, up to a quarter. The lag length was chosen using the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Results are reported in Table A.1 and
suggest that all series are I(1) at the 5% signiﬁcance level. As robustness
check, we have moreover computed unit root t-statistics based on weighted
symmetric (WS) estimations of ADF-type regressions (see Pantula et al.
(1994) for details). Those have according to Leybourne et al. (2005) more
power than the standard ADF test. The test statistics of the WS-ADF unit
root test are summarised in Table A.2 and provide further evidence for the
I(1)-ness of the individual series.Chapter 2. The Euro Dominance Hypothesis 43
2.3.2 Empirical results
Having established that the cointegrating framework is sensible we proceed
with testing the EDH. We ﬁrstly specify the lag structures of (2.9) and
(2.10). Table 2.2 reports the lag order of the individual country models.
The length selection is performed using the AIC which suggests that a
V ARX∗(2,1) suﬃces for most CEE country models.17 Subject to residual-
based speciﬁcation tests we decided to treat EMU and the US symmetrically,
with pi = qi = 2.
Country pi qi
Bulgaria 1 1
Czech Rep. 1 1
Estonia 2 1
Hungary 2 1
Latvia 2 1
Lithuania 2 1
Poland 1 1
Romania 2 1
euro area 2 2
Table 2.2: V ARX∗(pi,qi) order based on AIC.
Stacking endogenous and exogenous variables in zt, and after some repa-
rameterisations we obtain the V ECMX∗(pi − 1,qi − 1):
∆Rit = ci0 + αiβ
0
izi,t−1 +
p−1 X
k=1
Ψk∆zi,t−k +
q−1 X
k=1
Λk∆ e Ri,t−k + εit, (2.11)
where e Ri refers to euro rates in case of i = 1,...,8 and to dollar rates for
i = 0.
The EDH can now be tested using (2.11) in two steps. We start by
examining the cointegration properties of the individual country models,
followed by an assessment of the weak exogeneity assumption. The country-
speciﬁc cointegration rank ri is determined using Johansen’s trace statistic.
We follow Pesaran et al. (2000)’s testing procedure and restrict the intercept
to the cointegrating relations, hereby ruling out linear trends in the data.
Critical values are simulated based on 10,000 replications.
17By conditioning on weakly exogenous variables we obtain a richer dynamic structure
than in VAR models of the same order which would ﬁrst need to be rewritten in univariate
autoregressive (integrated) moving average (AR(I)MA) representations for comparability
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Detailed cointegration test results can be found in Table A.3. In sum,
euro and dollar rates cointegrate but there is also strong evidence for coin-
tegration between CEE and EMU rates. Evidence for Bulgaria is slightly
weaker but still well within the 10% level. We failed to establish cointegra-
tion between Hungarian and EMU interbank rates. This ﬁnding may well
be a result of the recent economic turmoil in Hugary as the national central
bank had to deal with speculative attacks on the forint. While we may ﬁnd
evidence for Euro Dominance in Hungary in a diﬀerent information set, we
conclude that the EDH is not supported by Hungarian money market rates.
To test for Euro and Global Independence (Conditions (II) and (III)), we
assess the pivotal weak exogeneity assumption which in econometric terms
may be considered a test for misspeciﬁcation. We test for the signiﬁcance
of the estimated error-correcting term, ECTi,t−1, in the marginal model for
e Rit following Dees et al. (2007). For example, to test for weak exogeneity
of EMU interest rates in the Bulgarian country model (i = 1) we need to
evaluate the null hypothesis that γ1 = 0 in the auxiliary regression:
∆R0t = µ1 + γ1ECT1,t−1 +
s1 X
k=1
δ1,k∆R1,t−k +
n1 X
m=1
ϕ0,m∆R0,t−m + ε1,t,
where we maintain the lag order of the underlying V ARX∗ by setting s1 =
p1 and n1 = q1. Results of this standard t-test are provided in Table A.4
and support the notion of weak exogeneity in all relevant country-speciﬁc
models.
(I) (II) (III)
Country CEE Dependence Euro Independence Global Independence
Bulgaria ‡ † †
Czech Rep. † † †
Estonia † † †
Hungary – – –
Latvia † † †
Lithuania † † †
Poland † † †
Romania † † †
Table 2.3: Summary of EDH testing. ‡ indicates signiﬁcance at the 10%
level; † at the 5% level
Table 2.3 summarises the empirical results. Overall, we seem to have
established strong evidence for the notion of Euro Dominance in the en-
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markets are dominated by the euro area over the long run, which follows
from Conditions (I) and (II). The EDH seems to hold in the strong form
in the sense that euro rates are weakly exogenous. We also ﬁnd that dollar
rates move independently from the eurozone. US interest rates thus aﬀect
CEE money markets only via the euro area which conﬁrms Condition (III)
of Global Independence.
2.3.3 Impulse response analysis
Any investigation of ﬁnancial linkages is of little meaning without analysing
the transmission of shocks. Based on the empirical evidence for Euro In-
dependence and Global Independence we shock foreign interest rates in the
country-speciﬁc models and estimate Generalised Impulse Response Func-
tions (GIRFs). We distinguish between the impulse responses arising from
an EMU shock on CEE interest rates and a ROW shock on EMU interest
rates. Both shocks are scaled appropriately to correspond to a rise by one
standard deviation of the error variance on impact. Graphical output is
summarised in Figure 2.3.3. The panel in the far lower right corner shows
the eurozone impulse response function. The solid lines plot the country-
speciﬁc point estimates; the dashed lines represent the 95% conﬁdence in-
tervals which are based on a sieve bootstrap using 5,000 replications.
The Figure illustrates the varying speeds of adjustments of the error-
correcting relations over a period of 2 years. The ROW shock on euro rates
appears to have quite prolonged eﬀects, with the response only gradually
dying out. More interesting for the case at hand is how EMU innovations
are transmitted across the CEE countries. Referring back to Table 2.1, we
see that by and large the short-term adjustment of exchange rate target-
ing countries is faster. This is particularly true for the Baltic countries of
Estonia (which indeed joined EMU in 2011) and Lithuania. The inﬂation-
targeters Poland and the Czech Republic show quantitatively a relatively
weaker and more sustained response. This feature of a more gradual EMU
shock adjustment appears to be in accordance with their prevailing oﬃcial
monetary stance. The case for Romania and Bulgaria is somewhat less
clear-cut, however. In line with the result on inﬂation-targeting regimes, ef-
fects on Romanian rates are more prolonged but quantitatively quite strong
in comparison to the Polish and Czech impulse function. The Bulgarian
impulse function is fairly persistent despite the introduction of the CBA
already in the late 90s. These diﬀerences in the Bulgarian and Romanian
shock proﬁle compared to the other CEE countries may be attributed toChapter 2. The Euro Dominance Hypothesis 46
their relatively late EU entry but also structural features such as diﬀerent
stages of ﬁnancial market development and thus diﬀerences in transmission
mechanisms.
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Figure 2.2: GIRF to country-speciﬁc shock. The solid lines plot the country-
speciﬁc point estimates; the dashed lines show the 95% conﬁdence intervals
which are based on a sieve bootstrap using 5,000 replications.
2.4 Economic and ﬁnancial globalisation and the
EDH
2.4.1 Global shock analysis
The distinct feature of the GVAR modelling approach is that it permits
incorporating aggregated foreign variables to investigate the transmission
of shocks both on a regional and global level. This appears particularly
relevant given the widespread consensus among academics and policymak-
ers that the ongoing ﬁnancial and economic globalisation and market in-
tegration also require more policy coordination at the supranational level.Chapter 2. The Euro Dominance Hypothesis 47
Indeed, the recent ﬁnancial and economic crisis constitutes an obvious re-
minder of that need. Moreover, thus far, we have only exposed the CEE
countries to EMU-speciﬁc shocks. We therefore analyse in this section to
what extent the evidence on Euro Dominance is aﬀected by such global
shocks, also in an attempt to provide some preliminary insights on the im-
pact of the Crisis.
Amidst our particular interest in the eﬀorts of CEE countries to integrate
with EMU, we may think of domestic CEE money markets as being driven
by a weighted average of foreign rates, i.e. other CEE money markets but
also EMU and the US. We refer to this aggregate variable as R∗
it to indicate
the conjectured linkages across markets. Foreign interest rates for each CEE
country are constructed using country-speciﬁc weights
R
∗
it =
N X
j=0
wijRjt,
where wij is the weight for CEE country i with respect to country j and
wii = 0. We experimented with diﬀerent weighting schemes. As the main
results were not materially aﬀected by this choice, we decided to resort
to simple equal weighting (to reﬂect the overall converging pattern) which
appeared most natural for the research question at hand. To ensure consis-
tency between country-level and aggregate evidence on the EDH, we exclude
the Hungarian series and index the remaining variables from 1,...,n − 1.
We again stack domestic and (now weighted) foreign country-speciﬁc
variables in the vector zit and introduce the matrix Wi that contains the
country-speciﬁc weights. This weighting matrix links all domestic models
and is needed to solve the GVAR recursively. It can accommodate various
weights as long as they are predetermined. Note that the empirical outcomes
of the analysis are invariant to the ordering of the countries.
Stacking all endogenous variables in Rt we can write
zit = WiRt i = 1,...,n − 1. (2.12)
Using (2.12) allows us to rewrite (2.9)
Ai(L,p)WiRt = ϕit, i = 1,...,n − 1, (2.13)
where
ϕit = ai0 + ai1t + εit.
We retain the lag structure of the previously speciﬁed country models and
stack them together to obtain the GV AR(p):
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where
G(L,p) =




A1(L,p)W1
. . .
An−1(L,p)Wn−1




and
ϕt =




ϕ1t
. . .
ϕ(n−1)t



.
We can solve (2.14) for all endogenous CEE interest rates simultaneously
which allows us to analyse impulse responses across the entire information
set. We may think of the GV AR(p) in this context as a regional model of
CEE money markets because it links this bloc of countries with both EMU
and the ROW, whilst at the same time allowing for the existence of linkages
across CEE economies. Thus, the presence of a solution to this system also
provides indirect evidence against the notion of “CEE insularity” referred
to above.
The previous impulse response analysis implicitly assumed that shocks
are not global, i.e. they originate from a particular country or region. While
this holds by deﬁnition for intra-EU shocks, the ﬁnancial crisis has demon-
strated that there are also events that cannot so easily be attributed to a
particular country or region. This is in particular due to the strong intercon-
nectedness and global character of the ﬁnancial market place. We therefore
construct a “global” shock which is a weighted average of variable-speciﬁc
shocks (based on PPP-GDP weights) and as such common to all CEE coun-
tries in the model.18
Figure 2.3 summarises the estimated GIRFs to a one standard error
global shock in CEE. The eﬀects through time are qualitatively rather sim-
ilar to the previous impulse responses to EMU shocks which conﬁrms the
predominant role of the euro area in the setting of CEE monetary policies
as well as the strong impact of eurozone events in general on this area.
The global analysis thus provides further support for the validity of the
EDH. It appears one cannot necessarily claim that the occurrence of global
shocks matters for the process of European monetary integration. It rather
seems to be the case that predominantly regional E(M)U events drive the
adjustment towards a long-run equilibrium or at least that global shocks
are largely “absorbed” by the eurozone and from there transmitted further.
18See Pesaran et al. (2004) for further technical details and other applications of this
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Figure 2.3: GIRF to global shock
2.4.2 Structural break analysis
As is generally accepted, the possibility of structural breaks in macroeco-
nomic data can never be ruled out a priori. This is particularly true for
the case of the emerging CEE economies that are and have been subject to
political and social changes. The presence of structural breaks would be a
serious issue in any cointegrating study as structural stability of both long-
run and short-run coeﬃcients is implicitly assumed. However, as Dees et al.
(2007) point out, the GVAR framework might help in alleviating the struc-
tural problem somewhat as it can readily accommodate co-breaking and
the underlying V ARX∗ models might be more robust to possible structural
breaks than for instance reduced-form single equation models.
Given the relatively short time span considered, it appears more mean-
ingful to focus in our structural break analysis on the stability of short-
run coeﬃcients and error variances that are crucial for the investigation
of the transmission of shocks. In particular, we calculate Ploberger and
Krämer (1992)’s maximal OLS cumulative sum (CUSUM) statistic, denoted
by PKsup and its mean square variant PKmsq. We moreover consider the
test for parameter constancy by Nyblom (1989) in its heteroskedasticity-
robust version. The critical values of the tests under the null of parameter
stability are computed using a sieve bootstrap. Results are reported in
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is some evidence for the Bulgarian series to reject the null of parameter
constancy and to a lesser extent for the US and Latvian series using the
Nyblom test. Overall, however, structural instability does not seem to have
a strong impact on our results on the EDH.
2.5 Concluding remarks
In this Chapter we have upgraded the so-called German Dominance Hypoth-
esis (GDH) in two dimensions. First, whereas the earlier literature on the
GDH modelled interest rate linkages and causality issues within the former
EMS, we reformulate the GDH for the CEE countries vis-à-vis the euro-
zone. We seek to answer whether the monetary policy implemented by the
ECB dictates CEE monetary policies. Evidence for this Euro Dominance
Hypothesis (EDH) has important implications for the process of European
monetary integration as all these countries have committed themselves to
eventually introduce the euro and to join the monetary union with a sin-
gle central bank. Second, we employ the relatively novel methodology of
GVAR modelling to investigate convergence and the transmission of exter-
nal shocks.
Unlike the traditional approaches of testing the GDH, that are either
bivariate in nature or are expressed in terms of high dimensional VECMs,
the proposed GVAR model generalises multivariate cointegration analysis
to allow for weakly exogenous, structural I(1) variables. This methodology
is hence particularly suitable for small open economies. It deals ﬁrst with
error-correcting terms on the country level which allows for richer dynamics
and more eﬃcient estimation. One can stack this information in a second
step into a global (multi-country) system that can be used to investigate
impulse response functions on a “global” level. The proposed approach may
hence be considered a consolidation of previous GDH testing procedures.
We tested the EDH as a set of three complementary hypotheses: CEE
Dependence, Euro Independence and Global Independence. Our empirical
results strongly support the EDH. We ﬁnd that there is evidence for the
notion of Euro Dominance, i.e. CEE Depedence together with Euro Inde-
pendence, across CEE economies. Domestic CEE policies seem to follow
the ECB’s monetary policy stance (proxied by money market rates) quite
closely, irrespective of the prevailing exchange rate arrangement. Country-
speciﬁc impulse response functions suggest that countries with relatively
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ject the EDH for Hungary which may reﬂect the notion of domestic policies
dominating over EMU ones. The fact that our procedure reveals diﬀerences
across economies shows that it has power. Our analysis moreover suggests
that inner E(M)U events rather than external global shocks appear to be
crucial drivers of monetary integration in Europe.
European monetary integration is best understood as an ongoing long-
term process. The non-rejection of the EDH is somewhat surprising, given
the recent turmoil on global ﬁnancial markets that has posed unprecedented
challenges to economic policymakers all over the world. Whilst the Crisis’
long-term eﬀects still remain to be seen, one may expect that central banks
in CEE will ﬁnd it increasingly diﬃcult in the near future to mimic the
ECB’s policies and to maintain the path of monetary convergence with the
euro area. In particular, trying to keep exchange rates, interest rates and
inﬂation rates within the Maastricht ranges on a sustainable basis may be-
come ever more challenging. On the other hand, if the evidence on Euro
Dominance were true, CEE central bankers would not lose their independent
monetary policy stance through joining EMU but are likely to gain inﬂu-
ence in the ECB’s common monetary policy decisions. Indeed, our analysis
suggests that inner E(M)U events rather than external global shocks will
determine the future of the enlarged eurozone. This indicates an already
fairly advanced state of monetary integration in Europe and implies that
policymakers should share a common interest in furthering (as opposed to
reversing) the process. Whilst we have deliberately conﬁned ourselves to a
somewhat stylised setting, the GVAR approach can readily be extended to
investigate further the transmission of euro area and global shocks. This
may be a fruitful exercise which is left for future work as it allowed to un-
derstand more clearly the long-term impact of the Crisis on the process of
European integration.
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The Fair Trade movement: an
economic perspective
Chapter Summary
Fair Trade (henceforth FT) products such as coﬀee and textiles
are becoming increasingly popular with altruistic consumers all over
the world. This Chapter seeks to understand the economic eﬀects
of this grassroots movement which directly links ethically-minded
consumers in industrialised countries with marginalised producers in
developing economies. We extend the Ricardian trade model and in-
troduce a FT sector in developing South that oﬀers a fair wage – the
FT premium. There are indeed positive welfare eﬀects from FT but
those come at the expense of rising inequalities within South which
are in turn a rational byproduct of FT. The degree of inequalities de-
pends on the speciﬁcs of the cooperative structures in the FT sector.
Given the rigidities and inequalities FT introduces and rests upon,
this form of alternative trade appears to be only sustainable as niche
movement.
3.1 Introduction
Fair Trade (FT) is catching on with ethically-minded end-consumers in in-
dustrialised countries. Households are more and more willing for altruistic
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reasons to pay higher prices to support marginalised producers all over the
world. Latest ﬁgures show that consumption of products certiﬁed by FT
organisations more than doubled between 2000-2005 (Krier, 2005). Europe
forms the centre of this grassroots consumer movement and coﬀee, the ﬁrst
product to be FT-certiﬁed, its backbone (Hira and Ferrie, 2006). One ﬁfth
of the ground coﬀee sold in the United Kingdom (UK) in 2004 carried one
of the various FT labels (Krier, 2005). Worldshops, the traditional distri-
bution channel of FT products, continue to be popular in countries such as
Germany and Italy (Krier, 2005). In the UK, FT is going mainstream with
an increasing number of major retail chains stocking diﬀerent FT prod-
ucts (Raynolds and Murray, 2007). Striving to be perceived as ethically
responsible companies, textiles made from FT cotton have become one of
the fastest growing product group of the British retail business (The Times,
2007).
FT empowers consumers in the developed world to express political
views through the shopping trolley and may be thought of as a form of
protest against perceived unfavourable terms of trade for poor countries that
are allegedly triggered by World Trade Organisation (WTO) trade liberal-
isation policies (The Economist, 2006b). Alternative Trade Organisations
(ATO) like the Fairtrade Labelling Organisations International (FLO) try
to oﬀer a third way between the extreme stances of free trade and protec-
tionism (Maseland and de Vaal, 2002).1 Essentially bypassing middlemen,
they guarantee certiﬁed cooperatives of farmers in developing countries a
“fair” price for their produce.
The focus of this Chapter is distinct. Whilst there are other (more
long-term) aspects of FT such as technology transfer or capacity building,
we single out the economic implications of the so-called FT premium and
its relation to FT prices. By the FT premium we essentially refer to the
social premium which the FT organisations oﬀer to the certiﬁed farmers
and their communities. This is arguably the best-known feature to “non-FT
campaigners” which motivates our emphasis on this particular aspect. The
Chapter intends to provide theoretical underpinnings to the FT movement.
This implies, on the one hand, that we need to oﬀer conceptualisations of
FT which the non-economist might ﬁnd hard to swallow. Equally, using
standard trade concepts by themselves might not do justice to the essence
of this form of alternative trade.
Our Chapter seeks to strike a balance between these two stands by
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providing a model which is highly tractable (and intuitive) yet non-trivial,
whilst at the same time reﬂecting some of the key elements of FT. We
develop a Ricardian-type general equilibrium model which in contrast to the
benchmark setting introduces two forms of “asymmetries”: First, one of the
goods (the FT good) is produced only in one country but only consumed
in the other. This rations, given ﬁxed expenditure shares, employment in
that particular sector. Second, those workers who are part of the FT sector
are better oﬀ compared to the non-FT sectors. This introduces inequalities.
The key point to bear in mind is that this set-up permits an investigation
of the economic eﬀects of ethical consumerism in industrialised countries on
FT-certiﬁed vis-à-vis non-certiﬁed producers in the developing world.
The FT premium (i.e. the monetary reward that directly beneﬁts the
farmers) is derived from the fair prices on the goods markets such that the
consumption of FT goods may be considered an act of altruism. This is
in line with the common denotation (the Oxford English Dictionary deﬁnes
altruism as “selﬂess concern for the well-being of others”). Our notion of
altruism is thus consistent with Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s concept of self-
centred inequity aversion in a perfectly rational framework: individuals are
willing to sacriﬁce resources to achieve more equitable outcomes. Similar to
Becchetti and Adriani (2002) and Richardson and Stähler (2007), we take
the existence of altruistic consumers as given. Indeed, the notion of altruism
in households’ preferences has become standard in behavioural economics
and is a typical result of experimental economics. Households in the North
genuinely consider it fair, if marginalised producers in the FT sector receive
a higher wage which allows them to close the technology and income gap to
the developing world. Research from psychology and related ﬁelds suggests
(see Hillis and Howie (2010) and the references therein) that this kind of
fairness is culturally transmitted and we therefore consider the representa-
tive agent assumption on an aggregate level a suitable approximation.
The objective of this Chapter is, ﬁrst, to make sense of FT in economic
terms. Second, we would like to understand its welfare implications. Is
the fair wage paid in the FT sector indeed welfare enhancing as commonly
claimed by the numerous ATOs? We elaborate in particular on Leclair
(2002)’s claim in his seminal contribution that alternative trade only sup-
ports one set of producers at the expense of others. We deliberately strive
to provide closed-form solutions for greater analytical tractability and eco-
nomic intuition – both of which we believe is crucial at this explorative
stage.
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vides additional insights that have been hitherto neglected in related studies
on the issue. We show that FT can be consistently modelled in a rational
utility-maximising framework. Without households in the North valuing
higher living standards in the South, there is no FT (altruism as source
of trade). It is possible that FT is induced by the presence of imperfect
competition (oligopolistic structures for intermediate traders) but FT can
arise in the presence of perfectly competitive markets as well, thus providing
a relevant benchmark to elaborate on. We ﬁnd that FT is overall welfare
enhancing – at least within a distinct and empirically plausible range. This
is due to its inequality reducing eﬀects between countries in the presence
of decreasing marginal utilities. However, the converging pattern comes at
the expense of rising inequalities within South. These inequalities, however,
seem to be a rational byproduct of FT which raises the question as to how
sustainable FT would be on a broader scale. FT does not, as often claimed,
lead to an excess supply of goods (as caused e.g. by the Common Agricul-
tural Policy of the European Union, EU, or the agricultural policy of the
United States, US). The reason for this is that FT is driven by demand, i.e.
preferences of households and not by administrative intervention. However,
our analysis also suggests that the nature of the cooperative structures in
the FT sector matters. Keeping our model’s obvious limitations in mind,
the analysis might also allow for highlighting (at least tentative) policy im-
plications regarding development policies in general and more speciﬁcally
design of the FT system.
The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 puts
this study into context with the related literature. Section 3.3 provides fur-
ther background information on FT and introduces the main stakeholders
behind the movement. Section 3.4 describes the model’s set-up and scope.
We augment the Ricardian trade model by FT in Section 3.5. In Section
3.6, we investigate the economic eﬀects of FT – in general equilibrium, from
a welfare perspective and ﬁnally considering the determinants of distribu-
tional outcomes paying particular attention to the cooperative structure in
the FT sector. Section 3.7 concludes and outlines policy recommendations
as well as potential areas of further research.
3.2 Related literature
Amid its growing importance, the FT concept has received relatively little
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to originate from political sciences (see for example Littrell and Dickson
(1999)) or from related strands outside orthodox economics. Leclair (2002)
was the ﬁrst to put the economic analysis of FT on the research agenda. His,
largely descriptive, article contains a short section on the economic under-
pinnings of FT in which he compares the eﬃciency of subsidising workers’
incomes in the South via “fairer” terms of trade with direct payments. He
argues that free trade combined with direct aid may be superior to the
FT system. Hayes (2006), on the other hand, suggests that FT is eﬃcient
in economic terms. Both papers, however, only oﬀer a partial equilibrium
context which precludes meaningful welfare statements.
In contrast to organic food, FT produces are not necessarily associated
with higher quality levels compared to “conventional” products. This has
led some authors (Leclair (2002); Booth and Whetstone (2007)) to imply
that FT consumers are either uninformed or irrational. Reinstein and Song
(2008) use contract-theoretic arguments to show that altruistic consump-
tion is compatible with rational and informed behaviour in a competitive
setting. Poret and Chambolle (2007) provide further theoretical evidence
for potential eﬃciency gains from FT through product diﬀerentiation.
Other studies have focused more on the speciﬁc components of FT con-
sumption. de Pelsmacker et al. (2005) employ a conjoint analysis for the
Belgian coﬀee market and ﬁnd that the FT label is on average the second
most important attribute (being as important as ﬂavour) in the consumer’s
purchasing decision. Maietta (2003) estimates hedonic prices for the Italian
market and detects signiﬁcant FT-related elements in coﬀee consumption.
There is empirical evidence (see Arnot et al. (2006) or Becchetti and Rosati
(2007) amongst others) that concerned consumers are willing to pay a pre-
mium for products which were made under ethical and socially responsible
working conditions.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two papers (Becchetti and
Adriani (2002); Richardson and Stähler (2007)) that analyse the FT concept
in a general equilibrium framework. Becchetti and Adriani (2002) investi-
gate the eﬀects of globalisation in general and consider FT a bottom-up
mechanism which allows Northern consumers with “international equality
concerns” to support Southern ﬁrms which pay “fair” wages. North’s and
South’s welfare in their analysis, however, is not responsive to the degree of
fairness. FT is simply considered a binary outcome which does not depend
on the size of the wage mark-up. Becchetti and Adriani (2002)’s idea of
FT is thus very similar to a related literature on “green consumerism” (see
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ronmental impact of a good but not the underlying production process or
factor rewards.
Richardson and Stähler (2007) focus more on the behaviour of a vertically-
integrated FT organisation in imperfectly competitive goods markets. Their
set-up implies that both FT and non-FT ﬁrm could compete in the same
(high quality) market. We believe this assumption is at odds with the anec-
dotal and empirical evidence which suggests that FT cooperatives oﬀer a
diﬀerentiated good in a distinct (albeit growing) niche market. This form of
product diﬀerentiation, however, does not (at least exclusively) come from
diﬀerent quality levels but rather arises due to diﬀerences in production en-
vironments. While both papers suggest that marginalised producers beneﬁt
from a higher degree of trade integration, they do not consider distributional
eﬀects within South.
3.3 Background information on Fair Trade
We provide in this Section more detailed background information on FT and
motivate some of the modelling decisions taken. When referring to FT, it is
important to distinguish between Fair Trade as an idea of creating greater
equity in international trade in general and Fairtrade as a speciﬁc labelling
organisation.2 FLO only certiﬁes producers who provide working standards
both in socio-economic and environmental terms that comply with certain
international standards.3 Typical FT products are bananas, cocoa, coﬀee,
honey, fruit, rice, sugar, tea, textiles and other handicrafts.
All products which are sold under a FT claim are associated with one
of the numerous FT organisations. This could be a national charity oﬀer-
ing ethical products (like Oxfam) or an international body (like the World
Fair Trade Organisation, WFTO). The Scottish Executive together with lo-
cal FT campaigners and Scotland-based Non-Governmental Organisations
(NGOs) has launched a forum to promote the idea of Scotland becoming
the world’s ﬁrst FT nation (BBC, 2008).4 Supporters of the FT movement
share the same overriding principles as to what constitutes FT: Integrate
2In the US fair trade tends to have yet a diﬀerent, slightly more political, meaning and
refers to asymmetric trade liberalisation in which markets of industrial goods are opened
up without full reciprocation for the developing world (also see Stiglitz and Charlton
(2005) for a further discussion.
324 labelling initiatives worldwide are currently part of FLO. For example, the Fair-
trade Foundation licenses the use of the Fairtrade Mark on products sold in the UK.
Also see Figure B.1 for the unique Fairtrade label.
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marginalised producers in the world trading system, develop long-term re-
lationships with them and hence alleviate poverty and inequality in the
developing world. It is far from clear, however, to what extent these goals
are and can be fulﬁlled by FT – also see Mohan (2010) for a balanced
account of the FT concept and potential beneﬁts but also problems.
Without claiming to be exhaustive, Figure 3.1 illustrates the main fea-
tures of FT in simpliﬁed form. There are essentially ﬁve stakeholders: end-
consumers in North, wholesale and retail chains (which we shall jointly refer
to as seller), the ATO and the farmers who join together to form a FT coop-
erative. We may think of Figure 3.1 as a stylised value chain which describes
the production, marketing and delivery links required for the FT commod-
ity to arrive from producer at consumer. Several small farms typically join
in to govern their own cooperative. The farmers’ cooperative applies to the
FT organisation for certiﬁcation which grants the FT trademark only to
those ensuring appropriate working conditions to their members. The co-
operative moreover needs to produce a letter of intent from the seller to buy
the produce at the higher FT price. The ATO in return maintains the price
ﬂoor on the global markets which provides economic stability to the coop-
eratives in case of adverse demand or supply shocks. Booth and Whetstone
(2007) therefore like to think of the price ﬂoor as hedging instrument.
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Figure 3.1: Stylised FT value chain
FT is a demand-driven concept. There are no quantity-based inter-
ventions in contrast to the EU Common Agricultural Policy, for example.
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use to charge higher prices from end-consumers. While the guaranteed min-
imum fair price is probably the most obvious feature of FT, end-consumers
really care about the amount that actually reaches the individual farmers
and their families. Indeed, the ATO also provides a so-called social premium
for investment in wider community projects. We shall refer to the entire
amount that directly beneﬁts the cooperative at large as the FT premium
which is distributed to the farmers in the form of wages.
Although (as Figure 3.1 implies) the FT organisation acts as interme-
diary between North and South, the essence of FT is really characterised
by the direct relationship between end-consumers and farmers. Our model
thus seeks to highlight in particular this market-based link between the two
agents across countries and the role of both FT premium and FT coopera-
tives in South.
Strictly speaking, consumers should be indiﬀerent between donating,
say, 10% of their income to charities and buying non-FT-certiﬁed goods
or spending 10% of their income on FT goods without going through the
hassle of the donation. While “giving fatigue” may play a role (Booth
and Whetstone (2007)), there seems to be some psychological appeal in
using the market-based FT mechanism (Nicholls and Opal, 2005). Moore
(2004) explains in his survey article the rising popularity of FT products
by their “informational” elements. He argues the diﬀerentiating factor may
lie in the “meaning” attached to the good which is derived from additional
information provided in the form of stories about the individuals who make
or grow the product and the reported beneﬁts of FT either for themselves
or their communities.
There are also critical voices, however. The Economist (2006b) asserts
that the guaranteed minimum price especially harms non-FT farmers. It
is argued in a related article that only proper free trade (i.e. trade in
the absence of market interventions) might alleviate poverty on a broader
scale (The Economist, 2006a). FT products appear to ﬁll (albeit growing)
niches (Hira and Ferrie, 2006). Tentative (yet largely anecdotal) ﬁndings
suggest that farmers and communities are better oﬀ due to FT and could
beneﬁt more, if demand was higher (see Raynolds (2002) and the references
therein).
Overall, the available anecdotal and empirical evidence stresses two as-
pects of FT: its demand-driven nature but also the clear distinction it seeks
to establish between certiﬁed vis-à-vis non-certiﬁed producers. Any serious
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3.4 Model set-up
Our Ricardian world consists of two countries, developed North (N) and
developing South (S), trading with each other. There are three goods: X is
the numeraire good and the non-FT good is denoted by Y . The FT good F
is only produced in S and only consumed in N. Y and F may be considered
as largely similar products (though this is not crucial) but in particular diﬀer
in the FT label attached to F. Both products are hence thought to serve
distinct markets (Nicholls (2002); Becchetti and Huybrechts (2008)). For
intuition, think in terms of the coﬀee market: Y is regular coﬀee and F is
FT-certiﬁed coﬀee. Both products diﬀer in terms of packaging and display.
There is also a price diﬀerential reﬂecting the relatively more ethical (i.e.
fair) production conditions in the certiﬁed sector. The degree by which FT
workers are better oﬀ compared to the non-certiﬁed sector is measured by
a wage premium paid in F.5 Farms that do not pay this higher wage bill
do not receive FT certiﬁcation. We may therefore also think of the wage
premium as a form of entry costs into the FT sector.
We consider FT and non-FT good as gross substitutes in the analysis for
two reasons. First, given the still small scale of FT goods in global trade,
there is as of yet no conclusive empirical evidence to suggest that FT pro-
duces have a sizable impact on the non-FT goods’ market shares. Second,
given the somewhat political stand FT consumers take with their purchas-
ing decision, one may also think in terms of complementarities between the
consumption of FT and non-FT good. Consumers derive additional utility
from the occasional purchase of an ethically-produced good. If anything,
FT producers might therefore compete with charities for donations. As we
do not intend to model the underlying drivers of FT consumption as such,
we remain agnostic in our modelling approach.
Countries diﬀer in their production technologies, hereby allowing for
comparative cost advantages.6 As we shall see below, consumers will only
demand F because they are (im)purely altruistic. It is the welfare-enhancing
eﬀect of consuming F which gives rise to trade in the FT product. Altruism
hence enters as additional (but not exclusive) source of trade. We suppress
various other sources of trade to single out the eﬀects of altruistic behaviour:
5There is some evidence for ineﬃciencies in the pass-through of the FT price premium
to farmers (Booth and Whetstone, 2007). We capture this by directing our attention to
the factor markets.
6This assumption is necessary for trade to arise in these products. It would not be
very interesting in a perfectly competitive environment to have trade due to heteroge-
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there is by assumption only one factor of production (labour) in each coun-
try which rules out relative diﬀerences in factor endowments. Given our
focus on the cooperative nature of FT, we do not allow for price-setting
behaviour on the product markets and thus also preclude love-of-variety
arguments.
We proceed as follows. We ﬁrst augment the Ricardian benchmark
model by FT. We then investigate the determinants of FT in general equi-
librium and consider implications for convergence and sustainability. In a
next step, we add further microfoundations to the cooperative structure in
the FT-certiﬁed sector and endogenise the existing wage premium.
3.5 Introducing Fair Trade in a Ricardian world
As detailed in Section 3.4, the underlying structure of our FT model is
Ricardian. In contrast to more conventional North-South frameworks, the
emphasis is not so much on the tangible transfer of resources but more on
the “transfer of utility”, i.e. altruistic behaviour. Consumers in North are
willing to pay a price premium for a certain product which is reﬂected in
South in the form of relatively higher wages. An alternative, perhaps more
streamlined, way of thinking of this is simply to consider a two-country free
trade model with full specialisation. One country produces the numeraire
good and consumes all goods available, while the other country produces
the non-numeraire goods but refrains from consuming one particular good
to meet increased foreign demand. This good is characterised by a protected
labour market which leads to a rationing of employment. The goal of the
analysis is then to investigate how overall welfare is aﬀected by such an
environment and what the policy implications are for both countries.
3.5.1 North
The ﬂexible-wage economy North produces two goods (X and Y ) using
constant-returns-to-scale technologies. There is one input factor, labour:
X
N = A
NL
N
X (3.1)
Y
N = B
NL
N
Y . (3.2)
Sector-wide productivity is measured by AN and BN, respectively. Produc-
tion is linear in labour and hence nests the case of technologies that exhibit
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Aggregate labour (LN) is supplied inelastically, where employment in
both sectors is given by LN
X and LN
Y . We can thus deﬁne North’s workforce
as
L
N = L
N
X + L
N
Y . (3.3)
Labour is perfectly mobile across sectors and chosen freely by proﬁt-maximising
ﬁrms. Goods and labour markets are perfectly competitive which leads to
the usual zero proﬁt condition that in equilibrium producers in each sec-
tor will always hire workers up to the point at which real wages match
productivities:
w
N
X = p
N
XA
N (3.4)
w
N
Y = p
N
Y B
N. (3.5)
Households in developed North derive utility from consuming both FT
and non-FT good as well as X which may be considered a composite good:
U
N = U
N(C
N
X,C
N
Y ,CF).
Preferences are convex and the representative household consumes all goods
in strictly positive quantities.7 Following the evidence cited above, FT
products serve niche markets and thus satisfy distinct needs. As we argue
in Section 3.4, we consider the limiting Cobb-Douglas case as suﬃcient to
illustrate the case:8
U
N = (CF)
θ(C
N
X)
σ(C
N
Y )
1−σ−θ, θ > 0, σ > 0. (3.6)
It is well-known that these preferences ensure an interior solution and that
the parameters represent the shares of North’s total expenditures (denoted
by EN) on each of the goods.
7This is not too restrictive. Recall that Ricardo’s original analysis was based on a
counterfactual as well: What are the eﬀects of a country opening up for trade? We
are interested in the eﬀects of consuming FT goods and hence do not directly compare
autarky with free trade but rather free trade with fair trade.
8We have also tried more elaborate preference speciﬁcations – e.g. allowing for ad-
ditional warm-glow or imperfect substitutability. In the light of this Chapter’s focus on
outcomes in South, however, those have just lowered tractability without oﬀering further
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Constrained utility maximisation (optimality here and in the remainder
is denoted by an asterisk) yields the following demand functions
C
∗
F =
θEN
pF
(3.7)
C
N∗
X =
σEN
pN
X
(3.8)
C
N∗
Y =
(1 − σ − θ)EN
pN
Y
, (3.9)
which provides an intuitive grasp of altruism in this context: the more
altruistic consumers are, the more of their income will be spent on F as
captured by a higher θ. We do not provide an explicit theory as to why
θ > 0 and take the existence of altruistic spending as one of our model’s
primitives. We may thus also think of the preference parameters as import
shares on an aggregate level.
3.5.2 South
There are three sectors in South. Producers operate in perfectly competitive
markets and technologies are characterised by constant returns to scale.
The numeraire good is produced in X, whilst Y and F crucially diﬀer
in the prevailing working conditions. Producers in the FT sector F oﬀer
more ethical occupational standards relative to Y such as increased work
safety or better health care. These factors are typical requirements for FT
certiﬁcation and are captured by a wage premium (wF > wS
Y). In terms of
the FT concept, the existence of a wage premium permits segmenting into
FT and non-FT producers.
Farmers who are certiﬁed as FT producers by the ATO typically belong
to one of the several cooperatives that make up F. We abstract for now
from any optimisation rationale the representative FT cooperative might
have in setting the wage premium and assume that the mark-up is speci-
ﬁed exogenously (say, by means of a binding agreement between ATO and
cooperative).9 Wages in the FT sector exceed wages oﬀered in the informal
sector by the mark-up µ:
wF = (1 + µ)w
S
Y, (3.10)
where µ measures the FT premium.
9For expositional convenience, we ﬁrst focus on the economic eﬀects of a segmented
labour market in South, before providing further microfoundations in Section 3.6.4.Chapter 3. The Fair Trade movement: an economic perspective 64
Supporters of the FT movement typically claim that better working
conditions in the FT sector increase productivity. They essentially relate
to the long-term eﬀects of FT which might be productivity-enhancing due
to technology transfers and capacity building mechanisms embedded in the
relationship between the FT cooperative and FT importers. Thus far, how-
ever, no robust empirical evidence has been established for the validity of
this claim.10 Without taking a stand on this debate, we therefore treat
productivities as exogenous and conservatively conjecture that D ≥ BS –
i.e. workers in F are not less productive than in the non-certiﬁed sector.
Output in each sector is a function of the amount of labour used and
the sector-speciﬁc productivity parameter:
X
S = A
SL
S
X (3.11)
Y
S = B
SL
S
Y (3.12)
F = DLF, D ≥ B
S. (3.13)
South’s labour endowment (LS) is fully employed across all productive
sectors
L
S = L
S
X + L
S
Y + LF, (3.14)
and in principle workers from each sector are perfectly mobile within S. In
equilibrium, nominal wages equal marginal value products as usual:
w
S
X = p
S
XA
S (3.15)
w
S
Y = p
S
YB
S (3.16)
wF = pFD. (3.17)
We thus follow Becchetti and Adriani (2002) who consider fair working
conditions strictly in terms of the usual competitive outcome of real wages
equal to productivities. After all, there should be no reason for this funda-
mental condition not to hold. In Section 3.6.4, we add a further dimension
to the notion of fair wages in the context of FT. Similar to Grossman and
Helpman (2007), amongst others, we introduce a form of relative wage con-
cerns (taking wages paid in the non-FT sector as the relevant benchmark)
as crucial element of what workers consider a fair pay.
As often the case in developing countries, certain sectors only produce for
foreign markets and FT produces are no exception. Households in South
10First studies in this direction are, for example, Becchetti and Costantino (2008) or
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derive utility from consuming X and Y , making full use of their labour
income. Preferences are Cobb-Douglas
U
S = (C
S
X)
α(C
S
Y)
1−α, 0 < α < 1, (3.18)
and optimal consumer behaviour yields the usual Marshallian demand func-
tions
C
S∗
X =
αES
pS
X
(3.19)
C
S∗
Y =
(1 − α)ES
pS
Y
, (3.20)
where α is a preference parameter and ES denotes overall nominal expen-
diture in South.
3.6 Economic eﬀects of Fair Trade
3.6.1 General equilibrium outcomes
There is free trade between North and South to isolate the eﬀects of the FT
wage premium in an elsewise undistorted economy. We assume that both
countries are of similar size to allow for complete global specialisation.11
North has a comparative advantage (i.e. relatively lower unit costs) in
producing X, while South is by virtue relatively more eﬃcient in producing
Y such that AN
BN > AS
BS.
Productivity in the FT sector is driven by two elements: BS captures a
particular level of base productivity which is enhanced by the positive exter-
nalities the FT premium might imply. Our framework suggests two compli-
mentary sources of trade: technological diﬀerences and altruistic spending
(θ > 0). Altruism is hence a necessary condition for trade in F to arise.
It enters in general equilibrium not just on the macro level (via higher
aggregate spending on FT products) but also on the micro level in that
higher consumption of a good made under fairer working conditions reﬂects
empathy felt for the FT workers’ utility.
It is straightforward to show that there is a unique equilibrium. World
expenditures (denoted by Ew) in this two-country setting without savings
equal world income in equilibrium and we can thus write: Ew = EN + ES.
Employment in North is trivial with complete specialisation: LN = LX.
11See Appendix B.3.1 for more detailed derivations of the necessary conditions for
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The main results of our model are driven by the activities taking place
in South. In particular, the endogenous allocation of labour across the two
active sectors Y and F matters:
L
S = LY + LF. (3.21)
Employment in each of these sectors determines production, consumption
and ultimately international terms of trade.
Labour can in principle move freely across sectors (wS
Y = wS and wN
X =
wN) but is country-speciﬁc in a Ricardian environment. Wage incomes in
N and S equal national expenditure levels in equilibrium which may be
written as
E
N = w
NL
N (3.22)
E
S = w
SLY + (1 + µ)w
SLF = w
S(L
S + µLF), (3.23)
where (3.21) has been used to replace LY.
Despite the wage diﬀerential, it is not necessarily the case that South’s
entire labour force works in the certiﬁed sector. It can be shown that in
general equilibrium the sectoral allocation of labour depends on preference
parameters and wage mark-up as follows12
LY =
 
1 −
αθ
(1 − σ)(1 + µ) − αθµ
!
L
S (3.24)
LF =
αθ
(1 − σ)(1 + µ) − αθµ
L
S, (3.25)
which suggests that employment in the FT sector is purely demand-driven.
As (3.25) reveals, the higher the demand for FT-products (i.e. larger θ),
the more employment ceteris paribus in F. The obvious implication from
(3.24) is that all the remaining labour is forced to work in the sector with-
out cooperative structures. We might think of (3.24) as measuring a form
of involuntary unemployment which in this Ricardian context is probably
most suitably described as involuntary employment. Moreover, the higher
the mark-up, the lower demand for a given θ and hence less employment
in F. Our model is thus able to capture an important trade-oﬀ of FT con-
sumption: on the one hand, consumers wish to be supportive of ethical
working conditions in developing South, on the other hand, higher prices
required to cover the FT premium reduce their budget set. The issue as to
what constitutes an optimal wage mark-up will therefore be central in the
12See Appendix B.3.2 for detailed derivations.Chapter 3. The Fair Trade movement: an economic perspective 67
welfare analysis below. It moreover follows from (3.24) and (3.25) that if
µ = 0, i.e. both sectors oﬀer the same working conditions, there is only one
active sector in South and F = CF = 0.
In a two-country world all goods produced are demanded in equilibrium:
X = C
N
X + C
S
X (3.26)
Y = C
N
Y + C
S
Y (3.27)
F = CF. (3.28)
Prices are determined on the world markets through supply and demand.
Goods can be traded freely and it therefore holds that
p
w
X ≡ pX = p
N
X = p
S
X, p
w
Y ≡ pY = p
N
Y = p
S
Y, p
w
F = pF. (3.29)
Relative prices on the global commodity markets follow endogenously:13
pY
pX
=
 
1 − σ
α
−
θµ
1 + µ
!
LN
LS
AN
BS (3.30)
pF
pX
=
 
(1 − σ)(1 + µ)
α
− θµ
!
LN
LS
AN
D
. (3.31)
The model’s reduced form solution suggests that international terms of trade
depend on labour endowments, technologies, preferences and the interac-
tion between the degree of altruistic spending in North and wage mark-up
in South. Except for µ, these determinants might be considered “deep”
parameters that also drive the main results in the benchmark Ricardian
setting.
This raises the question as to how changes in the FT premium aﬀect
international terms of trade. Partially diﬀerentiating (3.31) with respect to
the mark-up
∂(pF/pX)
∂µ
=
1 − σ
α
− θ
 LN
LS
AN
D
(3.32)
yields an analytic description of the behaviour of prices for FT commodities
(relative to the numeraire good) in response to changes in µ. They rise as
long as (1 − σ)/α > θ and fall if (1 − σ)/α < θ. The preference ratio
(1−σ)/α captures the conventional determinants of trade in a comparative
advantage environment. As long as the degree of ethical consumption falls
within that interval, FT prices rise in µ. The critical point occurs, when
these two forces balance at θ = (1 − σ)/α. Once FT consumption grows
13The derivations can be found in Appendix B.3.3.Chapter 3. The Fair Trade movement: an economic perspective 68
beyond this point, the concept is only sustainable if pF adjusts downwards
accordingly. In practice, of course, the downward price movement might be
prevented by the price ﬂoor.
Figure 3.2 sketches this relationship in a stylised fashion. Starting from
the intercept (µ = 0), which obviously coincides with the benchmark Ri-
cardian result (1−σ
α
LN
LS
AN
D ), the intuition is as follows. Suppose the rep-
resentative FT cooperative wishes to oﬀer higher premia to its members.
Eventually, this should be reﬂected in changing prices determined by basic
market forces. FT, however, is purely demand-driven. Depending on pref-
erences, three scenarios might arise. Increasing FT prices are only feasible
as long as the ethical consumer movement is on the rising path as indicated
by the upper line. However, there is also a lower bound (shown by the
horizontal dotted line) along which ethical consumerism stagnates. This
turning point occurs, once FT is no longer a niche movement but turns
mainstream. It appears intuitively plausible that a demand-driven concept
can only gain momentum if it is economically viable to consumers. Figure
3.2 thus visualises the inherent rigidity in the FT concept as downward pres-
sure on market prices (indicated by the dashed falling path) are typically
not binding for farmers in the certiﬁed sector.
μ
X
F
p
p
D
A
L
L
N
S
N
α
σ − 1
Figure 3.2: Illustration of the behaviour of FT prices as function of mark-up
One might draw several conclusions from this thought experiment. First,
given its demand-driven nature, FT seems to be only sustainable as niche
movement. Second and perhaps more importantly, being part of this well-
deﬁned system gives the FT cooperative a strong incentive to ensure FT
remains within that niche which justiﬁes the price diﬀerential (we return to
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suggests that the FT premium could turn out to be too high. In this case,
prices would need to be ﬂexible downwards or, if this was prevented, demand
would drop which would ultimately hurt the very marginalised producers
FT intends to protect (we quantify these eﬀects in Section 3.6.3).
3.6.2 Calibration
We calibrate the model to obtain a better quantitative understanding of the
welfare eﬀects of changes in the FT premium. Reﬂecting the market-based
nature of FT, we consider the decentralised solution in deriving the Ben-
thamite social welfare function denoted by Uw. We choose X as numeraire
(pX = 1) and obtain14
U
w =
 
θαDLS
(1 − σ)(1 + µ) − αθµ
!θ 
σA
NL
N
σ
 
(1 − σ − θ)α(1 + µ)BSLS
(1 − σ)(1 + µ) − αθµ
!1−σ−θ
+

(1 − σ)A
NL
N
α
 
(1 − α)B
SL
S
"
1 +
αθµ
(1 − σ)(1 + µ) − αθµ
#!1−α
. (3.33)
Table 3.1 summarises the chosen parameter values. The exogenous part
includes all the model’s primitives that are not altered further. Both coun-
tries are of the same mass – normalised to 1 here. The equal size qualiﬁ-
cation appears plausible comparing the population ﬁgures of the EU with
typical coﬀee exporting regions such as Latin America or Eastern Africa. We
moreover treat preferences as purely exogenous. Those can be understood
in this context as trade shares and are calibrated as follows. We choose α
to measure the import share of manufactures in total merchandise trade for
South and Central America which according to WTO (2009) data amounts
to 0.69. Data provided by the European Commission (2010) suggests that
in principle one out of three products traded in the EU could qualify for FT
status which implies that σ = 0.67. Whilst there is no robust data on the
demand for FT products, we set θ = 0.05, reﬂecting the still rather small
importance of FT products in global trade.15
Sectoral productivities are exogenous in a Ricardian set-up. Technolo-
gies are linear such that marginal products coincide with average pro-
ductivities. If we express real unit labour costs in North and South as
aN ≡ LX/X = 1/AN and bS ≡ LY/Y = 1/BS, respectively, we may deﬁne
labour productivity as the amount of X and Y each country produces on
14See Appendix B.3.4 for the derivations.
15The Guardian (2010) reports a share of 5% sales of FT-certiﬁed products in the
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average per hour of labour. The OECD (2008) reports estimates of labour
productivity in the range of 43-45 for the EU and values of 19 and 16 for
Mexico and Chile, respectively, and based on this empirical evidence we
strive to maintain a ratio of BS/AN = 2/5 in the calibration.
parameter value
exogenous LN 1a
LS 1a
α 0.69b
σ 0.67b
θ 0.05b
BS/AN 2/5b
imposed D (≡ ψBS) ≥ BS
calibrated ψ 1
µ [0,1]
Table 3.1: Model calibration. a: normalised to 1. b: based on empirical
evidence
The next panel in the Table displays all conditions that are imposed to
warrant meaningful results. These relations arise endogenously in the sense
that they need to be satisﬁed for internal consistency. As discussed above,
we claim that D ≥ BS, which is reﬂected in our calibration exercise by
deﬁning D ≡ ψBS, where ψ captures all potential positive eﬀects the more
sustainable working conditions may have on sector-wide productivity.
It follows that two parameters need to be calibrated as depicted in the
lower panel of Table 3.1. Those capture the core elements of FT. Posi-
tive values of µ imply the presence of fair wages, whereas ψ > 1 captures
potential productivity gains in the FT-sector resulting from the premium.
Given the prevailing lack of suﬃciently strong evidence for productivity-
enhancing eﬀects of FT, we ignore those potential long-term aspects of FT
and set ψ = 1. We specify an 0 to 1 interval for the wage premium such
that wages in F can be up to twice as high compared to the non-cooperative
sector.
3.6.3 Welfare eﬀects of Fair Trade
We investigate the welfare implications of FT based on the calibration de-
tailed in Table 3.1. Figure 3.3 plots the evolution of global welfare with
variations in the FT premium. As discussed above, µ = 0 corresponds toChapter 3. The Fair Trade movement: an economic perspective 71
the benchmark outcome in the conventional Ricardian setting of trade in
only two products. The resulting welfare level is indicated in the Figure by
the horizontal red line. The Figure reveals that the presence of FT does
indeed raise global welfare. The theoretical justiﬁcation for this ﬁnding is
that whilst all Walrasian equilibria are Pareto eﬃcient, they need not neces-
sarily be socially optimal from a welfare-theoretic perspective. Indeed, the
presence of welfare gains is in line with other theoretical studies (Becchetti
and Adriani (2002); Richardson and Stähler (2007); Poret and Chambolle
(2007), amongst others) who hint at positive welfare eﬀects through greater
trade integration and product diﬀerentiation. However, the Figure also
shows that those eﬀects are rather sensitive to the level of µ. With premia
exceeding 15%, global welfare falls relatively strongly. Quantitatively and
qualitatively we can thus identify a distinct segment (0 < µ < 0.2) in which
welfare gains outweigh welfare losses. This result is consistent with empir-
ical evidence which suggests that consumers are willing to accept a price
premium of roughly 10% (de Pelsmacker et al., 2005).
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Figure 3.3: Overall welfare eﬀects with varying FT premium.
The model thus provides theoretical evidence for the FT supporters’
claim that FT is beneﬁcial for the world as a whole. As can also be shownChapter 3. The Fair Trade movement: an economic perspective 72
analytically, welfare in North falls monotonically with increasing µ, whilst
it rises in South. Provided that (at least some) households in North are
willing to sacriﬁce resources to make farmers in South better oﬀ (through
positive income eﬀects), there can be positive welfare eﬀects. The positive
global welfare eﬀects arise because of an altruistically motivated transfer
of welfare from North to South. Consumers in North are willing to make
themselves slightly worse oﬀ to allow the world as a whole to beneﬁt. On
an aggregate level, once welfare losses in North dominate due to too high
wage premia, global gains are eroded.
It does appear to be the case, however, that the positive global welfare
eﬀects only sustain in the presence of suﬃciently strong spending on FT
goods. We have experimented as robustness check with diﬀerent values for
θ and found that the positive welfare eﬀects do vanish with FT-induced
consumption spending dropping below 3%. Moreover, it seems intuitively
plausible that this “utility transfer” only sustains within certain limits. Sim-
ilar to the analytical mechanism described above, the quantitative analysis
conﬁrms that for too high premia, demand for FT products falls, hereby
hindering further certiﬁcations of farmers in South and ultimately making
all agents worse oﬀ. Due to the price and employment frictions (certiﬁcation
is demand-driven) embedded in the FT concept, overall welfare might thus
drop well below levels as for instance predicted in the benchmark Ricardian
setting of µ = 0.
3.6.4 Distributional eﬀects of Fair Trade
While the existence of the FT premium raises overall welfare and indirectly
allows for a transfer of wealth between North and South, it does create
adverse distributional eﬀects within South. Welfare gains in South arise
solely in the FT sector whose farmers beneﬁt from higher wages at the
expense of farmers in the non-certiﬁed sector. Taking relative wages as
measure of income inequalities
ω(µ) ≡
wF
wY
, ω
0(µ) > 0, (3.34)
it is straightforward to see that the FT premium causes economic inequal-
ities across the two active sectors in South which are accelerating as the
diﬀerences in occupational standards become more pronounced. This is an
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in general.16 The interesting aspect lies in understanding what drives these
inequalities and whether they are problematic to FT.
The simple answer is that if there were no FT, i.e. µ = 0, there would
be only one active sector (see (3.23)) and inequalities would thus vanish.
FT supporters, of course, would argue that FT achieves a rise in living
standards at least for some individuals and if demand was higher, more
farmers could beneﬁt from the fairer working conditions. Identifying the
determinants of relative wages in the context of FT is thus likely to yield
important policy implications – in particular with respect to rising inequal-
ities – and we therefore provide in the following further microfoundations
to the determinants of µ.
As we have already noted, the existence of fair wages in one sector rela-
tive to the other introduces rigidities in South. The result is a dual labour
market. Labour is homogeneous17 but F is characterised by cooperative
structures. In general, all farmers would like to produce in the FT sector
but only those with certiﬁcation are allowed to enter. Employment (and
thus certiﬁcation) in our framework is endogenously determined through
the demand side in North. All remaining workers are involuntarily em-
ployed in Y . There is, however, a crucial feedback mechanism as with an
increasing wage mark-up also demand drops. FT creates an insider-outsider
problem: cooperatives have an incentive to oﬀer higher premia, yet they
hereby constrain output and foster inequalities.
We can formalise this mechanism as follows. Think of the FT cooper-
ative as a monopoly trade union that not only hires workers but also sets
the level of working standards – as captured through µ. It is characteristic
of cooperative structures that additional gains are immediately reinvested
in the community and thus beneﬁt all members equally. This permits fo-
cusing on a representative farmer. The cooperative is assumed to treat the
wage, which is determined in general equilibrium, parametrically. Proﬁt
maximisation can hence be described as a two-stage process, similar to the
well-known eﬃciency wage model of Solow (1979). In step one, the coop-
erative sets the level of working standards (i.e. µ) which fully describes
wF. In step two, the cooperative hires workers up to the point at which the
marginal value product equals the wage resulting from the previous step.
16This point has already been observed, amongst others, by Leclair (2002) but it has
not been formalised thus far.
17In other words, we focus on the determinants of the wage for unskilled labour. More
conventional dual sector models diﬀerentiate between urban and rural sectors and the
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The latter result has already been used above and it thus suﬃces to describe
the cooperative’s rationale of setting µ.
Suppose the representative farmer in F derives utility from his wage
income which rises in µ. His eﬀorts are governed by
F = min
 
wF
w∗
F
,1
!
. (3.35)
This description goes back to Akerlof and Yellen (1990)’s seminal fair wage-
eﬀort hypothesis which states that workers’ eﬀorts F depend on their con-
ception of a fair wage, denoted by w∗
F. Workers provide the normal level
of eﬀort (normalised to 1) if they are paid at least their fair wage. Eﬀort
levels could then be linked to average productivities (D in our notation) but
this is not crucial as we only consider the equilibrium case in which workers
receive their fair wage.
In the context of our model, the fair wage has two determinants: the
degree by which the more ethical working standards exceed the informal
sector (proxied by wF −wY) and the remuneration FT farmers could expect
in the competitive benchmark sector. The latter factor is scaled in more
conventional fair wage models by the sector-speciﬁc unemployment rate
to express the probability with which workers could end up outside their
own job (Kreickemeier and Nelson, 2006). Here, we could think in terms of
relative employment h(µ) ≡ LF/LY, where LF ≤ LY. Relative employment
is demand-driven and indeed the FT cooperative has an incentive to exploit
inequalities in employment levels: As long as there are sectoral employment
diﬀerences, an increasing fair wage is justiﬁed. We might therefore think of
h(µ) as measure for the ease of entry into the certiﬁed sector with h0(µ) < 0
to capture the insider-outsider mechanism described above.
Fair wages are thus expressed as:
w
∗
F = ΛµwY + (1 − Λ)(1 − h(µ))wY, (3.36)
where we have used (3.10) to replace the wage diﬀerential and Λ is the weight
attached to the respective factors of the fair wage concept. In the context
of developing countries, this weight is likely to be driven by macroeconomic
conditions and could thus also be interpreted as need for sustainable working
conditions vis-à-vis the degree of duality among unskilled workers. The
latter term in (3.36) obviously drops out in the absence of employment
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Due to (3.35), the cooperative rationally sets µ such that wF = w∗
F, i.e.
actual and fair wages should coincide to avoid ineﬃciencies. Thus,
ω = Λµ + (1 − Λ)(1 − h(µ)). (3.37)
While the interpretation obviously diﬀers from Akerlof and Yellen (1990)’s
original notion, we might consider (3.37) the fair wage constraint in the
sense that it establishes a link between equilibrium levels of wage inequal-
ities and fair wages. More speciﬁcally, wage inequalities are determined
by a weighted average of wage rigidities (the ﬁrst term of the right hand
side) and employment frictions (the second term of the right hand side).
Diﬀerentiating (3.37) with respect to µ gives
ω
0(µ) = Λ + (1 − Λ)h
0(µ).
The fair wage constraint is obviously upward-sloping in the ω − µ-space.
However, for a given Λ, the more responsive relative employment is to
changes in employment conditions in F (i.e. the higher the ease of en-
try), the lower the degree of inequalities. Equally, the lower the weight
workers attach to the FT premium, the lower the cooperative’s incentive to
raise the FT premium and thus inequalities become less pronounced.
The variant of the fair wage constraint suggests several policy implica-
tions regarding the design of the FT system. First, it may not necessarily
be the case that lower employment in F is exclusively due to insuﬃcient
demand in North. Other institutional features inherent in the FT system
(entry costs, limitations in labour mobility) might give rise to a segmented
labour market. Wage inequalities would be lower without those barriers in
equilibrium. Second, the actions of the FT cooperative and its incentives
to oﬀer fair wages (hereby allowing for more ethical working conditions)
follow rationally in line with optimal behaviour. Indeed, in the absence of
economic inequalities, FT can hardly prevail. Third, we know from (3.32)
that a rising degree ethical consumerism puts downward pressure on FT
prices. If, however, income and employment diﬀerentials are crucial drivers
of the FT premium, our analysis raises the question of the sustainability of
FT on a broader scale.
3.7 Concluding remarks
In this largely explorative Chapter we have sought to make sense of the
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closed form expressions to ensure tractability and greatest economic intu-
ition. Our model set-up moreover allows for comparisons against a mean-
ingful (the Ricardian) benchmark. We have shown that FT can arise in a
perfectly competitive environment. FT is compatible with the notion of free
trade and indeed both forms of trade are complementary to some extent.
FT is the result of utility maximising altruistic spending behaviour and thus
completely rational.
We have found that FT can be overall welfare-improving within an em-
pirically plausible range. This does require a suﬃcient level of altruistic
spending which ultimately gives rise to a transfer of utility from North to
South. However, the converging pattern between North and South comes
at the cost of rising income inequalities within South. The characteristic
FT premium which ensures sustainable working conditions in the FT sector
introduces rigidities which can be explained by deriving a variant of a fair
wage constraint.
Whilst it is diﬃcult not to oversimplify the complex phenomenon of
FT in a theoretical study, the model is able to capture characteristic ele-
ments of FT. Our analysis suggests that FT as a concept largely operates
on the input markets. Employment in the FT sector is essentially rationed
through North’s demand side. Therefore, any subsidy or other mechanism
(say, further advertising) which might entice consumers to buy more FT
products would be a way of not only raising living standards in South but
also of limiting inequalities. However, this is by far not the complete pic-
ture. Indeed, there are several rigidities embedded in FT which not only
characterise but ultimately drive the system. FT cooperatives need to en-
sure for eﬃciency reasons an appropriate level of the FT premium. Also,
to become a truly mainstream movement, FT prices would need to be sub-
jected to basic market forces. This, however, is against the very idea of FT.
Overall, our analysis suggests that FT might only be sustainable as niche
movement.
Keeping the inevitable limitations of our theoretical approach to the
matter in mind, one might draw several conclusions regarding development
policies from the analysis. First, too much reliance of South on the FT
mechanism is likely to accelerate regional heterogeneities. Given the implied
sustainability issues, FT should be considered what it claims to be, that is an
alternative form of trade. If at all, FT might be able to complement existing
development policies but appears unlikely to replace wider programmes in
a satisfactory manner. Second, for FT to allocate labour eﬃciently, the
transition between secondary and FT sector should be made as smooth asChapter 3. The Fair Trade movement: an economic perspective 77
possible. Low entry barriers and a suﬃcient degree of labour mobility are
crucial to limit inequalities. Policymakers should be aware that the FT
cooperative has a rational incentive to exploit inequalities. Relying on FT
as an eﬀective tool to alleviate poverty on a broader scale thus seems to be
a questionable strategy.
The economic analysis of FT is still in its infancy. We do see promising
avenues for further research. Particularly empirical evidence on the eﬀects
of ethical FT consumption is rather scant. Does the FT premium really
raise productivities both on an individual and community level? How does
the cooperative nature in the FT sector aﬀect sectoral employment? Further
empirical insights would inform the theoretical modelling process. This is
crucial because ultimately one would like to space the model across time
to investigate the long-term eﬀects of FT further. As yet, this evidence is
still to be established. As consumers’ awareness in industrialised countries
increases, understanding the economic impact of ethical consumerism is
crucial and will ultimately determine its future path.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Elhanan Helpman, Sushil Mohan, Catia Montagna
and J. Peter Neary for stimulating discussions and participants at the 2011
SGPE conference in Crieﬀ for helpful comments. I moreover would like
to acknowledge ﬁnancial support by the Scottish Institute for Research in
Economics (SIRE) to present this work at the 2011 European Economic
Association (EEA) conference in Oslo.Chapter 4
Should the Fed be worried about
rising economic inequalities?
Chapter Summary
Numerous factors such as global imbalances or weak ﬁnancial reg-
ulation haven been attributed to the outbreak of the recent global
economic crisis. However, as also argued by Rajan (2010), there are
other – slightly less salient (and thus probably at least as important)
factors – like rising economic inequalities that have led to instabili-
ties. Indeed, there is compelling empirical evidence for growing socio-
economic divergence in many industrialised countries. In particular
the U.S. economy is characterised by increasing internal imbalances
but at the same time features an institutional environment in which
labour markets place a wage premium on skilled workers (the so-
called college premium) as well as a central bank that oﬃcially pur-
sues a dual mandate of both caring for stable prices and maximum
employment. We therefore consider in this Chapter the relationship
between rising economic inequalities in the U.S. and monetary policy.
Instead of dealing with wage inequalities directly (say, through in-
come redistribution), we analyse to what extent monetary policy can
be used as rather blunt tool in an attempt to mitigate the suﬀerings of
lower-class households. In considering distributional eﬀects of mon-
etary policy we augment the benchmark New Keynesian model by
heterogeneous labour, distinguishing skilled vis-à-vis unskilled work-
ers. This introduces the notion of relativities in key macroeconomic
variables such as real wages, consumption and wealth, hereby provid-
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ing a natural measure of economic inequalities. Our results indicate
that monetary policy has asymmetric eﬀects across the two sets of
households which can lead in a rule-based environment to a further
widening of the consumption, wage and in particular wealth gap.
We moreover consider how the presence of inequalities aﬀects the
design of optimal monetary policy. We ﬁnd that whilst inequalities
do matter, it is not optimal for a monetary authority to seek to fully
tackle those inequality-increasing eﬀects. Policy objectives that ex-
plicitly seek to limit inequalities appear hardly feasible and seem to
introduce additional trade-oﬀs into the conduct of monetary policy.
4.1 Introduction
Since the end of the Great Moderation, it has become increasingly self-
evident to economic policymakers around the world also to consider the
wider implications of their actions. Indeed, the growing asset price bubble
in the United States (U.S.) – whose burst set oﬀ a whole chain of events
ultimately leading to the global ﬁnancial crisis – was to a large extent driven
by the political desire to create access for households of lower income ranks
to their own housing. Home ownership has always been an important el-
ement of the American Dream and as such was actively supported under
both President Bill Clinton’s and later President George W. Bush’s admin-
istration. When domestic interest rates were low and global savings high,
policymakers in the U.S. saw a golden opportunity to do something about
the rising income inequalities at home.1 As Rajan (2010) argues, in the light
of steadily rising economic inequalities, there was increasing political pres-
sure to tackle those using short-run measures. Given the alleged potency
of monetary policy to steer the evolution of the economy, it thus appears
natural to ask what role monetary policy could and should possibly play in
this regard.
Whilst there is an evolving empirical literature (see Bordo and Meissner
(2011) for example) that analyses how Rajan (2010)’s argument relates to
ﬁnancial instability, the focus of this Chapter is distinct in that it is on
real inequalities and how they relate to the conduct and optimal design
1See Section 4.2 for further stylised facts on income inequalities and rising wage gaps
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of monetary policy.2 In particular, we want to investigate whether it is
desirable and feasible for a central bank to be worried about rising economic
inequalities over the business cycle. More speciﬁcally, how does monetary
policy operate in an environment that is marked by inequalities and are
there asymmetric eﬀects across households in response to exogenous shocks?
Economic inequalities and their relationship with monetary policy have not
been investigated to the best of our knowledge from this angle thus far.3
It should be noted that there are diﬀerent notions of asymmetry in re-
lation with monetary policy and we use that term to refer to asymmetric
eﬀects of monetary policy across households. The related but diﬀerent no-
tion of asymmetric monetary policy behaviour in a rule-based environment
implies that policymakers assign diﬀerent weights to positive and negative
deviations of inﬂation and output from their reference values. This issue has
been investigated for diﬀerent countries by a number of authors (Cukierman
and Muscatelli (2002) and Surico (2007) amongst others), typically using a
linear-quadratic framework.
There is already a rather active literature on the evolution of economic
inequalities over the business cycle that focuses on the welfare state and
ﬁscal policies. Horvath and Nolan (2011), for example, study the short-
run eﬀects of a progressive tax and beneﬁt system on inequalities. Another
strand of literature is more concerned with the econometric analysis. A
widely accepted stylised fact in that regard is that in particular earnings
inequalities tend to widen during periods of economic downturn. Barlevy
and Tsiddon (2006), however, argue empirically that this does not neces-
sarily need to be the case as the short-run evolution of inequalities rather
depends on the underlying long-run trend.
To investigate the short-run relationship between economic inequalities
and monetary policy, we set up a New Keynesian (NK) model that extends
the prototypical framework (Clarida et al. (1999); Galí (2003)) in two di-
mensions: First, labour is heterogeneous, i.e. we distinguish between skilled
vis-à-vis unskilled households. Second, ﬁnancial markets are incomplete and
2It should be noted that Rajan’s investigation into the root causes of the Crisis is
richer and serves in this Chapter chieﬂy to motivate the analysis.
3There is an ongoing debate about the future design of monetary policy in light of
the recent crisis. See, amongst others, Blinder (2010) and Mishkin (2010) for a further
discussion. It should be noted that our analysis is motivated by the case of the U.S. Fed
whose political mandate and prevailing academic orthodoxy is distinct. Lessons for the
monetary policy strategy of the ECB amid recent developments are for instance discussed
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subject to transaction costs.4
Diﬀerentiating between diﬀerent types of labour based on skill levels
introduces the notion of relativities in key macroeconomic variables into
the monetary policy problem and, as we discuss in more detail in Section
4.2, matches well with more recent U.S. labour market data. Whilst our
analysis is motivated by developments in the U.S., there is strong evidence
for rising inequalities in other industrialised countries such as the UK but
also eurozone economies like Germany (see Goos and Manning (2009) for a
recent overview). As also noted by the OECD (2012), it is not so much the
level of inequalities that gives reason for concern in industrialised countries
but the rates at which those are growing. Thus, it appears to be increas-
ingly important to also consider distributional eﬀects of monetary policy.
The objective of this Chapter is to take a ﬁrst step of the analysis in that
direction.
The approach taken in this Chapter is as follows. We ﬁrst specify a
conventional Taylor rule in which the central bank sets interest rates in line
with changes in inﬂation. This permits investigating how households’ re-
sponses diﬀer using well-established perturbation techniques. We compare
our results with the benchmark economy with homogeneous labour through-
out. Based on this positive evidence, we turn in a next step to the optimal
monetary policy response from a welfare-theoretic perspective taking house-
hold utility into account and, in an attempt to capture the essence of Rajan
(2010)’s argument, also analyse a Ramsey plan that explicitly cares about
the welfare of the unskilled.
A main result of the Chapter is that monetary policy by itself seems to
be neither a suitable nor feasible tool to deal with economic inequalities.
Our ﬁndings indicate that monetary policy has asymmetric eﬀects across the
two sets of households which leads to a further rise in economic inequalities
over the business cycle. This applies in particular to wealth inequalities.
Wage inequalities appear to be largely driven by swings in relative hours
worked. The analysis of the optimal design of monetary policy reveals that
inequalities do matter. However, the Ramsey planner seems to be unable
to eﬀectively limit the inequality-increasing eﬀects. A Ramsey plan that
explicitly seeks to cater for the well-being of unskilled households reveals
4Whilst the elementary components of the benchmark NK model (such as nominal
price rigidities or rational expectations) stem from the well-established literature on
micro-founded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, these type of
models have come under increased scrutiny lately (Arestis and Sawyer, 2008). Our model
addresses some of the methodological shortcomings typically brought forward in that it
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that mitigating the eﬀects of inequalities on the real side of the economy
appears a hardly implementable target for monetary policymakers and may
introduce additional trade-oﬀs over the short run.
The policy lesson is that the monetary authority should thus not be
overly concerned about rising economic inequalities in terms of wages or
consumption. Although his argument is more nuanced, this does counter at
least to some extent Rajan (2010)’s idea of the potency of monetary policy
in tackling inequalities over the short run. However, monetary policy does
have a considerable bearing on the evolution of wealth inequalities. Next
to the normative dimension our model also features positive elements in
that it explores to what extent the presence of heterogeneous labour aﬀects
outcomes compared to the benchmark NK model. We see that whilst overall
responses are in line with predictions arising in a NK economy, considering
distributional eﬀects of monetary policy is crucial as it allows for more
nuanced policy implications.
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 summarises important
stylised facts on income inequalities in the U.S. in the recent past. Section
4.3 presents the NK-type model with heterogeneous labour. The model is
calibrated in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents the simulation results. We
analyse the design of optimal monetary policy in Section 4.6. Section 4.7
concludes.
4.2 Stylised facts
Economic inequalities can be measured along several dimensions (e.g. in-
come, consumption and wealth). These forms of inequalities are obviously
closely linked and we therefore investigate them jointly in this Chapter.
Wages form the most important income component and the following dis-
cussion is in particular concerned with inequalities arising from relative
wage income diﬀerentials.5 Rising income inequalities have not always been
considered problematic for the economy as a whole. President Reagan’s
economic policies, for example, were rather openly aimed at the beneﬁt of
the wealthy. The credo was that the additional disposable incomes created
through deregulation and lowering income as well as capital gains taxes
5Accounting for inequalities in wages (a ﬂow variable) alone is unlikely to suﬃciently
capture the households’ economic position. In the calibration (discussed in Section 4.4)
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would eventually “trickle down” to poorer households as well.6
From a purely economic perspective, relative wage diﬀerentials might
reﬂect diﬀerences in eﬀorts and productivities and can help identifying the
kind of jobs that require the highest skill levels, eventually providing incen-
tives to workers to invest in human capital. According to the World Values
Survey (2005), U.S. citizens generally believe more in the virtues of hard
work and self-made entrepreneurship as means of overcoming poverty than
for example British, French or Germans. This belief is commonly captured
by the notion of “going from rags to riches” and tends to make voters less
agreeable to a tax-induced redistribution of incomes (Alesina et al., 2001).
Income inequalities are becoming problematic (and would ultimately call
for some form of policy action), however, if factors other than innate ability
and individual eﬀorts came into play. Indeed, a recent study by Kopczuk
et al. (2010) using social security data suggests that both short-term (up
to ﬁve years) income mobility as well as long-term (i.e. lifetime) income
mobility have been fairly stable since the 1950s.
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Figure 4.1: Gini coeﬃcients based on individual annual earnings. Workers
are deﬁned here by employment in commerce and industrial sectors, aged
25 to 60. See Kopczuk et al. (2010) for further methodological details.
Amid the empirical evidence for a rather limited mobility across income
6Poverty as share of total population in these days, however, rather stagnated ac-
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groups, considering yearly snapshots of cross-sectional measures of income
inequality hence closely corresponds to the evolution of income inequal-
ity over the longer term. Figure 4.1, based on data provided by Kopczuk
et al. (2010), shows annual Gini coeﬃcients from 1937 to 2004 for the en-
tire sample and split by gender.7 Long-term inequality has been evolving
in a U-shaped pattern, implying steady increases since 1953 that acceler-
ated especially in the 1980s. This evidence is line with other studies. Since
the late 1970s, there has been an increasing “polarisation” particularly in
British and U.S. labour markets into high-skill and low-skill jobs at the
expense of middle-skill jobs (Autor et al., 2006). Among all workers, the
increase in the Gini coeﬃcient over the ﬁve decades from 1953 to 2004 is al-
most linear suggesting an upward trend that is not conﬁned to single events.
As Figure 4.1 shows, a similar U-shaped pattern can be observed for the
gender-speciﬁc series. Income inequalities appear particularly pronounced
among male workers.
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Figure 4.2: Percentiles of annual household earnings distribution (nor-
malised to 0 in 1967). Source: Current Population Survey (CPS).
The divergence of wages is typically quantiﬁed by considering diﬀer-
ent percentiles of the earnings distribution. Figure 4.2 plots the trends in
7As usual, the Gini coeﬃcient varies from 0 to 1, where 0 represents perfect equality
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U.S. household earnings for the top, median as well as bottom decile. The
data, based on a recent study by Heathcote et al. (2010), ranges from 1967
to 2005 and illustrates the growing widening of the distribution as higher
percentiles have experienced relatively higher wage growth. The Figure
moreover suggests that households earnings at the bottom of the distribu-
tion suﬀer relatively strongly during recessions. Consider for example the
contraction of the U.S. economy between 1980 to 1982. Earnings at the
bottom decile declined by nearly 20% and did not return to pre-recession
levels until the late 1990s.
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of the college premium. Source: Heathcote et al.
(2010).
In particular two factors have been identiﬁed in the literature as prox-
imate causes of wage inequalities in the U.S.: skill-biased technological
change (SBTC) and the so-called college premium. Both factors share a
similar underlying mechanism and are in a way complimentary. SBTC sug-
gests that technological advances (such as automatisation, computerisation,
etc.) beneﬁt skilled workers in a biased fashion as it increases demand for
them and hereby pushes up their wages relative to the unskilled. Since
the level of skills and thus individual productivity is largely determined by
the level of education (i.e. the accumulation of human capital), there is a
corresponding supply-side argument that is often overlooked. Whilst basicChapter 4. Should the Fed be worried about rising economic inequalities? 86
high-school education was suﬃcient for many jobs in the 1950s-70s, there
is nowadays an increasing premium on college education. Goldin and Katz
(2008) describe this phenomenon as a “race between education and technol-
ogy”, which is characterised by a situation in which labour is becoming ever
more skill-intensive, requiring an increasing level of educational attainment
of subsequent cohorts to keep up. However, as numbers show, growth of
educational attainment (measured by the share of college graduates in the
U.S. workforce) has been particularly sluggish for those at the bottom of the
income distribution – in particular for racial and ethnic minorities (Goldin
and Katz, 2008). Income inequalities could therefore also be explained by
a relative lack of supply of skilled local workers.
In the calibration of steady-state wage inequalities below, we particularly
resort to the notion of this college wage premium which is the most common
driver of inequalities for the U.S. considered in the literature. Heathcote
et al. (2010) present evidence for the college premium to evolve in the typical
U-shaped pattern as shown in Figure 4.3.
Overall, it appears the appropriate long-term policy response to ris-
ing inequalities may lie in fostering the domestic workforce’s accumulation
of human capital. This would shield workers from outside inﬂuences (say
through immigration or the the threat of outsourcing) but would also in-
crease their adaptability to technological advancement in general. Whilst
probably both supply and demand side eﬀects matter, in this Chapter we do
not oﬀer a theory of the deep causes of wage inequalities. We focus instead
on the short-run eﬀects of exogenous productivity shocks to skilled and
unskilled labour and the use of monetary policy as quick remedy without
tackling the problem at its roots. The evidence for limited social mobil-
ity and rising wage gaps motivates in particular our modelling decision to
distinguish between skilled and unskilled workers as two separate sets of
households. Workers cannot retrain over the short run and are thus treated
as ex-ante heterogeneous.
4.3 The model
We develop in this Section a model of a closed NK economy populated
by two types of households who diﬀer in terms of their skill levels. Since
labour is ex-ante heterogeneous, it appears reasonable to relax the assump-
tion of complete ﬁnancial markets. In particular, there is both aggregate
and individual uncertainty about future incomes and prices. The repre-Chapter 4. Should the Fed be worried about rising economic inequalities? 87
sentative skilled and unskilled households thus desire to insure themselves
against aggregate technology shocks but they face transaction costs when
restructuring their asset portfolios. We want to single out the eﬀects on
aggregates like household-speciﬁc consumption and wages and consider the
two types of households as similar in several other dimensions (such as rel-
ative risk aversion). The remaining economic agents in our model are as
usual a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, the government
and a monetary authority.
4.3.1 Households
Households are of two types, skilled (S) and unskilled (U) and inﬁnitely-
lived. The representative household of type i,i = S,U seeks to maximise
the following objective function
E0
∞ X
t=0
(β
t)
iU(C
i
t,N
i
t), (4.1)
where Ci is a composite consumption index for type i and Ni denotes the
skill-speciﬁc aggregate labour supply. Time endowments for each house-
hold are normalised to 1 such that 1−Ni measures time allocated to leisure
(i.e. non-productive activities). Lifetime utility is thus determined through
the consumption of goods and leisure across time in keeping with standard
micro-foundations. Instantaneous utility in (4.1) is assumed to satisfy the
usual conditions. In particular, the marginal utility of consumption is as-
sumed to be positive and non-increasing, while a marginal increase in labour
supply creates non-decreasing disutility.
The type-speciﬁc utility function is given by
E0
∞ X
t=0
(β
t)
i
"
(Ci
t)1−σ − 1
1 − σ
− Ψ
i(Ni
t)1+ϕi
1 + ϕi
#
, (4.2)
where Et is the mathematical expectations operator conditional on the in-
formation available in period t, βi ∈ (0,1) denotes the household’s discount
factor and Ψi > 0. Preferences are intertemporally additive with σ cap-
turing the (inverse) of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ϕi
measuring the degree of disutility from labour which we allow to diﬀer
across households. This speciﬁcation reduces the role of money to being a
nominal unit of account, thereby considering the limiting case of a cashless
economy in which the relative preference weight on real money balances is
arbitrarily close to zero.Chapter 4. Should the Fed be worried about rising economic inequalities? 88
As our economy is characterised by heterogeneous agents, it appears
plausible to impede risk sharing in consumption. Households seek to obtain
(at least partial) insurance against uncertainty about future labour income
in the absence of complete ﬁnancial markets. More speciﬁcally, they can
only invest in risk-free bonds bi
t+1 but incur costs for doing so. Real bond
holdings are governed by the following quadratic cost function
ω(b
i
t+1) =
1
2
Ω
i(b
i
t+1)
2, (4.3)
where Ωi scales the degree of ﬁnancial frictions each household faces.8 In
variation to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) who specify the quadratic costs
in terms of deviations from some ﬁxed level of bond holdings, (4.3) does not
vanish in the long run. This permits capturing empirically observed diﬀer-
ences in savings behaviour. Households for instance face costs in gathering
and processing the information related to their bond holding decision and
thus access bond markets to a diﬀerent extent, which is treated as a struc-
tural as opposed to a cyclical characteristic of the economy.9 Our model
features this realism by allowing the bond holding costs to diﬀer across the
two sets of consumers as discussed in more detail in Section 4.4.
The type i nominal budget constraint is given by
PtC
i
t + Ptb
i
t+1 +
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2
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iPt(b
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t + Rt−1Pt−1b
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t + W
i
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where Pt is the aggregate price level. We adopt the following notation for
the holdings of assets: bi
t+1 represents the purchases of one-period bonds
that yield a pay-oﬀ of one unit of currency at maturity in t + 1 and the
nominal (gross) return is denoted by Rt. Households also pay nominal
lump-sum taxes Tt ≥ 0 to the government. The right hand side of (4.4)
summarises the diﬀerent sources of income at time t: Households supply
labour and receive a nominal wage income of W i
tNi
t. Moreover, households
receive monopoly proﬁts in the form of dividends Πi
t.
The budget constraint can obviously be written in real terms as
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where τt denotes real lump-sum taxation and rt are real interest rates.
8The frictionless model is thus obtained by ω(·) = 0.
9In a similar vein, Benigno (2009) introduces costs in changing asset holdings to
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Household-speciﬁc consumption is aggregated by the following constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) basket of diﬀerentiated products
C
i
t ≡
Z 1
0
C
i
t(j)
θ−1
θ dj
 θ
θ−1
, (4.6)
where θ describes the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties
among the continuum of diﬀerentiated goods on the unit interval and Ci
t(j)
is household’s i demand for consumption good j. Constrained maximisation
yields the usual demand function for goods variety j:
C
i
t(j) =
 
Pt(j)
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The resulting CES price index (deﬁned through the Lagrange multiplier
from the intratemporal maximisation problem) is given by
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt(j)
1−θdj
 1
1−θ
. (4.8)
Considering household’s i intertemporal problem, we obtain the follow-
ing ﬁrst order conditions, respectively, for consumption, labour supply and
bond holdings:
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Eliminating the Lagrange multiplier in (4.9) yields the Euler equations for
labour supply
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Note how (4.13) yields the standard consumption Euler equation in the
absence of trading frictions.
4.3.2 Firms
The domestic economy consists of a continuum of monopolistically compet-
itive ﬁrms that are indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. Each ﬁrm j employs skilled NS
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and unskilled NU
t (j) labour to produce a diﬀerentiated product using the
following CES production function
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ρ−1
ρ
 ρ
ρ−1
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where ρ is the elasticity of substitution between the types of workers, At is
aggregate productivity and δi
t is a time-varying weight capturing demand for
skilled vis-à-vis unskilled labour. Note that in the extreme case of NU = 0,
(4.14) reduces to a linear production function in (only skilled) labour.10 The
level of productivity At follows an AR(1) process:
ln
At
A∗ = ρ
Aln
At−1
A∗ + 
A
t , (4.15)
where the persistence parameter ρA < 1 in magnitude and A
t are the non-
serially correlated technology shocks that are normally distributed with
mean zero and standard deviation σA.
Considering the benchmark case in which each ﬁrm j freely chooses
input factors in a perfectly competitive fashion, the static cost minimisation
problem boils down to
min W
S
t N
S
t (j) + W
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t N
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t (j)
st. PtYt(j) = PtAt
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.
The Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (denoted by mc)
can be interpreted as the real marginal cost of producing one extra unit of
output. We hence obtain a system of three equations in three unknowns.
The input demands for skilled and, respectively, unskilled labour can be
written as follows:
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such that the equilibrium relative wage is
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10The benchmark case of an economy with homogeneous labour is investigated in
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The model is thus able to accommodate both potential sources of wage in-
equalities discussed in Section 4.2. There is an increasing wage premium
modelled ceteris paribus by a rise in δS
t , whereby skilled workers are de-
manded relatively more – capturing SBTC. Similarly, an increase in the
relative employment of skilled labour reduces the skill premium. Relative
wages moreover depend on the degree of substitutability between input fac-
tors. A rise in At does not aﬀect relative wages and therefore captures
factor-neutral technical change.
Marginal costs of production (common to all ﬁrms) are given by:
MCt ≡ Ptmct = A
−1
t
h
(δ
S
t )
ρ(W
S
t )
1−ρ + (δ
U
t )
ρ(W
U
t )
1−ρ
i 1
1−ρ . (4.17)
Following Rotemberg (1982), we assume that each ﬁrm j faces quadratic
adjustment costs in changing output prices:
φ
2
 
Pt(j)
π∗Pt−1(j)
− 1
!2
PtYt, (4.18)
where π∗ is the gross steady state inﬂation rate. The parameter φ measures
the degree of economy-wide price stickiness. The higher φ, the more sluggish
the adjustment of nominal prices, where φ = 0 captures the special case
of perfectly ﬂexible prices. Price adjustment costs increase in magnitude
with the size of the adjustments made (particularly large price changes in
excess of steady-state inﬂation are costly) and the overall level of economic
activity. The presence of costly price adjustment renders the producer’s
pricing problem dynamic and is examined next.
The ﬁrms are only owned by skilled households who receive the monopoly
proﬁts to capture the related source of inequalities in wealth. Skilled house-
holds may thus be considered the entrepreneurs in this economy in the
absence of a rental market for capital. Firms pay total dividends of sΠt
(derived from the aggregate proﬁts, where s denotes the population share
of skilled workers) and set prices to maximise the net present value of future
proﬁts. Each ﬁrm faces the following pricing problem:
max Et
∞ X
s=0
Qt,t+sΠt+s(j),
where the ﬁrms’ stochastic cash ﬂows are priced using the stochastic dis-
count factor of the representative skilled household, Q, which can be backed
out as:
Qt,t+k =
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Firm’s j proﬁt function can be written as
Πt(j) = Pt(j)Yt(j) − MCtYt(j) −
φ
2
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π∗Pt−1(j)
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!2
PtYt, (4.20)
where we have assumed that quadratic adjustment costs and portfolio ad-
justment costs are payable in terms of the aggregate consumption good.
The ﬁrm’s demand curve is thus given by
Yt(j) =
 
Pt(j)
Pt
!−θ
Yt. (4.21)
In the Rotemberg quadratic price adjustment cost model there is no price
dispersion and in a symmetric equilibrium all ﬁrms make the same decisions.
Moreover, the aggregate resource constraint in this case is given by:
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where πt = Pt/Pt−1 is the gross inﬂation rate.11 Note how the adjustment
costs “tighten” the constraint because part of the output is used to cover the
price changes. This ineﬃciency wedge is obviously removed in the absence
of price stickiness or in the stationary steady state.
Using (4.21) and the symmetry condition, we can rewrite (4.20) as fol-
lows turning this into an unconstrained optimisation problem:
Πt(j) = Pt(j)
1−θP
θ
t Yt − mctPt(j)
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1+θ
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The ﬁrst order condition is readily derived as
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which represents the non-linear New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC)
relationship under Rotemberg pricing.
4.3.3 Government and monetary authority
The public sector consists of the ﬁscal authority and the central bank.
The government issues one-period bonds which determines the amount of
economy-wide borrowing ¯ bt in every period t and levies a lump-sum tax Tt
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to maintain the outstanding source of government bonds. The government
budget constraint is
Pt¯ bt+1 = Rt−1Pt−1¯ bt − Tt,
where Pt¯ bt+1 expresses the nominal value of the stock of government debt
at the end of period t and T measures aggregate tax collection.
We can express the government budget constraint in real terms as
Rt−1
πt
¯ bt = ¯ bt+1 + τt, (4.24)
where the real return on the outstanding stock of government debt that
needs to be ﬁnanced is denoted by rt−1 = Rt−1/πt.
While there is no active role for ﬁscal policy, monetary policy can have
real eﬀects in the short run in the presence of price stickiness. The mone-
tary authority implements its policies by choosing the sequence of nominal
interest rates {Rt}∞
t=0 following a simple monetary policy rule (MPR):
Rt − R
∗ = φπ (πt − π
∗) + φy (yt − y
∗), (4.25)
where Rt denotes the gross one-period nominal interest rate, π∗ denotes
the targeted inﬂation rate, Yt is output in period t and Y ∗ describes the
non-stochastic steady state output level. The various φ-parameters attach
weights to the diﬀerent components of this conventional interest rate rule.
4.3.4 Aggregate resource constraint
The aggregate resource constraint (4.22) can be derived by consolidating
both the private and public households’ budget constraints as follows. In
our model, the aggregate workforce (normalised to 1) is segmented into two
sub-populations: skilled and unskilled, where s measures the amount of
skilled labour and the remainder 1−s constitutes the unskilled part. Both
labour markets clear:
N
S
t (j) = sN
S
t
N
U
t (j) = (1 − s)N
U
t
and ﬁrms (of total measure 1) are symmetric. Using Walras’ Law and given
market-clearing in the bond markets, we know that in equilibrium all output
produced is consumed. Noting that aggregate consumption is divided into
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population shares) and recalling the equivalence between national income
(i.e. the sum of factor incomes) and aggregate output, it follows that
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which can be combined with (4.24) and the private households’ real budget
constraints to yield (4.22).
4.3.5 Equilibrium
The dynamic general equilibrium is characterised by the households’ and
ﬁrms’ optimal behaviour subject to their individual and aggregate con-
straints and under the proviso that all markets clear. The numerical results
presented below are thus based on a system of non-linear equations and
equilibrium conditions that be can be summarised as follows.
As for the skilled households, we obtain the following Euler condi-
tions: Labour supply
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given the following intertemporal budget constraint
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Similarly, unskilled households, supply labour
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given the following intertemporal budget constraint
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The bond market clearing condition is as follows:
sb
S
t+1 + (1 − s)b
U
t+1 = ¯ b, (4.32)
where the government sets taxes in a rule-like form to ﬁx the stock of
economy-wide debt:
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πt
− 1

¯ b. (4.33)
Firms hire labour in the following mix which gives rise to an economy-
wide relative wage of
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They face marginal costs of
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and the proﬁt function under symmetry can be expressed as
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Aggregate technology is given by
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the aggregate resource constraint is
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and inﬂation evolves according to
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where the monetary authority sets interest rates in a rule-based manner.
4.4 Calibration
The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy at a quarterly frequency. As
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splitting the (working) population into two parts: skilled and unskilled. We
deﬁne skilled households as those with education beyond high school level
(i.e. college equivalent) and unskilled households as those with less than 16
years of schooling. Goldin and Katz (2008) report evidence for the increase
in educational attainment to be rather stagnant in the U.S. over the last
25 years, and we therefore consider the share of college graduates a natural
measure for the size of skilled households compared to the unskilled. We
use CPS data to calibrate the population share and set s = 0.35 in line with
evidence that 35% of the young adults hold some form of a college degree,
where the remainder 1−s = 0.65 only hold a high school diploma or did not
ﬁnish education and thus fall into the unskilled bracket of the workforce.
Having pinned down the household-speciﬁc contribution to aggregate
output, we ﬁx in a next step their relative diﬀerences in key macroeconomic
variables. Our calibration draws heavily upon the evidence provided by
Heathcote et al. (2010) who oﬀer a coherent analysis of the various forms
of inequality in the U.S. over a longer horizon. This is important as the
diﬀerent sources of inequality are linked and thus need to be considered
jointly using comparable ﬁgures. More speciﬁcally, we want to account for
inequalities in wage incomes, consumption and wealth and we discuss the
chosen calibration for those in turn.
To calibrate steady-state wage inequalities, we draw upon the idea of
the so-called college wage premium which is the most common driver of in-
equalities for the U.S. considered in the literature. Evidence based on CPS
data suggests that the premium on college education accounts for nearly a
doubling of the relative wage (90%) and we therefore aim for a steady-state
relative wage of 1.9. In line with (4.34), steady-state relative wages are
driven by four factors: relative labour demand, relative labour supply, the
degree of substitutability between the input factors and the given relative
population shares. We follow common practice in the RBC literature and
calibrate Ψi such that both sets of households supply the same amount of
labour in the steady state, i.e. Ni∗ = 1/3. This permits focusing on rela-
tive diﬀerences in skills (due to diﬀerent levels of education) as the major
determinant of long-run wage inequalities. Katz and Murphy (1992) use
a factor-speciﬁc productivity accounting approach to back out the elastic-
ity of substitution between skilled (i.e. college-educated) and unskilled (i.e.
having high school education) labour. Their estimates are consistent with
the empirical literature on factor substitution and suggest that the degree
of substitutability between these input factors, measured by ρ, amounts to
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desired relative wage level. We express labour demand in terms of unskilled
labour (δU∗ = 1) which implies that δS∗ = 0.22, reﬂecting the relative lower
share of skilled workers in the production process.
Parameter Value
Population share (skilled) s 0.35
Population share (unskilled) 1 − s 0.65
Discount factor (skilled) βS 0.99
Discount factor (unskilled) βU 0.98
Transaction costs (skilled) ΩS
y∗ 0
Transaction costs (unkilled) ΩU
y∗ 0.03 (percent)
Steady-state relative labour demand δS∗
δU∗ 0.22
Steady-state relative labour supply NS∗
NU∗ 1
Steady-state relative wage WS∗
WU∗ 1.9
Steady-state relative wealth
bS∗
+(Π∗/βS)
bU∗ 2.4
Steady-state relative consumption CS∗
CU∗ 1.7
Steady-state inﬂation rate π∗ 1.02 (annual)
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/σ 1/2
Frisch elasticity of labour supply (inverse) ϕ 1/3
Labour elasticity of substitution ρ 0.29
Consumption elasticity of substitution θ 5
Rotemberg adjustment parameter φ 30
Taylor rule parameter (inﬂation gap) φπ 1.5
Technology shock persistence ρA 0.85
Technology shock variance σ2
A 0.012
Table 4.1: Model calibrated at quarterly frequency
Information on the distribution of wealth is taken from the Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF) which is a triennial survey of U.S. families com-
missioned by the U.S. Fed and the U.S. Treasury that provides extensive
micro data on household-level assets and liabilities. To ensure comparabil-
ity, we resort to the 2007 survey (hereby also excluding the recent decline
in economic activity) and again consider skilled vis-à-vis unskilled house-
holds. We moreover need to establish a coherent mapping between empirical
evidence on relative household wealth (recall that throughout we only con-
sider inter-group as opposed to intra-group diﬀerences) and what is actually
captured by our model. In doing so, it is important to recognise that accu-
mulating wealth is a basic economic activity of any household and indeed
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pose. The skilled households hold all the equity (i.e. the present value of
the ﬁrms’ monopoly proﬁts) in our model and both types of households save
by holding government bonds. To quantify the diﬀerences in asset holdings,
we again partition the workforce by its skill level and calculate the relative
diﬀerence of the median value (in 2007 dollars) in bond holdings accounting
for the fact that the skilled segment also holds stocks. The resulting ratio
is 2.4 which is in line with the empirical observation of wealth inequalities
being more pronounced than income inequalities.
We calibrate the intertemporal discounting factors (βi) and the scal-
ing factors (Ωi) to match this observed heterogeneity in savings and equity
holdings. As indicated in the description of the model, households diﬀer
in their subjective intertemporal discounting factors (βi) to capture diﬀer-
ent degrees of patience across households.12 Indeed, empirical studies for
the U.S. suggest that time preference is a key determinant of occupational
choice, investments in human capital and resulting wage structures. Munas-
inghe and Sicherman (2006) ﬁnd that households with lower discount rates
are more likely to select into jobs with steeper wage proﬁles. It therefore
appears plausible to assign a relatively higher value of β to skilled house-
holds. The common approach in the real business cycle literature to pin
down β is to infer its numerical value from the average long-run real inter-
est rate (Prescott, 1986). Taking an annual net real interest rate of about
4%, βS amounts to 0.99 at a quarterly frequency. Thus, ΩS = 0, i.e. bond
holding costs only apply to unskilled households as further discussed below.
Given the obvious problems with quantifying time preference (see Frederick
et al. (2002) for a discussion), we only require unskilled households to be
relatively less patient without creating stark absolute diﬀerences across the
two households. In our calibration, βU amounts to 0.98. There is an evolv-
ing literature (Hendricks (2007); Iacoviello (2008)) that seeks to exploit
diﬀerences in discount rates to capture wealth inequality, typically from a
life-cycle perspective, and our value for βU is line with the discount factors
used there.
We use the diﬀerent degrees of ﬁnancial frictions (captured by Ωi) to
help deﬁning a steady state. For expositional convencience, we claim that
skilled households do not pay any transaction costs, whereas a tiny cost of
monitoring (0.03% of steady-state output) applies to unskilled households.
An alternative interpretation of those costs is that unskilled households face
12Recall the inverse relationship between the individual discount rate and time pref-
erence: the lower the discount rate, the more value individuals place on future beneﬁts
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certain barriers (for instance of informational kind) to trade and thus partic-
ipate to a lower degree in ﬁnancial markets. The idea of skilled households
not being characterised by limited ﬁnancial participation is in line for exam-
ple with Iacoviello (2008) and not overly restrictive given that all the equity
is held by skilled households.13 The degree of ﬁnancial frictions prevailing
in this economy is arguably small but it is needed to ensure model stability
and to capture inequalities which is this Chapter’s focus. Unskilled house-
holds moreover do not hold any shares to reﬂect the empirical evidence on
limited ﬁnancial participation (see Hong et al. (2004) and the references
therein). Indeed, data suggests that the stock market participation rate in
the U.S. rises in the level of wealth and education (Hong et al., 2004). This
may be explained by thinking of investing in stocks being associated with
ﬁxed costs. The wealthier households are, the more funds available to invest
such that the ﬁxed costs are less deterring to them. Similarly, the level of
ﬁxed costs (say, in acquiring and interpreting stock market information) is
lower, the more educated households are.
Evidence for the degree of inequalities in consumption is based on the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). Switching from the CPS to capture
wage inequalities to the CEX sample is not problematic because, as Heath-
cote et al. (2010) ﬁnd, both tell a consistent story regarding cross-sectional
variation. The CEX sample runs from 1980 to 2006 and provides extensive
panel information regarding the households’ characteristics. As before, we
only consider representative households in the working age (between 25 and
60 years of age). Splitting the sample by household skills permits deriving a
consistent measure of consumption inequality. We use a narrow deﬁnition of
consumption focusing only on real non-durable consumption expenditures
which is in line with our model. The resulting skilled-to-unskilled consump-
tion ratio is 1.6 – a target which we could only meet with implausibly high
values of transaction costs. We therefore conﬁne ourselves to the general
observation of consumption inequalities being lower than income inequali-
ties and aim for a steady-state consumption ratio of 1.7 which is fairly close
to the cited empirical evidence.
The remaining model parameters are more conventional in the RBC lit-
erature and have been calibrated as follows. The Frisch elasticity of labour
supply is set to 3 which lies well within the range of values typically used
(also see Prescott (2004) for a discussion). A more critical parameter to
calibrate is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, σ. We
13This assumption moreover permits a seamingless transition between homogeneous
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follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) and choose σ = 2 which implies
that households desire a smoother consumption proﬁle than in the common
logarithmic case of unitary relative risk aversion. Parameterisations for the
aggregate technology process are in line with the standard literature. The
productivity level at the steady state is normalised to 1. The calibration of
the aggregate productivity shock follows Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007)
with serial correlation of ρA = 0.85 and a standard deviation of the innova-
tion to a productivity shock of σ2
A = 0.012. The price elasticity of demand
(θ) is assumed to be 5, corresponding to a gross steady state mark-up of
prices over marginal costs of 1.25. The Rotemberg price adjustment pa-
rameter φ is 30 (see Keen and Wang (2007)), given the mirco-data evidence
that on average U.S. ﬁrms reoptimise prices every three quarters suggesting
a slightly lower level of price rigidities than for instance in the euro area
(Sbordone, 2002). The annual inﬂation target is set to 2% with the stan-
dard Taylor rule weight on the inﬂation gap of 1.5. As for the ﬁscal side,
government debt in steady state amounts to 60% of GDP at an annual rate.
Table 4.1 summarises the chosen parameter values.
4.5 Simulation results
Since we are ultimately interested in investigating potential asymmetric ef-
fects of monetary policy across the diﬀerent sets of households, we cannot
simply rely on linear approximations to our model’s equilibrium conditions
but need to resort to non-linear solution techniques instead. We use per-
turbation techniques along the lines of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004)’s
second-order accurate approximation of the policy function. Based on the
model’s deterministic steady state (see Appendix C.1 for details), we investi-
gate impulse response functions of core variables in response to an aggregate
technology shock. We ﬁrst consider a simple inﬂation-targeting rule before
turning to a conventional Taylor (1993)-type rule which adds considerations
for the output gap (e.g. as forecaster of future inﬂation) into the monetary
policy rationale (Clarida et al., 1998). The simple linear MPR, which we
label Rule I is obtained by setting φπ = 1.5 and equating φy in (4.25) to
zero. Rule II adds further considerations to monetary policy behaviour in
that there is also concern about output gap minimisation (φy = 0.125).
Figure C.1 summarises the responses under the diﬀerent MPR variants
for an aggregate technology shock. We see that, whilst in line with the
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appears to be somewhat less inﬂation variability under Rule II, overall re-
sponses are similar across the diﬀerent monetary policy stances. Output
increases, which is more accommodated under Rule I. The fall in real in-
terest rates induces both types of households to reduce their savings. The
increase in aggregate productivity makes – at least on impact – both types
of workers better oﬀ. Both consume more and earn higher wages. The drop
in marginal costs reduces immediately inﬂationary pressures in the econ-
omy, reﬂecting the forward-looking nature of the model. There is moreover
a wealth eﬀect that is typically suggested in the RBC paradigm: households
start consuming more leisure which leads to a drop of hours worked.
If both sets of households responded in a symmetric fashion, as is to be
expected amidst a factor-neutral shock, relativities should not be aﬀected.
However, this is is not entirely the case. Whilst skilled households consume
on impact relatively more, the diﬀerence is hardly sizable and consumption
inequalities remain quantitatively largely unaﬀected over the business cycle.
The impact on relative wages is somewhat more noticeable. The further (al-
beit small) widening of wage inequalities stems from the endogenous labour
supply decision which is the distinctive feature of this class of models. As
skilled hours worked drops by relatively more, there is a relative scarcity of
skilled labour. The skilled labour market tightens relatively strongly as a re-
sult, and hence wage inequalities increase in line with the idea of the college
premium. The strongest eﬀects, however, are observed in terms of wealth
inequalities. Those increase considerably as unskilled households dissave
relatively strongly and moreover do not beneﬁt from the increased overall
economic proﬁtability. Thus, the model suggests that whilst monetary pol-
icy may not have sizable eﬀects on household-speciﬁc consumption proﬁles,
it does exercise a strong intertemporal eﬀect on the households’ relative
wealth position. Diﬀerences in savings behaviour appear to be the most
prominent channel through which monetary policy is capable of aﬀecting
economic inequalities.
Overall, the simulation results provide some evidence for asymmetries
in the responses of skilled and unskilled households. As households respond
in diﬀerent absolute magnitudes, relative measures and thus inequalities
change. Inequalities are real phenomenena that are aﬀected by real in-
ﬂuences (e.g. shifts in relative labour supply) and thus can also rise in
an economic upswing. Empirical evidence on the evolution of inequalities
(Heathcote et al. (2010); Hornstein et al. (2005)) typically suggests that
earnings inequalities widen only by a little and then remain relatively sta-
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fact.
Wage inequalities are in particular driven by diﬀerences in hours worked.
As the skilled supply relatively less labour in periods of economic expansion,
their labour market is relatively tight which keeps up wage pressures in the
skilled segment of the domestic labour market. This eﬀect is in line with
Buch and Pierdzioch (2009) who report stylised facts which suggest that the
volatility of hours worked is higher for skilled than for low-skilled workers.
The model in particular stresses the possibility of shifts in the distri-
bution of wealth. Relatively more wealth is accumulated by the skilled
households being the shareholders in the economy. This feature is not new
to the literature. Krusell and Anthony A. Smith, Jr. (1998) already point at
the importance of changes in the wealth distribution for the macroeconomy.
Similarly, models along the lines of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995) emphasize
the importance of short-run wealth accumulation for the international trans-
mission of policies across countries. Our ﬁndings highlight the importance
of this channel between heterogeneous households within an economy.
4.6 Optimal monetary policy
Keeping our model’s obvious limitations in mind, an important (at least
tentative) policy implication that appears to arise from the impulse re-
sponse analysis is that monetary policy does not seem to be a suitable
tool to eﬀectively deal with economic inequalities in the presence of exoge-
nous shocks. This raises the general question from a welfare-theoretic point
of view whether the monetary authority should be worried about economic
inequalities and take them into account when choosing its policy path. Hav-
ing obtained a descriptive understanding of the eﬀects of shocks in a NK
economy characterised by inequalities subject to a monetary policy rule, we
therefore turn in a next step to the normative dimension and consider the
optimal monetary policy response to a positive aggregate technology shock.
Our welfare analysis is based on the well-known Ramsey problem under
commitment. The policy problem in Ramsey’s seminal study takes the
form of an allocation problem, in which the policymaker can be thought of
as benevolent planner who directly chooses the feasible allocation subject
to the model’s equilibrium conditions that summarise the evolution of the
economy. This welfare-theoretic approach has evolved as the conventional
tool for analysing optimal policy in dynamic economies and we shall follow
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The Ramsey-type approach to characterising optimal monetary policy
is based on the constrained optimisation of the planners objective function
subject to the model’s equilibrium conditions and constraints and under
consideration of all the distortions that characterise the economy. Rather
than following some exogenously speciﬁed monetary policy rule, however,
the approach is micro-founded in that the social planner’s policy objective
is to maximise overall social welfare in the economy. The optimal policy
problem can be set up in terms of a Lagrangian as
L0 = max
yt
E0
∞ X
t=0
β
t
n
U
w(yt+1,yt,yt−1,ut) − λtf(yt+1,yt,yt−1,ut)
o
,
where yt and ut are vectors containing the model’s endogenous and exoge-
nous variables, respectively, Uw describes the planners objective function,
f(yt+1,yt,yt−1,ut) = 0 are the model’s equilibrium conditions (see Section
4.3.5) and λt is the vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with these
constraints.
The Ramsey planner seeks to maximise overall household welfare which
in this case is a weighted average of skilled and unskilled households’ utility.
The period objective function is
U
w
t = s
wU
S
t + (1 − s
w)U
U
t + βU
w
t+1, (4.40)
where β = 0.99 is the discount factor and sw represents the weight attached
to the skilled household period t utility with the type-speciﬁc utility function
given by (4.2).
In studying the Ramsey dynamics, we seek to investigate the optimal
monetary policy response to an aggregate technology shock with particular
focus on the desirability of introducing asymmetries into monetary policy-
making over the course of the business cycle. In particular, we assign diﬀer-
ent weighting schemes to household utility. First, we choose sw = s = 0.35
to reﬂect the population share of skilled households in the economy. We
explore in a next step how the dynamics are aﬀected, if policymakers (say,
due to political pressures) only worried about skilled households (sw = 1)
or unskilled households (sw = 0), respectively.
Figure C.3 depicts the resulting Ramsey dynamics for the diﬀerent weight-
ing patterns. Overall, we see that regardless of the weights attached, the
Ramsey planner uses monetary policy in a consistent way to stabilise the
volatility in the endogenous variables. On impact, the planner raises nom-
inal interest rates and allows inﬂation to fall. Those dynamics are in line
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for the matter at hand is the way the Ramsey policy seeks to alter the
allocation between skilled vis-à-vis unskilled households. Given that the
Ramsey planner is concerned with the maximisation of household utility
per se, we should expect inequalities to be lowest, the more importance is
given to the economic position of the unskilled households. Our results con-
ﬁrm this intuition. Consumption and wage inequalities are less pronounced,
the higher the weight on unskilled households’ utility. This suggests that
in principle monetary policy may ﬁnd it optimal to desire to counteract
inequality-increasing eﬀects. However, the Ramsey dynamics also raise a
feasibility issue as the Ramsey plan with greatest concern for the unskilled
households shows the greatest variability in inﬂation.
Thus, inequalities and distributional concerns matter for the optimal
conduct of monetary policy. However, even if full consideration is given to
the utility of the unskilled, the Ramsey planner seems to be unable to eﬀec-
tively limit the extent of the diﬀerent forms of inequalities in an economy.
Whilst the Ramsey planner is able to counteract wealth inequalities rather
eﬀectively, the responses to consumption and wage inequalities are more
sluggish. The Ramsey planner rather ﬁnds it optimal to seek to stabilise
inﬂation. This raises the question as to whether it is feasible for a mone-
tary authority, given the tools it has at its disposal, to actively worry about
economic inequalities that are not arising from a redistribution of wealth.
Whilst further empirical investigation as to how monetary policy responds
to economic inequalities (also in conjunction with output variability) would
inform the analysis, the Ramsey dynamics appear to suggest that lowering
inequalities over the short run might require compromising on other goals
such as price stability.
4.7 Concluding remarks
In this Chapter we have sought to shed light on the link between economic
inequalities and monetary policy. We have augmented the benchmark NK
model that has evolved as the workhorse for monetary policy analysis by
the presence of heterogeneous labour. This permits investigating distribu-
tional eﬀects on skilled vis-à-vis unskilled households. In particular, key
macroeconomic variables such as wages, consumption and wealth can now
be expressed both in absolute and relative terms. An increase in relativities
therefore provides a natural measure of rising inequalities and we consider
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aforementioned variables.
Our analysis is motivated by the case of the U.S. and the prevailing so-
cial imbalances that characterise the internal economic structure. However,
there is increasing empirical evidence that inequalities also start to matter in
major European economies. Indeed, the evolution of inequalities in the U.S.
and the UK has been largely similar in shape. Given the known potency
of monetary policy to have a bearing on the evolution of the economy, we
have therefore investigated in this Chapter to what extent monetary policy
is a suitable tool to deal with those rising inequalities. We take up Rajan
(2010)’s political economy argument which claims that inequalities were an
important (yet largely unnoticed) long-run driver of the recent Crisis. He
suggests that there has been increasing political pressure on policymakers
to limit these inequalities through short-run measures. Particularly lower-
ing consumption inequalities was allegedly regarded as a quick “palliative”
(Rajan, 2010).
We ﬁnd that in line with empirical evidence there are asymmetric eﬀects
on households in response to exogenous shocks, which leads to a further in-
crease of inequalities over the business cycle. Monetary policy seems hardly
capable of limiting the inequality-increasing eﬀects using simple rules. We
moreover consider the optimal monetary policy response in an economy
characterised by inequalities. We ﬁnd that even if the monetary authority
only considered the unskilled households’ utility, it would not ﬁnd it opti-
mal to seek to aggressively limit inequalities since this might compete with
other policy goals.
An important policy implication that appears to arise from the analysis
is that monetary policy on its own is neither a suitable nor feasible tool
to tackle inequalities over the short run; in particular those that are not
related to an unexpected redistribution of wealth. Our results counter to
some extent Rajan (2010)’s idea of a consumption-fueled crisis. It should be
noted, however, that his argument is richer and accounts for further institu-
tions (welfare programs, government-backed mortgage agencies, subprime
lending, etc.) that were in place during the build up of the Crisis to actively
support unskilled consumption. Not surprisingly, our framework falls short
of those eﬀects.
We see promising extensions for future work on the link between mon-
etary policy and inequalities. It would be interesting to also give a more
active role for ﬁscal policy which was for motivational reasons deliberately
neglected in this Chapter. Moreover, our model features perfect market-
clearing of labour markets. It would be interesting to incorporate intoChapter 4. Should the Fed be worried about rising economic inequalities? 106
existing frameworks that explicitly account for unemployment the notion
of asymmetric eﬀects of monetary policy on heterogeneous households in a
rule-based environment.
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Conclusion
This dissertation has sought to shed light on topical issues relating to Eu-
ropean integration and economic inequalities. We have analysed in three
self-contained core chapters monetary integration between the euro area
and the transition economies from CEE after the EU Eastern enlargement,
the eﬀects of the emerging FT movement that seeks to establish a direct
link between altruistic consumers in the North and poor farmers in devel-
oping countries and ﬁnally the conduct of monetary policy in the presence
of economic inequalities – an issue that is becoming increasingly obvious to
many industrialised countries. In doing so, we have employed a wide range
of methodologies depending on the ﬁt to the speciﬁc research question.
We have used econometric cointegration techniques to investigate long-run
linkages, static Walrasian equilibrium concepts to introduce FT in the Ri-
cardian trade model and short-run dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
modelling approaches for a closed economy characterised by ineﬃciencies
such as price rigidities and limited ﬁnancial participation. We have sought
to provide intuitive insights throughout the analysis, highlighting policy im-
plications but also possible avenues for further research. In this concluding
Chapter of the monograph we want to brieﬂy summarise the main ﬁndings
but also to elaborate on the shortcomings of our analysis and, building upon
those, trying to identify directions for future work.
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5.1 Main ﬁndings and policy implications
Chapter 2 provides a direct extension to my Master’s thesis. We use a
GVAR model to test for co-movements of short-term interest rates between
the euro area and the transition economies from CEE, focusing on long-
term aspects of monetary policy and economic integration. Our framework
provides both an institutional and methodological upgrade of the GDH and
permits an assessment of the degree of Euro Dominance in the enlarging
eurozone. The results indicate that, apart for the case of Hungary, there
is evidence for Euro Dominance in CEE. The EDH appears to hold in its
strong form which implies weak exogeneity of euro rates. Including US
interest rates as proxy for the ROW moreover allows us to test for Global
Independence. The idea is to investigate whether global developments are
transmitted to CEE indirectly via the eurozone. We ﬁnd that indeed dollar
rates move independently from the euro rates. To investigate these linkages
further, we consider impulse responses arising from an EMU shock on CEE
interest rates and a ROW shock on EMU interest rates. The analysis reveals
that the eﬀects on interest rates die out more quickly for countries with a
relatively tight exchange rate regime towards the euro. We ﬁnally aggregate
foreign interest rates to introduce the notion of a global shock in reﬂection
of the recent Crisis. Findings conﬁrm the predominant importance of the
euro area to outcomes in CEE in that global shocks appear to be largely
transmitted via the eurozone. The global analysis therefore provides further
support for the validity of the EDH.
The empirical evidence for the presence of Euro Dominance has several
policy implications for the process of European monetary integration. It
suggests that as stipulated in the Treaty on European Community coun-
tries from CEE show a credible commitment to join the common currency
over the long run. Overall, there are indications for an equilibrium relation-
ship between euro and CEE interest rates. From a monetary policymaker’s
perspective this appears to imply that domestic CEE policies follow the
ECB’s stance (proxied by money market rates) quite closely. This relation-
ship prevails regardless of the exchange rate regime in place which conﬁrms
the idea of diﬀerent monetary strategies being capable of ensuring conver-
gence. It might appear puzzling at ﬁrst sight that Euro Dominance prevails
in times of global ﬁnancial unrest. However, banking sectors in the enlarg-
ing euro area are already fairly integrated and as such it seems plausible
that events in the eurozone play such a dominant role in CEE countries.
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cess. Given the already close linkages between CEE and EMU and the
evidence on the EDH, it appears reasonable for policymakers to further this
process as CEE central bankers would no longer lose an independent mon-
etary policy stance but are likely to gain inﬂuence in the ECB’s common
decision-making process.
Chapter 3 anlayses the economic eﬀects of the FT movement. We aug-
ment the Ricardian trade model by the presence of a FT sector that oﬀers
more ethical working conditions relative to the non-FT sector, captured
by a wage premium. We show that altruistic spending on FT products is
in line with rational behaviour. FT could not arise without households in
industrialised countries valuing higher living standards in the developing
world. The presence of FT indeed raises overall welfare – at least within a
distinct and empirically plausible range. The positive global welfare eﬀects
arise because of an altruistically motivated transfer of wealth from North
to South. It appears plausible that such a utility transfer only sustains
within certain limits and under certain conditions. For too high FT pre-
mia, ethical demand falls which hinders further certiﬁcations of FT farmers
and thus ultimately makes all agents worse oﬀ. Similarly, the welfare eﬀects
only prevail under a suﬃciently strong degree of FT-induced consumption
spending. Our results moreover indicate that whilst the presence of the FT
premium allows for convergence between North and South, it does generate
adverse distributional eﬀects within South. Farmers in the FT sector gain
at the expense of non-FT farmers. Endogenising the degree of wage in-
equalities reveals that FT as concept introduces and hinges upon rigidities
and inequalities. We formalise the insider-outsider problem surrounding
FT by depicting the FT cooperative as monopoly trade union that not only
hires workers but also sets the level of working standards, captured by a
fair wage. The FT cooperative has an obvious rationale in exploiting sec-
toral employment diﬀerences as only those justify an increasing fair wage.
Our analysis suggests that the higher the ease of entry into the FT sector,
the lower the degree of inequalities. The model implies that whilst FT is
very much a demand-driven concept, insuﬃcient certiﬁcation levels in the
FT sector may not be exclusively due to insuﬃcient demand in North but
could also be driven by other institutional features inherent in the FT sys-
tem. Given that inequalities arise as part of the FT framework (but also
drive the success of the system in the ﬁrst place), it appears that this form
of alternative trade can only sustain as niche movement.
Although it is diﬃcult not to oversimplify the complex phenomenon of
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design of the FT system but also development policies in general. It ap-
pears that FT is ﬁrst and foremost a demand-driven concept which under
certain conditions may have positive welfare eﬀects. Thus, any mechanism
which entices Northern consumers to increase their FT-induced spending
could beneﬁt the world as a whole. This could be achieved for instance
through further advertising or perhaps by lowering prices for FT commodi-
ties. Indeed, in many European countries, and particularly in the UK, FT
is turning mainstream and major retailers increasingly stock FT-certiﬁed
products. However, our analysis also suggests that FT is best understood
as niche movement. For FT to attract consumers on a broader scale, pro-
duces should be economically viable; yet, our model implies that downward
pressure on market prices might be prevented by the price ﬂoor that is
embedded in this trade concept. Moreover, it is not the demand side on
its own that appears to determine the future path of the movement. The
nature of the cooperative structures in the FT sector matters as well. FT is
a concept that rests upon and highlights inequalities. Whilst the FT move-
ment seeks to achieve a higher level of global integration between developing
and developed world, it essentially creates an insider-outsider problem be-
tween certiﬁed and non-certiﬁed workers. This is not problematic per se
but inequalities would increase if labour mobility, say due to administrative
hurdles in the certiﬁcation process, was limited. The overriding goal of the
FT movement is to alleviate poverty on a global scale. The analysis does
suggest that free trade and FT are to some extent complementary and could
co-exist. Relying on FT as development tool on its own, however, seems a
questionable development strategy at least at present. FT appears to ap-
peal to speciﬁc type of ethical consumers and indeed might simply compete
with other charities for their donations. In that regard, FT gives direct
empowerment to consumers but to make an impact on a greater scale one
would need to re-assure consumers of the positive eﬀects of FT. This is a
long-term challenge which the movement faces and which certainly needs to
be investigated further (also see the discussion below). For the time being,
FT is probably best considered what it claims to be, namely an alternative
form of trade.
Chapter 4 considers the interplay between monetary policy and eco-
nomic inequalities. We extend the workhorse NK model and segment the
workforce into skilled and unskilled labour. Introducing household hetero-
geneity into the framework allows for analysing potential asymmetric eﬀects
across households in response to aggregate shocks, which in principle should
aﬀect all households equally. Our results suggest that monetary policy in-Chapter 5. Conclusion 111
deed has asymmetric eﬀects across the two sets of households which leads
to a further stretch of internal coherence. Wage inequalities rise over the
business cycle as skilled labour becomes relatively scarce, reﬂecting the no-
tion of the college premium. Monetary policy appears to have particularly
a bearing on the evolution of wealth inequalities. We moreover analyse dif-
ferent Ramsey plans to investigate how the presence of inequalities aﬀects
the design of optimal monetary policy. Although inequalities do appear to
matter for optimal policy, the Ramsey planner does not ﬁnd it optimal to
seek to strongly limit inequality-increasing eﬀects. A plan that is exclusively
concerned about the utility of the unskilled households reveals that doing
this might conﬂict with other policy goals.
A central policy implication arises from the analysis: Monetary policy
is not “neutral” over the business cycle when it comes to the evolution
of inequalities. This seems to apply in particular to wealth inequalities.
However, monetary policy on its own appears to be neither a suitable nor
feasible tool to eﬀectively tackle inequalities within an economy. The under-
lying reasoning is that long-run structural problems cannot be addressed by
purely short-run measures. Economic inequalities are ﬁrst and foremost real
phenomena that are likely to be outside the scope of a monetary authority.
Whilst a monetary authority is capable of – as is well established – aﬀecting
output, inﬂation and unemployment in the short run (and also observing a
redistribution of wealth through unanticipated inﬂation), it cannot make up
for ineﬃciencies for instance in productivity or relative scarcity of skilled
labour. An additional complication for a central bank is the well-known
instrument-goal problem. If a monetary authority has only one instrument
at its disposal, it faces a trade-oﬀ for example in ensuring both price stabil-
ity and lowering inequalities. Of course, as Romer and Romer (1999) argue,
this trade-oﬀ might vanish in the long-run, where a prudent monetary policy
stance that ensures low inﬂation and steady output growth might enhance
the well-being of the poor on a lasting basis. Creating pressure on an in-
stitution that does not have the appropriate tools available seems therefore
not only unjustiﬁed but indeed could exacerbate structural imbalances of
an economy. It should be noted, however, that the NK framework presented
here is somewhat stylised. As also discussed further below, several features
are missing. For example, there is no physical capital which would permit
an investigation of capital-skill complementarities. Moreover, an extension
to the open economy dimension would allow for considering migration of
labour across countries. The interplay between monetary policy and eco-
nomic inequalities thus appears to be a fruitful area to be explored further.Chapter 5. Conclusion 112
Overall, the dissertation seeks to highlight the importance of investi-
gating economic aspects of European integration and inequalities. As it
stands, those are becoming ever more important. The introduction of the
euro more than ten years ago was a signiﬁcant step in the integration of EU
economies as discussed in Chapter 1. However, open questions about the
future architecture of the “European house” remain. What are the suitable
institutional and policy-related arrangements for the EU in general and the
eurozone in particular? Further applied research will be necessary to help
shaping an environment that ensures macroeconomic stability in Europe
and beyond. In a similar vein, as recent events have shown, social un-
rest arising from economic inequalities are no longer conﬁned to developing
countries. Whilst it was commonly believed that a society that is divided
between rich and poor would be a rational byproduct of a well-functioning
market economy, providing incentives to “move up”, economic inequalities
in industrialised countries are increasingly being identiﬁed as root causes of
instability. Those are not only conﬁned to socio-economic factors such as
inequalities in health or employment histories (Roubini, 2011) but indeed
can also give rise to ﬁnancial instability (Rajan, 2010).
5.2 Directions for future research
The overall goal of this dissertation is to provide a deeper economic under-
standing of topical aspects pertaining to economic integration and inequal-
ities. All our ﬁndings are based on established methodologies (cointegrat-
ing error-correcting model, Ricardian trade model, NK workhorse model),
where we have tried to give a methodological twist to each of the frame-
works. Of course, all modelling exercises (whether of empirical or theoretical
nature) being simpliﬁcations of reality are open to several caveats and as
such our analysis is not free of shortcomings. In this ﬁnal Section we there-
fore want to critically reﬂect upon some of them – also in an attempt to
formulate ideas for future research.
Given the topical nature of this study, the models developed to pro-
vide answers to the diﬀerent research questions are inevitably somewhat
exploratory. We have deliberately sought to single out distinct mechanisms
to allow for a clearer economic understanding of the eﬀects at work. Build-
ing upon this analysis, several aspects could be explored further that may
be roughly categorised as follows:
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• real features
We shall discuss in the remainder each of these items in turn and close with
some ﬁnal thoughts on the current state of macroeconomic research.
Empirical evidence
Whilst we have sought to establish robust ﬁndings in Chapter 2 by carefully
motivating the estimation steps and by considering the research question
from slightly diﬀerent angles, the GVAR analysis could easily be extended
by adding additional countries. For instance, one could incorporate the
UK as non-eurozone country that unlike the CEE countries has decided to
opt out from the monetary integration process. Conﬁning ourselves to the
most minimal set-up allowed for a coherent mapping of the EDH from the
VECM to the GVAR – an important methodological idea. But the GVAR
can be generalised by introducing further variables (in particular real ones
as discussed below).
The more theoretical Chapters 3 and 4 are based on calibration tech-
niques to quantify results. Whilst calibration essentially is an empirical
method as well, it is not directly concerned with estimation and hypothesis
testing. Amid the interrelationship between empirical evidence and the-
oretical modelling, further empirical results might help in progressing the
theoretical frameworks. For example, the empirical evidence on the eﬀects
of ethical FT consumerism is rather scant. Does the FT premium enhance
productivity and living standards in the Southern communities? Are there
for example administrative ineﬃciencies in the certiﬁcation process that af-
fect sectoral employment diﬀerences? Having a deeper understanding of
the long-term eﬀects of FT is important as this is likely to determine the
future success of the movement. Moreover, one would like to have a better
idea of the drivers of ethical consumption patterns. Which factors moti-
vate consumers to buy FT products? How does this purchasing decision
for instance diﬀer from buying organic products that are more associated
with higher quality levels but less so with development aspects? Further
empirical insights on these aspects would inform the theoretical modelling
process.
On a related note, there is an evolving literature on the estimation of
DSGE models (see for example del Negro and Schorfheide (2004)). The the-
oretical conciseness of the developed NK framework could thus be exploited
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a worthwhile exercise given that the calibration approach was able to high-
light some continuity between benchmark and heterogeneous labour NK
economy.
Real features
Beyond tractability, model simplicity oﬀers an additional virtue: it allows
for disentangling distinct features that drive this dissertation’s results. For
example, focusing on short-term nominal interest rates provides an indica-
tor of European monetary integration that is established in the literature
and that moreover represents an empirically accepted proxy for analysing
monetary policy behaviour and transmission. Also, introducing additional
features to a baseline model (such as the Ricardian trade model or the NK
monetary policy model) with known properties permits detecting certain
eﬀects at a time. Building upon these ﬁndings, one could add further fea-
tures to the models. Particularly considering further real variables might
turn out to generate additional insights.
To take an example, we have ignored the notion of unemployment through-
out the analysis. Indeed, it is far from being clear how to analyse unemploy-
ment in a general equilibrium context. Economists typically like to think
of aggregate labour markets as being characterised by search and matching
processes (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994), but given that this framework
was initially set up in a partial equilibrium setting, researchers have taken
diﬀerent routes to capture some labour market features (e.g. hiring costs)
under the DSGE paradigm (see for example Blanchard and Galí (2010)).
These methodological considerations apart, it might be worthwhile to have
diﬀerent degrees of wage rigidities between skilled and unskilled labour or
to allow workers outside the FT sector to be unemployed.
Moreover, there is no active role for ﬁscal policy in this monograph. One
could relax the assumption of lump-sum taxation or attribute a richer role
to the welfare state for instance by introducing unemployment beneﬁts or
subsidies to consumption. It does appear at present that further steps in
European integration are particularly necessary on the ﬁscal side. Thus,
whilst we focus on monetary integration, the scope of the analysis could be
widened by considering the presence of integration in terms of ﬁscal policies.
At the current juncture, the notion of debt sustainability has become ever
more relevant. One could in this regard not only consider the public sector
but also turn to the diﬀerent levels of private household debt within and
across economies.Chapter 5. Conclusion 115
Concluding thoughts
Economics is very much a problem-solving discipline. In particular macroe-
conomics looking at the “big picture” should be (and indeed is) open for
“outside” inﬂuences, when this picture changes, and should seek to contin-
uously widen its scope of methods. The Crisis of 2008 and its aftermath
was one of those events that has changed the picture also for academic re-
search. As many modelling frameworks (but also empirical studies) were
not properly taking features of social and economic imbalances into account,
they were unable to guide policymakers through current times of important
decisions. Whilst many of these “missing elements” are increasingly be-
ing addressed within mainstream macroeconomics, alternative approaches
have gained in popularity as well. Experimental insights and behavioural
elements are increasingly being explored for instance. Of course, a basic
problem is to incorporate those ﬁndings coherently in a general equilibrium
setting. To take an example, measures of individual discount rates in ex-
perimental studies turn out to be much higher than those typically used in
macroeconomic models (see amongst others Dohmen and Falk (2011) for
such a micro study and also the discussion in Frederick et al. (2002)).
Probably one of the major pitfalls when looking at economics as a sub-
ject is to believe that evidence on the micro level matters to the same
extent to (representative) aggregates and conversely that changes in the
policy environment would aﬀect all agents in the same fashion. It has been
arguably one of the greatest achievements of recent macroeconomic theory
to build a bridge between microeconomic foundations and macroeconomic
insights; yet it is important to keep the purpose of an empirical or theo-
retical thought framework in mind and to alway assess to what extent the
particular approach is capable of capturing those desired features. Indeed,
this still existing methodological divide between micro and macro sphere is
a commonplace to many other social sciences and even occurs in life sci-
ences such as biology and poses challenges to natural sciences like physics.
Thus, it remains to be seen to what extent for instance more closely linking
psychology with economics would give insights that have been up until now
not fully understood.
As also Wickens (2010) argues, there may not bee too much wrong
with the basic foundations of modern macroeconomics after all. However,
macroeconomics as way of analysis increasingly needs to address issues per-
taining to integration but also divergence both on a European and global
scale. Whilst the present dissertation has sought to at least consider some ofChapter 5. Conclusion 116
these aspects, an overriding conceptual framework on the matter that guides
empirical analysis and vice versa empirical insights that direct theoretical
conceptualisations is yet to evolve.Appendix A
Appendix Chapter 2
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Figure A.1: Bilateral euro-CEE exchange rates. Euro exchange rates in
terms of domestic CEE currency. Source: ECB. Monthly averages; the old
Romanian lei was replaced by the leu on 1 July 2005
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A.2 Tables
p=0 p=1 p=2 p=3
1st diﬀerences
euro area -4.38a -4.35 -3.52 -3.88
Bulgaria -11.20 -7.76 -5.84 -6.68a
Czech Rep. -5.93a -5.50 -4.44 -3.87
Estonia -8.59a -7.10 -4.94 -4.15
Hungary -8.46a -7.35 -5.85 -5.10
Latvia -8.85 -8.29 -6.87 -6.97a
Lithuania -8.12 -10.88a -8.09 -6.78
Poland -5.04a -4.18 -3.07 -3.02
Romania -7.81a -7.78 -6.77 -5.11
US -7.46 -5.16a -4.45 -3.58
Levels
euro area 0.27 -1.78a -1.62 -2.05
Bulgaria -1.81a -1.79 -1.69 -1.79
Czech Rep. -1.35 -1.59a -1.53 -1.61
Estonia -0.64 -0.91a -0.83 -1.06
Hungary -2.41 -2.53a -2.24 -2.32
Latvia -1.52 -2.11 -0.81a -0.61
Lithuania -4.56 -2.29 -1.47a -1.46
Poland -2.08 -2.18 -2.48 -2.27a
Romania -3.89 -4.60a -2.32 -1.48
US -0.73 -1.15a -1.42 -1.52
Table A.1: ADF test results. ADF test statistics for the levels are computed
with an intercept. The 5% critical values are -1.94 for the ﬁrst diﬀerences
and -2.89 for the levels. Tests are conducted for diﬀerent lag lengths p with
a maximum order of three, where the a in superscript denotes the order of
augmentation chosen in the Dickey-Fuller regressions according to the AIC.Appendix A. Appendix Chapter 2 121
Country Levels First diﬀerences
euro area -2.02 -3.65
Bulgaria -1.99 -6.84
Czech Rep. -0.83 -5.80
Estonia -1.26 -7.22
Hungary -2.12 -7.14
Latvia -1.20 -8.45
Lithuania 1.13 -6.07
Poland -1.12 -3.21
Romania 0.60 -4.22
US -1.01 -5.42
Table A.2: WS-ADF test results. Choice of lag length based on AIC as in
ADF test. The 5% critical value is -2.55.
trace critical values
Country H0 HA statistic 95% 90%
Bulgaria r=0 r=1 11.14 12.53 10.69
Czech Rep. r=0 r=1 20.93 12.53 10.69
Estonia r=0 r=1 14.86 12.75 10.79
Hungary r=0 r=1 5.19 12.75 10.79
Latvia r=0 r=1 16.83 12.75 10.79
Lithuania r=0 r=1 27.20 12.75 10.79
Poland r=0 r=1 19.56 12.53 10.69
Romania r=0 r=1 27.07 12.75 10.79
euro area r=0 r=1 16.93 12.80 10.82
Table A.3: Cointegration rank statistics. Critical values are simulated using
10,000 replications.Appendix A. Appendix Chapter 2 122
Country t-statistic p-value
Bulgaria 0.44 0.66
Czech Rep. 0.66 0.51
Estonia 0.01 0.99
Hungary – –
Latvia 0.04 0.96
Lithuania -0.03 0.97
Poland 0.50 0.62
Romania 1.54 0.13
euro area -0.81 0.42
Table A.4: Weak exogeneity test results. Hungary not included in the
testing procedure due to lack of evidence for cointegration.
Country PKsup PKmsq robust Nyblom
t-statistic crit. value t-statistic crit. value t-statistic crit. value
euro area 0.85 5.29 0.21 3.14 2.37 6.84
Bulgaria 0.56 2.90 0.05 0.25 1.83 0.74
Czech Rep. 1.00 4.57 0.22 1.98 1.82 3.83
Estonia 0.78 5.00 0.11 2.62 1.97 5.54
Latvia 0.69 4.81 0.07 2.31 1.59 0.97
Lithuania 0.64 5.09 0.08 2.77 0.56 5.59
Poland 1.20 4.01 0.27 1.36 1.14 1.46
Romania 0.80 5.04 0.15 2.68 1.22 5.77
US 0.74 2.93 0.09 0.26 1.28 0.73
Table A.5: Structural break test statistics. 95% critical values reported;
based on sieve bootstrap with 1,000 replications.Appendix B
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B.1 Figures
Figure B.1: FT Trademark
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Figure B.2: Logo of the Scottish FT forum
B.2 Alternative preference speciﬁcations in North
B.2.1 Introducing a warm-glow term
FT intends to link Northern households with Southern farmers. This link
shows up in our model through the demand-driven employment in the FT
sector. Alternatively, we could make the relationship between consumption
in North and production in South already visible in North’s utility function.
Suppose North derives additional warm-glow from higher welfare in South.
Consider South’s indirect utility function, denoted by vS, for that matter.
Using (3.19) and (3.20), indirect utility can be expressed as
v
S =
 
αES
pX
!α  
(1 − α)ES
pY
!1−α
,
which describes a homothetic function and we can thus also write
v
S =
 
α
pX
!α  
(1 − α)
pY
!1−α
E
S. (B.2-1)
The goods market-clearing condition F = CF together with the production
function (3.13) permits rewriting South’s budget constraint as
E
S = w
S
XL
S
X + w
S
YL
S
Y + wF
CF
D
,Appendix B. Appendix Chapter 3 125
which is now a function of CF. The more altruistic consumers in North are,
the higher CF such that Southern income (and welfare by the same token)
rises in θ.
We incorporate vS as warm-glow term in North’s utility function as
follows:
U
N = (CF)
θ(v
S)
β(C
N
X)
σ(C
N
Y )
1−σ−θ, (B.2-2)
where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 such that this parameter scales the warm-glow FT
consumers feel.1 The representative household maximises (B.2-2) subject
to the usual budget constraint
pXC
N
X + pYC
N
Y + pFCF = E
N.
It can easily be shown that the constraint cannot be slack and optimality
requires all income to be spent due to strictly increasing utility. It follows
from Weierstrass’ Theorem that there has to be a global maximum within
the compact opportunity set.
We log-linearise (B.2-2) and form the Lagrangian
L = θln(CF)+βln(v
S)+σln(C
N
X)+(1−σ−θ)ln(C
N
Y )−λ

pXC
N
X + pYC
N
Y + pFCF − E
N

.
The ﬁrst order conditions are:
∂L
∂CN
X
=
σ
CN
X
− λpX = 0 (B.2-3)
∂L
∂CN
Y
=
1 − σ − θ
CN
Y
− λpY = 0 (B.2-4)
∂L
∂CF
=
θ
CF
+
β
ES
wF
D
− λpF = 0 (B.2-5)
∂L
∂λ
= pXC
N
X + pYC
N
Y + pFCF = E
N.
We know from (B.2-3) that λ = σ
pXCN
X
and thus
CN
X
CN
Y
=
pY
pX
σ
1 − σ − θ
θ
CF
+
β
ES
wF
D
=
pF
pX
σ
CN
X
pXC
N
X + pYC
N
Y + pFCF = E
N,
1We could easily introduce consumer heterogeneity by assuming a distribution for β,
say, uniform. However, the model readily implies the eﬀects of low or high values for β
and could be calibrated accordingly.Appendix B. Appendix Chapter 3 126
which describes a systems of three equations in three unknowns, the con-
sumption levels. We may use pXCN
X = σ
1−σ−θpYCN
Y and further simplify
pYC
N
Y =
1 − σ − θ
θ +
βwFCF
ESD
pFCF
σ
1 − σ − θ
pYC
N
Y + pYC
N
Y + pFCF = E
N.
The system can thus only be solved explicitly for the consumption levels, if
we abstract from the additional warm-glow (β = 0) in which case we would
arrive at the same demand functions as in (3.7), (3.8) and (3.9). In the
presence of warm-glow, we could substitute in for CF/D as done in Section
B.2.2, albeit at the expense of analytical transparency.
B.2.2 Introducing imperfect substitutability between FT
and non-FT good
Our chosen preference speciﬁcation (3.6) is consistent with empirical evi-
dence on product diﬀerentiation (see for instance Becchetti and Huybrechts
(2008)) but at odds with other theoretical studies (such as Richardson and
Stähler (2007)) that consider FT and non-FT good imperfect substitutes.
In contrast to the economic analysis of charities, as amongst others pio-
neered by Andreoni (1990), FT is a consumption-based mechanism in basic
agricultural produces that in our view can be captured by Cobb-Douglas
preferences. We do allow for corner solutions in this Section that may arise
in the presence of imperfect substitutability.
We express North’s utility function as follows:2
U
N = (C
N
X)
σ(C
N
Y + CF)
1−σ(v
S)
β, σ > 0. (B.2-6)
The Kuhn-Tucker Theorem permits distinguishing among diﬀerent cases,
where we rule out the trivial outcome of no consumption at all, given posi-
tive labour income. In particular, (B.2-6) is maximised keeping CN
Y and/or
CF slack:
max U
N = (C
N
X)
σ(C
N
Y + CF)
1−σ(v
S)
β s.t.
w
N
XL
N
X + w
N
Y L
N
Y = pXC
N
X + pYC
N
Y + pFCF = E
N
C
N
X > 0, C
N
Y ,C
N
F ≥ 0.
2We could also write (B.2-6) in terms of a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
aggregator. However, the present speciﬁcation suﬃces to illustrate the point.Appendix B. Appendix Chapter 3 127
As before, it is easy to see that South’s indirect utility function is a function
of CF and, again, the scaling parameter β lies within the [0,1] interval.
We apply the usual positive monotonic log transformation and set up
the Kuhn-Tucker Lagrangian
L = σln(C
N
X)+(1−σ)ln(C
N
Y +CF)+βln(v
S)−λ

pXC
N
X + pYC
N
Y + pFCF − E
N

.
The ﬁrst order and complementary slackness conditions are:
∂L
∂CN
X
=
σ
CN
X
− λpX = 0 (B.2-7)
∂L
∂CN
Y
=
1 − σ
CN
Y + CF
− λpY ≤ 0 (B.2-8)
∂L
∂CF
=
1 − σ
CN
Y + CF
+
β
ES
wF
D
− λpF ≤ 0 (B.2-9)
∂L
∂λ
= pXC
N
X + pYC
N
Y + pFCF = E
N (B.2-10)
C
N∗
Y ≥ 0 (B.2-11)
C
N∗
Y
"
1 − σ
CN
Y + CF
− λpY
#
= 0 (B.2-12)
C
∗
F ≥ 0 (B.2-13)
C
∗
F
"
1 − σ
CN
Y + CF
+
β
ES
wF
D
− λpF
#
= 0. (B.2-14)
Obviously, (B.2-8) rules out that both CN∗
Y = C∗
F = 0.
Let us ﬁrst consider the standard two goods Ricardian case (CN∗
X ,CN∗
Y >
0 and C∗
F = 0). We obviously obtain similar Cobb-Douglas demand func-
tions for X and Y as in South:
C
N∗
X =
σEN
pX
(B.2-15)
C
N∗
Y =
(1 − σ)EN
pY
(B.2-16)
C
∗
F = 0. (B.2-17)
Suppose consumers in North exclusively consume the FT good (say fairly
produced coﬀee as opposed to conventional coﬀee brands). To evaluate
CN∗
Y = 0 and C∗
F > 0, we are left with
σ
CN
X
− λpX = 0 (B.2-18)
1 − σ
CF
+
β
ES
wF
D
− λpF = 0 (B.2-19)
pXC
N
X + pFCF = E
N.Appendix B. Appendix Chapter 3 128
Solving (B.2-18) for λ = σ
pXCN
X
yields a system of two equations in the two
unknown consumption levels
1 − σ +
βwF
ESD
CF = σ
pF
pX
CF
CN
X
(B.2-20)
pXC
N
X + pFCF = E
N,
where, using (3.28) and (3.13), (B.2-20) can be rewritten as
CF
CN
X
=
1 − σ
σ
pX
pF
+ β
pX
pF
wFLF
σES . (B.2-21)
The resulting demand functions are
C
N∗
X =
σEN
pX[1 + β
wFLF
ES ]
(B.2-22)
C
N∗
Y = 0 (B.2-23)
C
∗
F =
(1 − σ + β
wFLF
ES )EN
pF[1 + β
wFLF
ES ]
, (B.2-24)
where the usual Cobb-Douglas results prevail in the absence of warm-glow
(i.e. β = 0). For β > 0, there is an additional term depending on wages and
employment in the FT sector as well as overall wealth in South. Demand for
X, for example, not only rises in its preference parameter (σ) and overall
income (EN) but also falls, next to its price (pX), in the parameter β.
Moreover, higher wages (in our model driven by µ) and employment in the
FT sector lower demand for X. The warm-glow eﬀect is dampened if South’s
wealth increases. The demand functions deliver intuitive implications and
eﬀectively illustrate the ceteris paribus eﬀects of fair wages and employment
in the FT sector on warm-glow. One would indeed expect that warm-glow
is strongest, if a relatively large portion of farmers in South beneﬁts from
higher wages.
We analyse in the following whether similar implications arise in the
empirically more relevant three goods case. The case in which all optimal
consumption levels are supposed to occur at the interior of the opportunity
set gives a system of four equations in four unknowns:
σ
CN
X
− λpX = 0 (B.2-25)
1 − σ
CN
Y + CF
− λpY = 0 (B.2-26)
1 − σ
CN
Y + CF
+
β
ES
wF
D
− λpF = 0 (B.2-27)
pXC
N
X + pYC
N
Y + pFCF = E
N.Appendix B. Appendix Chapter 3 129
The optimal consumption levels are derived as follows. First, solve for λ in
(B.2-25) as above and eliminate in others. This gives
1 − σ
CN
Y + CF
=
σ
pXCN
X
pY (B.2-28)
1 − σ
CN
Y + CF
+ β
wF
ESD
=
σ
pXCN
X
pF (B.2-29)
pXC
N
X + pYC
N
Y + pFCF = E
N.
Ratios of marginal utility (in (B.2-28) and (B.2-29) if rearranged) are identi-
cal to relative prices. This is a system of three equations in three unknowns,
the consumption levels. Now use pXCN
X = σ
1−σ(CN
Y + CN
F )pY from (B.2-28)
to eliminate CN
X. We are thus left with two equations in two unknowns
1 − σ
CN
Y + CF
+ β
wF
ESD
=
1 − σ
CN
Y + CF
pF
pY
(B.2-30)
σ
1 − σ
(C
N
Y + CF)pY + pYC
N
Y + pFCF = E
N,
where we can rewrite (B.2-30)
β
wF
ESD
=
1 − σ
CN
Y + CF
 
pF
pY
− 1
!
(B.2-31)
such that (B.2-31) shows a crucial aspect of optimal behaviour. If β = 0,
that is if Northern consumers do not feel additional warm-glow from con-
suming FT products, this equation only holds if pF = pY. After all, (B.2-6)
assigns the same preference parameter for both types of goods. An impli-
cation of this result is that β really measures the degree of substitutability.
Without the notion of warm-glow, both goods are perfect substitutes and
consumers are hence indiﬀerent between consuming the two. Now, what if
β > 0? We ﬁrst see that there is no solution either if pF < pY. The right
hand side of (B.2-31) is negative in this case, yet consumption cannot be
negative. Economically speaking, if pF < pY, i.e. the fair good yielding
higher utility is cheaper, there is no reason to consume the normal Y good.
If pF = pY, there is no solution either as this implies that only the fair good
is consumed. The system seems to suggest the existence of a solution, iﬀ
pF > pY.
Provided that pF > pY and hence β > 0, we obtain
pYC
N
Y =
(1 − σ)ESD[pF − pY]
βwF
− pYCFAppendix B. Appendix Chapter 3 130
thus
C
∗
F =
EN
pF − pY
−
ESD
βwF
,
which gives
C
N∗
Y =
ESD[(1 − σ)
pF
pY + σ]
βwF
−
EN
pF − pY
,
and with CN∗
X = σ
1−σ
pY
pX(CN∗
Y + C∗
F), demand functions in a world in which
households wish to consume all three goods are:
C
N∗
X =
σESD[pF − pY]
pXβwF
(B.2-32)
C
N∗
Y =
ESD[(1 − σ)
pF
pY + σ]
βwF
−
EN
pF − pY
(B.2-33)
C
N∗
F =
EN
pF − pY
−
ESD
βwF
. (B.2-34)
Compared to the previous cases, the three goods scenario yields rather un-
tidy demand functions. An important determinant of the decision between
consuming FT good as opposed to the non-FT good is the price diﬀerential
between the two. The absence of income eﬀects (similar to quasilinear spec-
iﬁcations) for the demand for X is striking. There still seems to be the idea
of warm-glow, depending on fair wages and thus µ, but it is rather hidden.
While we obtain non-trivial demand functions for all three goods, they
somewhat lack analytical transparency. This is largely due to the introduc-
tion of the warm-glow term. As the analysis suggests, β > 0 is the only
meaningful way to capture the notion of altruism, that is consumers being
willing to pay a price premium for an otherwise similar good. We there-
fore consider the path we take using (3.6) a more elegant way of capturing
altruism, whilst at the same time allowing for greater analytical tractability.
B.3 Derivations
B.3.1 Conditions for complete specialisation
The international terms of trade discussed in the main text and derived in
more detail below need to satisfy several conditions for the assumption of
complete specialisation to sustain. We discuss those in this section.
Following the logic of the original Ricardian analysis, let us ﬁrst consider
both countries in isolation. It is straightforward to see that in autarky (aut.)Appendix B. Appendix Chapter 3 131
relative prices equal domestic relative productivities and hence measure
opportunity costs of production:
pY
pX
|aut. =
Ai
Bi, i = N,S.
We postulate that North has a comparative cost advantage in producing X:
AN
BN >
AS
BS.
This implies that Y is in autarky in South relatively cheaper than in North:
pY
pX
|aut.N >
pY
pX
|aut.S
South will therefore only have an incentive to trade Y internationally, if
terms of trade at least match domestic market prices:
pY
pX
≥
pY
pX
|aut.S =
AS
BS. (B.3-1)
Similarly, North will only open up for trade, if
pY
pX
≤
pY
pX
|aut.N =
AN
BN , (B.3-2)
such that international terms of trade have to lie between relative autarky
prices:
AS
BS ≤
pY
pX
≤
AN
BN . (B.3-3)
Either country does not specialise completely, if terms of trade coincide with
relative prices under autarky as in this case the amount of X that can be
produced per unit of Y domestically equals the relative prices oﬀered on
global markets. It follows from the notion of comparative advantage that
at least one country needs to specialise completely.3
Countries will always specialise in line with their comparative cost ad-
vantage but several conditions need to be satisﬁed to rule out the case that
one of the countries only specialises partially. Intuitively, if one economy
is relatively large compared to the other, it might need to produce both
goods just like in autarky to ensure all domestic demand is met. If the
(large) economy remains incompletely specialised, intersectoral labour mo-
bility implies that a single nominal wage rate must prevail in both active
3If (B.3-3) held with strict equality (pY /pX = AS/BS = AN/BN), there would not
be any comparative cost diﬀerences and hence no scope for international trade to arise.Appendix B. Appendix Chapter 3 132
sectors. Terms of trade then follow in a straightforward fashion. Suppose
that North is incompletely specialised. Proﬁt maximisation in North and
South yields:
w
N = pXA
N = pYB
N
w
S = pYB
S
and as a result international terms equal relative prices under autarky in
North. The same line of reasoning applies to the case of partial specialisation
in South.
We have therefore established that countries will only specialise com-
pletely, if international terms of trade lie strictly between domestic relative
productivities such that the equality case in (B.3-3) needs to be ruled out.
We can solve our FT model (see below) to obtain relative country wages:
wS
wN =
 
1 − σ
α
−
θµ
1 + µ
!
LN
LS (B.3-4)
wF
wN =
 
(1 − σ)(1 + µ)
α
− θµ
!
LN
LS . (B.3-5)
In the benchmark Ricardian outcome (µ = 0), two components determine
the specialisation pattern: the countries’ relative size (LN
LS ) and relative
preferences (1−σ
α ). The model augmented by FT delivers two additional
factors: the interaction between altruistic spending and wage mark-up (θµ)
and the mark-up itself (1 + µ) pin down relative wages.
Thus, the following results emerge under FT. First, and not too re-
strictive, it has to hold that
θµ
1+µ < 1−σ
α to ensure positive terms of trade.
The economic intuition is that the combination of (relative) mark-up and
altruistic spending should not dominate the conventional determinants of
specialisation under free trade. Second, (B.3-4) and (B.3-5) suggest a nat-
ural measure in terms of relative preferences, mark-up, altruistic spending
and relative size according to which the specialisation pattern in North and
South evolves.
Figure B.1 illustrates the diﬀerent cases by means of the number line.
Note that BS
BN has to be to the right of AS
AN because of the assumed direction
of comparative advantage. The focus is on preferences since LN = LS. As
discussed above, the measure has to lie between AS
AN and BS
BN for complete
specialisation to arise – indicated by the shaded area.
If both countries are completely specialised in line with their compar-
ative cost advantage, it follows for South that LS = LY + LF. The wage
diﬀerential created by (1 + µ) does aﬀect specialisation, however.Appendix B. Appendix Chapter 3 133
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Figure B.1: Area of complete specialisation
Figure B.2 illustrates the eﬀects of the presence of the additional FT
sector. We see from (B.3-5) that as long as D = BS, the measure (now
adjusted by the mark-up) shrinks the shaded area (indicated by the dotted
line). FT therefore reduces the scope for complete specialisation and is
hence only to some extent compatible with a Ricardian world of comparative
advantage. This eﬀect is relaxed (and potentially oﬀset), however, if FT
does raise workers’ productivity (D > BS) as indicated by the additional
lightly shaded area created in Figure B.2.
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B.3.2 Allocation of labour across sectors in South in gen-
eral equilibrium
Using the demand functions and technologies in North and South we can
write the equilibrium conditions for the goods markets as follows
A
NL
N =
σwNLN + αwS(LS + µLF)
pX
(B.3-6)
B
SLY =
(1 − σ − θ)wNLN + (1 − α)wS(LS + µLF)
pY
(B.3-7)
DLF =
θwNLN
pF
. (B.3-8)
World prices follow from the ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order conditions:
pX =
wN
AN (B.3-9)
pY =
wS
BS (B.3-10)
pF =
wF
D
=
(1 + µ)wS
D
. (B.3-11)
Expressions (B.3-9), (B.3-10) and (B.3-11) allow us to write (B.3-6), (B.3-7)
and (B.3-8) in terms of relative costs as follows
wS
wN =
(1 − σ)LN
α(LS + µLF)
(B.3-12)
wS
wN =
(1 − σ − θ)LN
αLY − (1 − α)(1 + µ)LF
(B.3-13)
wS
wN =
θLN
(1 + µ)LF
, (B.3-14)
where obviously (1−σ) measures all (remaining) income spent on both FT
and non-FT good.
Using (B.3-14) together with South’s full employment condition in (B.3-
12) and (B.3-13), we obtain a system of two equations in two unknowns,
the endogenous employment levels in Y and F
θLN
(1 + µ)LF
=
(1 − σ)LN
α(LY + (1 + µ)LF)
θLN
(1 + µ)LF
=
(1 − σ − θ)LN
αLY − (1 − α)(1 + µ)LF
,Appendix B. Appendix Chapter 3 135
which can be solved for the relative employment levels as follows
LY
LF
=
(1 − σ)(1 + µ)
αθ
− (1 + µ) (B.3-15)
LY
LF
=
(1 − σ)(1 + µ)
αθ
− (1 + µ). (B.3-16)
(B.3-15) and (B.3-16) suggest that there is indeed a unique solution.
Solving for LY
LY =
 
(1 − σ)(1 + µ)
αθ
− (1 + µ)
!
LF
and using the fact that LS = LY + LF gives
LY =
 
(1 − σ)(1 + µ)
αθ
− (1 + µ)
!
(L
S − LY)
we are thus left with
LY =
 
1 −
αθ
(1 − σ)(1 + µ) − αθµ
!
L
S
and hence
LF =
αθ
(1 − σ)(1 + µ) − αθµ
L
S.
Equations (3.24) and (3.25) 
B.3.3 International terms of trade
The allocation of labour in N and S determines production, consumption
and ultimately international terms of trade. As shown in B.3.2, (B.3-12),
(B.3-13) and (B.3-14) are identical. Using (B.3-14) and (3.25) as derived,
we can thus uniquely determine relative wages:
wS
wN =
(1 − σ)(1 + µ) − αθµ
(1 + µ)α
LN
LS . (B.3-17)
Relative prices in terms of the numeraire good follow from the ﬁrms’
ﬁrst-order conditions (B.3-9), (B.3-10) and (B.3-11):
pY
pX
=
(1 − σ)(1 + µ) − αθµ
(1 + µ)α
LN
LS
AN
BS
pF
pX
=
(1 − σ)(1 + µ) − αθµ
α
LN
LS
AN
D
Equations (3.30) and (3.31) Appendix B. Appendix Chapter 3 136
B.3.4 Social welfare function
The welfare analysis is based on the concept of utilitarian welfare which
weights individual utility equally. The Benthamite social welfare function
is maximised, if overall welfare (Uw) comprising both North and South
is largest. Substituting the Marshallian demand in the domestic utility
functions, we obtain indirect utility as a function of prices and income
U
w =
 
θEN
pF
!θ  
σEN
pX
!σ  
(1 − σ − θ)EN
pY
!1−σ−θ
+
 
αES
pX
!α  
(1 − α)ES
pY
!1−α
.
We can use the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order conditions as above and also the fact that
EN = wNLN = pXANLN and ES = wS(LS + µLF) = pYBS(LS + µLF) to
obtain
U
w =
 
θαDLS
(1 − σ)(1 + µ) − αθµ
!θ 
σA
NL
N
σ
 
(1 − σ − θ)α(1 + µ)BSLS
(1 − σ)(1 + µ) − αθµ
!1−σ−θ
+

(1 − σ)A
NL
N
α
 
(1 − α)B
SL
S
"
1 +
αθµ
(1 − σ)(1 + µ) − αθµ
#!1−α
,
where we have chosen X as numeraire. Equation (3.33) Appendix C
Appendix Chapter 4
C.1 Steady state
The model is solved based on its deterministic long-run equilibrium. As
in the main text, the steady-state values are denoted by an asterisk as
superscript. The model is described by (4.26) to (4.39) and the monetary
policy rule.
The stationary steady state is described by the following set of thirteen
non-linear equations in the endogenous real variables {CS∗,CU∗,NS∗,NU∗,
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
WS
P
∗
,

WU
P
∗
,bS∗,bU∗,τ∗,Y ∗,

Π
P
∗
,mc∗,r∗}:
Ψ
S(N
S∗
)
ϕS
= (C
S∗
)
−σ
 
W S
P
!∗
(C.1-1)
Ψ
U(N
U∗
)
ϕU
= (C
U∗
)
−σ
 
W U
P
!∗
(C.1-2)
W S∗
W U∗ =
δS∗
δU∗
 
sNS∗
(1 − s)NU∗
!− 1
ρ
(C.1-3)
1 + Ω
Sb
S∗
= r
∗β
S (C.1-4)
1 + Ω
Ub
U∗
= r
∗β
U (C.1-5)
C
S∗
+ b
S∗
+
1
2
Ω
S(b
S∗
)
2 + τ
∗ =
ΠS∗
P ∗ + r
∗b
S∗
+
W S∗
P ∗ N
S∗
(C.1-6)
C
U∗
+ b
U∗
+
1
2
Ω
U(b
U∗
)
2 + τ
∗ = r
∗b
U∗
+
W U∗
P ∗ N
U∗
(C.1-7)
sb
S∗
+ (1 − s)b
U∗
= ¯ b
∗ (C.1-8)
τ
∗
t = ¯ b
∗
R∗
π∗ − 1

(C.1-9)
Y
∗ =
"
δ
S∗
(sN
S∗
)
ρ−1
ρ + δ
U∗ 
(1 − s)N
U∗ ρ−1
ρ
# ρ
ρ−1
(C.1-10)
s
Π∗
P ∗ = Y
∗

1 −
MC∗
P ∗

(C.1-11)
MC∗
P ∗ =
θ − 1
θ
(C.1-12)
mc
∗ =

(δ
S∗
)
ρ
 
W S∗
P ∗
!1−ρ
+ (δ
U∗
)
ρ
 
W U∗
P ∗
!1−ρ

1
1−ρ
(C.1-13)
The monetary authority sets interest rates in line with its inﬂation target,
where the following equilibrium relationship holds: r∗ = R∗/π∗. Given
values for the structural parameters, the system can be solved for its steady
state, where we have checked for determinacy of the solution.
C.2 The economy with homogeneous labour
C.2.1 Model
We analyse in this Appendix the benchmark scenario of homogeneous labour
to obtain a better both quantitative and qualitative feeling of the model.
Dropping the i superscript implies that we no longer distinguish betweenAppendix C. Appendix Chapter 4 139
skilled and unskilled households and our model can thus be fully described
in absolute terms. We want to investigate how the MPR operates in an
otherwise standard NK model under the chosen calibration. In particular,
we resort to values selected for the skilled households as those are more in
line with the benchmark NK model. We thus reinstate ﬁnancial market
completeness in the presence of homogeneous consumers. Our model can
now be represented as follows.
The household’s ﬁrst order conditions are as in the benchmark NK
framework:
Ψ(Nt)
ϕ = (Ct)
−σWt
Pt
(C.2-1)
1
Rt
= βEt
(Ct+1
Ct
−σ 1
πt+1
)
. (C.2-2)
As a result of homogeneous input factors, the time-varying weight δt remains
normalised at 1 for all t and (4.14) simpliﬁes to a linear production function
in labour:
Yt(j) = AtNt(j), (C.2-3)
which implies the usual form of real marginal costs:
mct =
Wt/Pt
At
. (C.2-4)
These four equations together with the goods market clearing condition
and (4.36), (4.39) as well as the policy rule represent a system of eight equa-
tions in {Ct,Nt, Wt
Pt ,Yt, Πt
Pt,mct,rt,πt} that describe the economy’s unique
equilibrium.
C.2.2 Steady state
The model’s deterministic steady state is characterised by the following set
of equations:
Y
∗ = A
∗N
∗ = C
∗ (C.2-5)
Ψ(N
∗)
ϕ = (C
∗)
−σ w
∗ (C.2-6)
r
∗ =
1
β
(C.2-7)
mc
∗ =
w∗
t
A∗
t
=
θ − 1
θ
(C.2-8)
Π∗
P ∗ = Y
∗ [1 − mc
∗], (C.2-9)
where w denotes the real wage.Appendix C. Appendix Chapter 4 140
C.2.3 Log-linear representation
We present in this Section a log-linearised version of the model’s equilibrium
conditions with homogeneous labour. Let ˆ x denote the relative deviation of
xt from its stationary state level x∗.1 The relevant expressions log-linearise
as:
ˆ Yt = ˆ At + ˆ Nt (C.2-10)
ˆ Yt = ˆ Ct (C.2-11)
d mct = ˆ wt − ˆ At (C.2-12)
ϕ ˆ Nt = −σ ˆ Ct + ˆ wt (C.2-13)
ˆ Ct = Et ˆ Ct+1 −
1
σ

ˆ Rt − Eˆ πt+1

(C.2-14)
φˆ πt − φβEtˆ πt+1 = θ
w∗
A∗ d mct + φβEt(σ ˆ Ct − σ ˆ Ct+1 + (C.2-15)
ˆ Yt+1 − ˆ Yt) (C.2-16)
ˆ At = ρA ˆ At−1 + 
A
t (C.2-17)
Note that the Rotemberg-type NKPC (C.2-16) corresponds to the linearised
form of the NKPC under Calvo (1983) pricing upon suitable reparametrisa-
tions.2 The NKPC together with the consumption Euler equation (C.2-14)
– commonly referred to as dynamic IS curve – and some exogenously speci-
ﬁed variant of the monetary policy rule form the backbone of the workhorse
NK model and can be used to conduct various policy exercises.
C.2.4 Simulation outcomes
We can simulate in a next step the model’s response to an aggregate tech-
nology shock as introduced in the main text – see Appendix C.3.2 for the
graphical output. We again diﬀerentiate between the diﬀerent monetary
policy stances described by variants of (4.25), in particular a simple linear
MPR as well as a MPR that also responds to deviations from the steady
state output.
Figure C.2 shows the impulses under Rules I and II. There is the usual in-
crease of output and consumption to a favourable (+1%) technology shock.
The increase in aggregate productivity raises the workers’ wages and the
ﬁrms’ proﬁtability. The improvement in technology is accommodated by
1Thus, ˆ x = dxt
x∗ ≈ ln(xt) − ln(x∗). Also see Uhlig (1995) for a “toolkit” approach.
2However, with the crucial diﬀerence that with quadratic price adjustment costs we
do not need require the gross steady state inﬂation rate being equal to one.Appendix C. Appendix Chapter 4 141
the central bank which lowers interest rates and thus boosts consumption.
Given the forward-looking nature of the model, there is a decline in inﬂa-
tion with the eﬀects being stronger under Rule I. Moreover, hours worked
decline consistent with empirical evidence for the U.S.
C.3 Figures
C.3.1 The model with heterogeneous labour
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Figure C.1: Simple MPR, dashed line refers to Rule IIAppendix C. Appendix Chapter 4 142
C.3.2 The model with homogeneous labour
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Figure C.2: Simple MPR, dashed line refers to Rule IIAppendix C. Appendix Chapter 4 143
C.3.3 Ramsey plans
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Figure C.3: Ramsey plan for diﬀerent utility weighting patternsBibliography
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